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Executive Summary 
With the contours and implications of the Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (EPAs) between the European Union (EU)1 and the African, Carib-
bean and Pacific (ACP) countries becoming visible and real, the focus in the 
debate is shifting from the negotiation of the agreements to the challenges 
of their potential implementation from 2008 onwards. This study aims to 
contribute to this ongoing debate, in which the need to closely monitor the 
agreements is more and more emphasized, by making concrete recommen-
dations on how different options for monitoring EPAs could be integrated 
into their legal text and realized in practice.2  
These recommendations are informed by an in-depth exploration of four 
key dimensions (Figure 1). 
1. EPA monitoring in short 
There is an increased awareness of and openness to the importance of moni-
toring the implementation and impact of EPAs, but so far few have reflected 
on the possible structures and details of a monitoring mechanism. Some 
questions will have to be addressed after the signing of an EPA, while oth-
ers should better be clarified beforehand and possibly be included into the 
legally binding agreement to ensure the establishment of a credible and 
effective monitoring system.  
Why monitor? 
Different parties involved in EPA negotiations are putting increasing em-
phasis on the importance of having a mechanism to monitor EPA imple-
mentation and impacts. The main motivation is to ensure that the develop-
ment dimension of EPAs is adequately addressed. More concretely, the 
objective of EPA monitoring is to assess compliance of the commitments
 
                                                          
1  The term European Union is here used in the broad sense, irrespective of competencies, and 
is meant to refer to the European Community and/or its Member States, within their respec-
tive competence as derived from the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
2  For recent calls for comprehensive EPA-monitoring, refer to the conclusions on EPAs of the 
General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of 15 May 2007 (Council of the 
European Union 2007), as well as the Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) on EPAs, con-
ducted by Price Waterhouse Coopers for the European Commission (PwC 2007). 
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made as well as outcomes and impacts of their implementation. EPA moni-
toring should further aim at ensuring that parties have the capacity to im-
plement EPAs and take advantage of the new partnership agreements. Such 
monitoring and evaluation can then feed into the EPA-related national, 
regional and ACP-EU policy making processes (including development 
assistance provided by the EU), and could trigger adjustment and remedial 
measures. 
  
Figure 1:   Key dimensions of EPA monitoring 
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Source:    own design 
What to monitor? 
The content of a monitoring exercise will be largely dependant on the actual 
EPA legal text and on the underlying economic settings (assets, production, 
consumption and trade structures and sensitivities as well as national and 
regional capacities) and will therefore differ between different regions and 
countries. Moreover, stakeholders involved in the exercise will have differ-
ent focuses and expectations regarding the content and main priorities of a 
monitoring exercise. In any case monitoring can encompass: 
Monitoring Economic Partnership Agreements 
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− The capacity to implement EPAs: In order to ensure that EPAs can be 
implemented properly, the parties have to monitor the degree of capacity 
of different stakeholders to comply with EPA provisions, benefit from 
them and put in place the relevant accompanying measures. This would 
also help to identify capacity building needs.  
− The implementation of EPA provisions (including on development coop-
eration): For compliance purposes and to reassure that monitored results 
are in fact a result of EPAs, the parties will have to monitor the imple-
mentation of EPA provisions. This should include EPA-accompanying 
development cooperation measures such as capacity building. 
− Results of EPAs: Monitoring the results (outputs, outcomes and impacts) 
of EPAs should aim at triggering policy adjustments, appropriate ac-
companying measures, EPA in-built adjustment measures such as safe-
guards, and possibly the revision of some provisions of the agreement, 
where relevant. 
− The enabling environment: EPAs will not happen in a vacuum and thus 
have to be seen in the broader environment, which ideally should be ena-
bling but can also be adverse and override EPA influences. To ensure 
that EPAs will deliver on their objectives, accompanying domestic 
measures will have to be adopted. In order to capture which (monitored 
or otherwise stated) changes are in fact related to EPAs and which are re-
lated to other factors, which is fundamental for choosing the appropriate 
accompanying measures, at least some framework conditions will have 
to be monitored, too. 
The object of the actual monitoring system will most probably be a mix of 
these different areas, which are interlinked. Due to the potentially very 
broad range of monitoring areas, prioritization or sequencing will be neces-
sary, which should reflect the key objectives of each EPA as well as the 
different ACP national or regional contexts and priorities. The broader the 
scope of the monitoring exercise, the stronger the need to establish syner-
gies with other (existing) policy monitoring mechanisms at national and 
regional levels. Besides avoiding duplication and unnecessary demands on 
ACP national or regional administrations and relevant non-state actors
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(NSA3), this will also increase the consistency and efficiency of monitoring 
while reducing costs. 
In this study EPA monitoring is thus defined as follows: 
EPA monitoring is the systematic collection of data through different 
approaches that make it possible 
a) to check the compliance of the signatories with the agreement; 
b) to follow the implementation of the policies and measures convened 
within EPAs or accompanying them; 
c) to provide plausible indications of the results that EPAs produce. 
This includes tracking whether the EPAs have the positive impact in 
terms of trade and development set out in the agreements and the 
Cotonou Partnership Agreement, and particularly tracking undesired 
effects and impacts and signalling them to EU and ACP decision-
makers as well as indications on underlying reasons for these effects 
in order to assist in informing results-based adjustments. 
How to monitor? 
A review of the different methodologies used for policy monitoring and im-
pact assessment indicates that ‘result chain analysis’ appears to offer the most 
appropriate approach for monitoring EPAs. For the purpose of monitoring, 
according to the capacities available and targets of the monitoring, result 
chains can be developed for different sectors, development dimensions or 
domains. These result chains start with the EPA-induced policy changes and 
the accompanying measures that would be necessary in the sector. Using this 
basis, induced effects towards the development goals of EPAs can be con-
structed, both direct and indirect, positive and negative and for different 
stakeholders. Indicators then have to be identified for the crucial steps in these 
results chains to measure progress towards goals. These indicators may be 
quantitative or qualitative, and may be measured with different methodolo-
gies. Special provisions have to be made to capture unexpected results, par-
ticularly negative ones, for instance a complaint mechanism. 
                                                          
3  Non-state actors in EU terminology particularly encompass private sector and civil society; 
see footnote 27. 
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The exact choice of methodologies used may differ from one region or 
country to another, and different areas to be monitored will require differ-
ent methods to identify impact paths, indicators and approaches to collect-
ing evidence. Moreover, the final decision on methodologies used will also 
depend on the availability of data and analytical capacities in each country 
and region. In many countries a major task of the monitoring exercise will 
consist in collecting and generating data which are not yet readily avail-
able. The quality of the data collected will also have to be checked. Col-
lecting reliable data is essential for any assessment to be sound, reliable 
and suitable as an acceptable basis for further (participatory) decision-
making.  
One particular challenge will be to make monitoring comparable across 
countries and, even more difficult, EPA regions. A major task of regional 
bodies will be to ensure regional coherence of the country approaches, to 
create awareness of and debate over EPA results, to trigger in-built correc-
tive measures such as safeguards and to programme with the EU and de-
velopment partners regional adjustments and accompanying measures. 
2.   Stakeholders and key principles of a monitoring mechanism 
EPAs are very complex agreements which are concluded between the 
European Union, a supranational entity, and its member states on the one 
hand and the regional ACP groupings with their respective member states 
on the other hand.4 The implementation of EPAs will thus affect a great 
number of different stakeholders in the EU and ACP countries operating at 
different levels. These stakeholders include continental (in the case of 
Africa, where there is a commitment to harmonise EPAs across the re-
gional groups), regional and national, governmental and non-governmental 
organisations, commercial private enterprises and their interest groups, 
farmers and their organisations, other non-profit organisations, as well as 
the population at large. 
These stakeholders have different economic and political interests, which 
are reflected in different views on the ideal institutional features and moni-
toring mechanisms for EPAs. Moreover, this variety of stakeholders and 
                                                          
4  Some ACP regional entities like ECOWAS, further, do have a legal status and will thus be 
signatory partners of the agreement. 
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interests means that the information produced by an EPA-monitoring 
mechanism is a highly political commodity which will be used to defend 
these interests and this influence and draw benefits from the EPAs. It is 
important to carefully reflect on the design of an EPA-monitoring mecha-
nism, in order to mitigate bias towards one or the other group of stake-
holders.  
For the same purpose, it appears important to involve a broad variety of 
stakeholders in the process of reflection on institutional modalities for EPA 
monitoring and later in the process of monitoring itself. This can help to 
generate acceptance for a more evidence-based approach to policy making 
in the field of trade and related development cooperation, a broad owner-
ship of the monitoring mechanism. To ensure credibility, accountability 
and ownership, the monitoring exercise should involve not only govern-
ment officials but also parliamentarians, representatives from the private 
sector and civil society. Moreover, specific efforts will be needed to ensure 
that representatives of vulnerable and marginalised groups take part in the 
monitoring exercise and can make use of the information generated.  
Monitoring should take place both at regional and national level. The task 
division between both levels can follow the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. the 
regional level would only perform those monitoring tasks that cannot be 
effectively exercised at the national level. Given the limited capacities for 
monitoring trade and development in many ACP countries, and even more so 
within regional organisations, setting up an EPA-monitoring mechanism will 
require capacity building at both levels. These investments seem to be justi-
fied by the importance of EPAs and the potentially crucial role monitoring 
can play to improve the coherence and effectiveness of trade and develop-
ment policies. 
However, as mentioned above, EPA monitoring should avoid duplicating 
efforts and functions of existing institutions. It should be linked to other 
relevant monitoring mechanisms where possible (e.g. those designed in the 
context of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers – PRSPs - and aid for trade 
monitoring), and to existing joint ACP-EU institutions when appropriate. 
At the same time, a complex and heavy institutional design should be 
avoided, as experience shows that this tends to be an obstacle to timely 
production of information and a smooth functioning of monitoring mecha-
nisms. 
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3.   Key issues and way forward for monitoring EPAs 
In order to make the monitoring mechanism useful and operational, it is 
important to establish some key guidelines as part of the EPA provi-
sions. The first task is thus to identify those features that should be cov-
ered by the legal text. After an agreement is signed some steps will be 
necessary to develop a workable and effective monitoring of EPA im-
plementation and impacts. Drawing on key messages of this study, and 
without trying to identify the precise mechanism and substance of EPA 
monitoring (that most likely will vary from region to region and country 
to country depending on the different contexts and priorities), some 
options for provisions to be included in the EPA texts, as well as rec-
ommendations on the process to make it operational, are summarised in 
the following sections. 
3.1   What to include in the legal EPA text? 
It is likely that EPA monitoring that is not thoroughly embedded in the 
EPA legal texts, as regards the function, the scope, the participation and 
the use of the monitoring results, will be of little relevance for accom-
panying EPAs in the future. For the establishment of an effective and 
workable monitoring mechanism it is therefore important that the design 
and process of monitoring be carefully thought out. Yet, to be of use, a 
monitoring mechanism must remain flexible and adaptable to unforeseen 
and evolving circumstances. 
In determining the appropriate provisions on monitoring in an EPA text, the 
key considerations should be to provide for the conditions needed for the 
establishments of a credible, transparent, workable and effective monitoring 
mechanism. These could include clusters of provisions that are summarised 
in the following table: 
Clusters of 
provisions 
Summary of options for including monitoring in legal text 
of the agreements 
i.  
Principles 
Include the commitments of the EU and ACP to monitor 
implementation and results in line with agreed principles. 
Key principles for monitoring can be committed to with 
reference to the Cotonou Agreement. 
Michael Brüntrup et al.
 German Development Institute 8 
ii. 
Key func- 
tions 
Specifying the main functions of monitoring in the EPA text 
will clarify the main purpose of monitoring as well as how 
the resulting information will feed into envisaged review, 
adjustment and support arrangements. 
iii.  
Scope 
Specifying the content of monitoring (implementation, capaci-
ties, impact, framework conditions) will prevent such decisions 
from being left to the discretion of one of the partners. 
iv. 
Use of  
results 
Defining the ‘response’ dimension of monitoring in a legally 
binding manner would contribute to the effectiveness and 
credibility of the monitoring process and the EPA itself. The 
results may help to design trade-related assistance or safe-
guards, feed into periodic formal EPA reviews, contribute to 
the identification of appropriate remedial measures and can 
be used to increase public awareness and transparency, e.g. 
by spelling out a ‘public disclosure policy’. 
v.  
Institu- 
tional  
setting 
The EPA can specify the roles and responsibilities of differ-
ent institutions and actors involved in the national, regional 
and joint ACP-EU monitoring bodies according to the princi-
ples, the functions, the scope, the capacities and the sensitivi-
ties of stakeholders. This includes options for “outsourcing” 
monitoring tasks to independent parties. 
vi.  
Coopera-
tion and 
develop-
ment 
assistance 
The EPA could also include provisions which specify the 
European Union's support to the operation of the EPA 
monitoring (such as the setting up and operationalization of 
the monitoring mechanism, the collection and analysis of 
data, and the participation of different actors). 
vii.  
Approaches 
and  
procedures 
Defining the basic methodological and procedural framework 
for the monitoring process could help to ensure the estab-
lishment and integration of the monitoring process. The EPA 
text could additionally include some broad principles for an 
envisaged periodic review process by specifying the key 
development objectives or targets against which the agree-
ment's outcomes will be assessed as well as how the monitor-
ing information will be used in this process. 
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The following gives an overview of what could be included in an EPA legal 
text. The list is neither exhaustive nor to be seen as an ‘either-or’ choice but 
tries to structure the different elements that could be agreed on in an EPA 
legal text. In discussing such different elements (e.g. principles, key func-
tions of monitoring, etc.), a choice will have to be made firstly on whether 
or not to include (clusters of) provisions for each specific element and sec-
ondly in how much detail those provisions should regulate the respective 
area. In this context, it has to be kept in mind that the benefit of greater 
concreteness always has to be balanced against flexibility. 
i.   Principles of monitoring 
Basic objective  
In order to follow up EPA implementation and ensure that it generates posi-
tive results, monitoring will be essential. To ensure that such a monitoring 
mechanism becomes fully operational and effective, it may be useful to 
contractualise the commitment of both parties to monitor implementation 
and results of EPAs on the basis of agreed principles. 
Options 
i. Contractualising the principles of monitoring can be done in differ-
rent ways and in different parts of the agreement. 
ii. The introduction/preamble of the agreement could refer to the need to 
regularly monitor implementation and results of the agreement. 
ii. A monitoring chapter in the agreement could contain detailed provi-
sions on the design, institutions and functions of monitoring. Rele-
vant chapters could explicitly refer to the need for monitoring. 
Principles would indicate the fundamental features of the monitoring exer-
cise (e.g. ownership, transparency, mutual accountability, participation) and 
could either be newly established or refer to those agreed in the broader 
ACP-EU cooperation framework (as embodied in the CPA). 
ii.   Key functions of monitoring 
Basic objectives   
In order to prevent monitoring from becoming an end in itself, it is neces-
sary to reach an agreement on the purposes and related functions of an 
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EPA-monitoring mechanism. Specifying the main functions of monitoring 
in the legal EPA text would enhance the credibility of the monitoring exer-
cise. It should notably clarify the main purposes of monitoring (e.g. raise 
awareness and spread information, facilitate participatory opinion making 
on results, watch compliance, trigger safeguards, guide accompanying 
measures, etc.) and specify how the parties will use the results of the moni-
toring exercise, feeding them into policy making processes. 
Options 
A provision on key functions of monitoring could be rather vague and in-
clude only general functions of monitoring (like control, learning and ac-
countability) or its broad overall objectives (such as facilitating implemen-
tation of EPA and related further policy changes in a manner that fosters 
sustainable development of ACP countries).  
Alternatively, it could be more specific, defining the concrete functions of 
monitoring the implementation of an EPA as well as the implications of 
EPA monitoring for the EPA policy cycle, from identification of problems 
(gathering of information) to assessment of changes required (information 
analysis) and to policy changes (decision-making by the parties). 
iii.   Scope of monitoring 
Basic objectives 
Parties may agree to define the scope of monitoring in the EPA legal text. 
This will serve the aim of better defining what should be monitored and not 
leaving it to the interpretation or discretion of one of the parties.  
Options 
i. The text could explicitly mention that compliance with and im-
pacts of EPAs will be monitored, as well as the capacity devel-
opment needs of the involved stakeholders and the framework 
conditions in which EPAs will take place. 
ii. Another option would be to have a formal monitoring process 
contractualised in the agreement while parts of monitoring would 
be ‘outsourced’ to independent institutions (e.g. compliance by 
government, impact on certain sectors by independent institu-
tions). This may imply that only those areas are mentioned in the 
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legal texts that are monitored by official EPA-monitoring bodies. 
Monitoring areas to be contractualised in an EPA can include: 
− The capacity to implement EPAs (i.e. capacity to comply 
with EPA commitments); 
− The implementation of EPA provisions (including on devel-
opment  cooperation); 
− Results (outputs, outcomes and impacts) of EPAs; 
− The enabling environment. 
iii. In addition to areas broadly defined as above, parties could agree 
to include in the text provisions on what to monitor exactly, in 
terms of implementation and results, either under certain chapters 
of the agreement (e.g. trade rules) or under a specific monitoring 
chapter, which could potentially outline the key areas to be moni-
tored. 
iv.   Use of results 
Basic objectives 
The primary aim of monitoring is to ensure that the results feed back into the 
design and implementation of the agreement or accompanying measures. 
Defining the ‘response’ dimension of monitoring – e.g. the way monitoring 
results are used and trigger adjustments, safeguards or accompanying meas-
ures - in a legally binding manner would contribute to increasing the effec-
tiveness and credibility of the monitoring process, and hence of the EPA. It 
could also alleviate fears that possible negative effects of an EPA (in terms of 
non-compliance or development impact, for instance) would not be addressed 
by the parties, and it would further contribute to policy coherence 
Options 
The response dimension can be defined either in the monitoring chapter itself or 
in the respective chapters (safeguard measures, accompanying measures, etc.), 
which could refer to results of monitoring activities. Monitoring could specifi-
cally shape the format and trigger the application of built-in flexibilities such as 
safeguards or trade-related assistance. In addition, the outcome of monitoring 
could feed into the periodic formal reviews and evaluation of the EPA. 
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The monitoring results could also be used for transparency and public 
awareness purposes, for example by forwarding the reports to national par-
liaments and other interested stakeholders. 
v.   Basic institutional setting for monitoring 
Basic objectives 
The aim is to identify the institutional framework for the political oversight 
of the monitoring exercise and the use of its results, and possibly for the 
conduct of and consultation process for the EPA monitoring. The EPA text 
could specify the respective roles and responsibilities of the different insti-
tutions and stakeholders involved in the national, regional and joint ACP-
EU in monitoring bodies.  
Options 
i. One option would be for a Joint EPA Council and its subcommit-
tees (established for each region) to be given all the EPA imple-
mentation functions, including monitoring. 
− The EC has initially proposed to establish for each regional 
EPA a Joint EPA Council at ministerial level, with different 
sub committees, namely a Trade Committee (called ‘Imple-
mentation Committee’), a Development Committee, a Parlia-
mentary Committee and a non-state actors Committee (called 
‘Consultative Committee’). 
− The EU Council has proposed not to distinguish between trade 
and development and to establish a Joint Implementation 
Committee responsible for both (including monitoring). 
ii. A Joint EPA Council or Implementation Committee could instruct 
the regional/national authorities to identify (or establish, if new) 
appropriate monitoring institutions, give them the directions to take 
for operational monitoring and then jointly consider follow-up on 
the monitoring reports. The regional bodies could be responsible 
for harmonising national monitoring. 
iii. Another option would be to simply refer to the need for regional 
coordination, but without defining new or responsible institutions.
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iv. The national-level framework could be defined in the agreement, 
with national monitoring bodies (e.g. part of the government, NSA, 
or parliaments) to present their results to the regional body and the 
joint EPA Council and affiliated institutions. In this case, the roles 
of the different national-level institutions/actors involved in moni-
toring bodies (or task forces) could be specified. 
v. The EPA text could further contractualise the role, if any, of existing 
ACP-EU joint institutions established by the CPA (such as the Joint 
Ministerial Trade Committee or the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, 
JPA) and other institutions with important mandates on the future of 
the ACP and Europe (such as the African Union or the European 
Parliament). 
vi. Some stakeholders have proposed the creation of a regional entity 
or an observatory body in charge of the monitoring of the EPA (and 
possibly regional integration). 
vii. Other stakeholders have proposed specific types of institutions de-
signed to capture the interests of a specific set of actors (e.g. civil 
society, private sector), with more or less formal roles in the im-
plementation and monitoring of the agreement. 
vi.   Cooperation and development assistance 
Basic objectives 
Knowing that monitoring is a costly exercise and that resources and capac-
ity in ACP countries and regions are highly constrained, the text of the 
agreement may further contain provisions for assistance by the EU to sup-
port the operation of the EPA-monitoring system, including inter alia assis-
tance for the establishment of regional and national-level monitoring 
frameworks, participation of different actors, and the collec-
tion/development of monitoring data. 
Options 
Development assistance to allow the ACP to conduct the monitoring exer-
cise may be addressed through the Joint EU Aid for Trade (AfT) Initiative 
or the European Development Fund (EDF). Provisions on development 
assistance for monitoring capacity may be rather vague in terms of a refer-
ence to capacity building assistance in the context of the AfT Initiative or be 
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part of a specific development or monitoring chapter and thus be a formal 
component of EPA implementation. The parties may further decide to clar-
ify in the legal text the links between EDF financing, the Joint EU AfT 
Strategy and assistance for the EPA-monitoring system. If scarce resources 
do not allow capacity building (CB) for all involved actors, the text could 
include provisions for assistance to specific ‘priority’ actors or actions. 
vii.   Methods and procedures 
Basic objectives 
The aim is for the parties to commit to a sound, evidence-based approach 
and analysis to monitoring and its results. Specifying in the EPA text the 
basic methodological approach and procedures for the operationalization of 
a monitoring mechanism could ensure concrete follow-up to its establish-
ment and definition of principles. In addition, agreeing on methodologies 
and quantitative/qualitative indicators/targets (against which to monitor 
outcomes of EPAs against development objectives) would to a certain ex-
tent formalise the monitoring results within a jointly agreed framework and 
thus promote an evidence-based interpretation (which would otherwise risk 
becoming too polemical and political). 
Options 
Methods, procedures and/or indicators can be 
i. left outside the agreement, with the understanding that the parties to 
each EPA will discuss them in the implementation phase, through 
the respective responsible institutions, 
ii. identified after the signature of an agreement but with a joint com-
mitment through an EPA provision that stresses the importance of an 
results-based monitoring approach, calls for a minimum of harmoni-
sation and comparability, and perhaps concretely names the different 
institutions that are to develop it (by an agreed deadline),or 
iii. agreed upon beforehand and included in a protocol to or an annex of 
the agreement. 
3.2   Process to make EPA monitoring operational 
Taking into account the above recommendations, and in order to ensure that 
the monitoring mechanism becomes operational, a number of steps should 
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be taken after signing an EPA. The non-exhaustive list of suggestions pre-
sented below also aims at ensuring that monitoring in fact serves to 
strengthen the ownership and transparency of the EPA processes as a whole. 
Once the necessary legal basis, functions and basic features have been estab-
lished by the parties through an EPA legal text, a credible EPA-monitoring 
mechanism requires a consultative and participatory process to widely discuss 
and make decisions on various operational aspects. Only the stakeholders 
involved can determine concretely the detailed objectives, scope, procedures, 
and institutions for monitoring in a specific country or region (Section I be-
low) as well as the exact content, indicators, targets, methodology and timing 
of the exercise (Section II). The actual steps to make the monitoring mecha-
nism credible, transparent, workable and effective will vary depending on the 
specificities of each ACP country and region and on what has already been 
included in the EPA legal text. 
3.2.1   Institutions and stakeholders 
A national monitoring committee – comprising civil society, private sector 
and government officials, and possibly parliamentarians – should be estab-
lished (if new) or identified as a result of a participatory process in the ACP 
countries. Such a process should be initiated immediately after the possible 
signature of an EPA agreement and before the implementation of specific 
EPA commitments. In parallel, each EPA region should define a regional 
framework (if not defined in the legal EPA text) to coordinate national 
monitoring exercises and harmonise results as well as decide on transparent 
procedures to operationalised the linkages between national monitoring and 
regional-level EPA decision-making processes. 
The next step would be to conduct a first stocktaking exercise on existing 
capacity to participate in monitoring exercises at national level, subsequent 
quantification of capacity building needs, and possible sources of funding. 
This is crucial as current capacity, existing institutions, and availability of 
capacity building resources will largely determine what is feasible in a spe-
cific country in terms of actual monitoring. After this second step, an ad-
justment of stakeholder composition, stakeholder capacity needs and capac-
ity building resources may be necessary once the priority sectors and issues 
are identified and stakeholders can be targeted more precisely. An adjust-
ment of the composition of a national committee could be necessary if new, 
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particularly marginalised actors have been identified and are to be associ-
ated with EPA monitoring. 
Since different stakeholders have very different priorities and interests in an 
EPA (for instance, between public and private sector or between consumers 
and producers), the involvement of different actors in monitoring should be 
guaranteed and the exact contribution and role of each actor clearly identi-
fied (provided they have not been defined in the EPA legal text). In particu-
lar, the roles of the following bodies should be addressed: 
− national parliaments 
− existing monitoring mechanisms (such as PRSP or national policy 
evaluation frameworks5), 
− national and regional bodies that were established to prepare for EPA 
negotiations (such as the RPTFs6, or NDTPF in the ESA region7). 
Monitoring exercises and their results might be biased if some actors are 
better organised while others lack the capacity to fully engage in a monitor-
ing mechanism. Non-state actors in certain sectors, for instance small farm-
ers, may not have an effective representation (especially in certain countries 
in Africa, and often at the regional level) and may not receive support for 
establishing adequate organisations. Thus the capacity of each involved 
group of stakeholders to monitor should be assessed and gaps should be 
addressed. 
Importantly, flexibility should be a key feature of any monitoring instru-
ment so that it can be continually adapted to changing conditions through-
out the subsequent phases of the EPA process. In this context, it may be 
useful to define in each country a set of actors that are responsible in the 
                                                          
5  One example would be the National Integrated Monitoring & Evaluation System (NIMES) in 
Kenya. For a brief description of NIMES, see the Report of ECDPM-DIE Monitoring EPA 
Workshop (23-24 April, Nairobi), available in Annex 4, point 1. 
6  Regional Preparatory Task Forces were set up, outside but closely linked to the formal setting 
of EPA negotiations to contribute ideas to cooperation activities, help in the identification of 
sources of assistance required for EPA-related capacity building and facilitate the efficient 
delivery of such support. 
7  National Development and Trade Policy Fora were established in countries belonging to the 
Eastern and Southern African EPA configuration as consultative bodies responsible for for-
mulating national positions on EPA. 
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first phases of monitoring, with the flexibility needed to allow others to step 
in for certain sectors (e.g. depending on the schedules and sequencing of 
implementation of EPA provisions). 
In addition, incentives are needed to get stakeholders seriously involved. A 
major incentive would be to ensure the transparency of results and to equip 
the monitoring mechanism with teeth (enforcement power). In this context, a 
process for the establishment of a national monitoring mechanism should also 
decide how to use the monitoring results, apart from the formal links to EPA 
legal commitments (see example in Section 7.1). The options would include, 
for instance, to create awareness and disseminate public information, or to 
inform an independent “observatory” on the EPA process. It may be particu-
larly important for the monitoring system to include a sort of ‘ombudsman’ 
mechanism to allow the private sector to make its case directly to the highest 
level of ACP-EU EPA decision-making (a Regional Joint EPA council or 
others) (instead of going first through slow national-level bureauc-
racy/procedures) when harm to the business environment is caused by actions 
(or non-actions) on the part of the EU or the national government as part of 
EPA implementation or support programmes.8 However, the monitoring 
mechanism should remain separate from EPA dispute settlement procedures.9 
A national monitoring committee may decide to establish sub-committees 
keyed to different functions of monitoring (e.g. compliance, impact, devel-
opment cooperation, etc) or clusters of monitoring (e.g. impact on consum-
ers/farmers/exporters). Some of the stakeholders consulted emphasized that 
monitoring should be done by industries (agriculture, fisheries, service, etc.) 
to ensure that the private sector has better chances of playing a leading role in 
the mechanism. In this case results could be reported to the competent au- 
                                                                                                                               
8  For instance, private sector stakeholders consulted mentioned that more transparency and 
government accountability are badly needed, as issues related to corruption, red tape, and 
lack of implementation of business environment/trade facilitation reforms are the most seri-
ous impediments to growth for the Kenyan private sector. 
9  Feeding monitoring results directly into the dispute settlement system is likely to lead to 
reluctance of parties to share information. Dispute settlement is meant to deal with negative 
impacts on other partners that result from non-compliance with the treaty provisions. EPA 
monitoring, on the other hand, is supposed to look at the impacts (both positive and negative) 
on the implementing country itself. For similar reasons in the WTO, the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism is kept separate from the Dispute Settlement system, and the information pro-
vided for the national Reviews cannot be used for formal complaints. 
Michael Brüntrup et al.
 German Development Institute 18
thorities of the specific cluster (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture), so that these are 
best placed to implement effectively the required changes.10  
Alternatively, the national monitoring committee could be comprised of 
separate fora for private sector, civil society, and government officials. 
Accordingly, and in line with the suggestion for 'independent monitoring', 
government officials could be in charge of monitoring compliance, the 
private sector of assessing the impact on the economy (and related capacity 
issues), and civil society in charge of monitoring the impact on the poor and 
other social outcomes of EPA.11 
 
However, before exclusive monitoring tasks are transferred to actors with 
stakes in the EPAs, it should be ensured whether the associated risks of bias 
can be controlled and managed, since monitoring is an immanently political 
issue (see Chapter 3.3). In many cases participatory approaches will serve 
EPA monitoring purposes better. 
Examples 
1. An interesting example of institutional design for national-level monitor-
ing is provided in Annex 4. Stakeholders in Kenya observed that the Minis-
try of Planning and National Development (MPND) should take on the 
coordination function, while the concrete monitoring exercise should be 
done by clusters in the respective line ministries. A forum should be estab-
lished for each cluster to bring together private sector and CSOs to feed into 
the reporting. The institutional linkage with the Ministry of Planning, coor- 
                                                                                                                               
10  For example, the fisheries industry in Kenya has previous experience of a collaboration with 
the government to monitor implementation of certain policies (for instance, on eco-labelling 
of products), whereby the Kenyan producers appointed an independent monitoring body 
(such as a consultancy firm) and used its reports to ask the government to make certain legis-
lative/regulatory changes. 
11 It emerged from consultations in Kenya and Tanzania, for instance, that there is a pool of 
researchers, including within universities (with increasing numbers of PhD students) and 
CSOs (such as the Consumer Information Network, Economic Affairs Institute, Econews, or 
Oxfam), that have improved their ability to undertake relevant trade-related research of the 
kind needed for EPA monitoring. With appropriate resources and under the supervision and 
mandate of the Ministry of Trade&Industry, they could undertake such an important exercise 
for data collection. Tanzania also has interesting capacities to carry out EPA-monitoring (see 
Annexes 3 and 4). 
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dinating ODA resources and development budget disbursements would 
ensure that enough resources are provided for monitoring. Furthermore, 
coordination of the National Integrated M&E System (NIMES) is already 
located with the Monitoring & Evaluation Directorate (MED) of the Minis-
try of Planning. The concrete monitoring would be done by Central Plan-
ning Units (CPU) in the respective line Ministries, which are already in 
charge of conducting the annual reports of each Ministry required to report 
its results to the Ministry of Planning. By using these existing structures, the 
costs for monitoring would be reduced.  
2. An example of a sub-committee of the national monitoring mechanism 
would be a development committee. Its tasks, varying greatly depending on 
whether development cooperation commitments are included in the EPA 
text or the mandate of a monitoring mechanism, may include: 
− to assess the development cooperation needs of each involved actor re-
lated to EPA monitoring; 
− to undertake phasing and prioritization of identified needs and sequenc-
ing; 
− to identify possible funding sources in addition to anything already pro-
grammed (EDF, etc.), e.g. domestic sources, including private commer-
cial banks, regional instruments, Cotonou, bilateral donors, aid for trade 
initiatives. 
3. One example of ways to concretely involve ACP regional organisations 
in the operationalization of monitoring would be to assign regional organi-
sations the exclusive competence and task of monitoring regional integra-
tion within the overall EPA implementation process. This will be particu-
larly relevant for some regions that have already created endogenous initia-
tives for monitoring regional integration, like SADC and the COMESA 
region. 
3.2.2   Methodology and substance of monitoring   
In addition to clear institutional design and broad involvement of stake-
holders, a methodology for and exact content of monitoring EPAs at the 
national level should be defined as soon as possible. As it is impossible to 
exhaustively monitor all areas of interest to actors involved in EPAs, it will 
be necessary to identify at national and regional level priority sectors as 
well as those inputs (in terms of EPA provisions and EPA-related accompa- 
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nying measures) that are likely to have a major impact. Given the range of 
issues and the limited capacity to address them all, there is a need for priori-
tization, or at least sequencing, of what is set to be monitored. This could be 
done by prioritizing, according to the chapters of the EPA Agreement, the 
economic sectors, the social groups involved, or the most serious impedi-
ments to achieving the EPA goals (see Chapters 4.2. and 5). 
Given that the overall final assessment and prioritization will depend on the 
importance and weight given to each monitored area, the weighting exercise 
and the underlying assumptions12 must be made explicit through the consulta-
tive process and the identification of the methodology.  
Once the broad methodological approach for monitoring has been identified 
through a national participatory process, it will be necessary to define the exact 
content of monitoring and the related indicators.  
The methodology for national-level monitoring of EPA should encompass in 
particular:  
i. EPA-relevant indicators to be monitored. The identification of indica-
tors should build on a pre-selection based on a participatory process 
including all stakeholders involved in EPAs. A thorough impact as-
sessment, if available (see Annex 6), can help to identify priority sec-
tors, impact domains and inputs.13 
ii. This study proposes to identify indicators that can be based on a re-
sults chain analysis. Result chains link EPA instruments and ac-
companying measures (national policies and development assis-
tance) over a succession of intermediary outputs and outcomes with 
expected (positive and/or negative) changes at the impact level of 
EPAs, i.e. poverty reduction and sustainable development. Capaci-
ties to implement EPAs and draw benefits from them can be part of 
the result chains as well as certain indicators of the wider frame-
work conditions which are known to influence the effects of EPAs 
and the impact level.  
                                                          
12  For instance on the possible causal linkages between the EPA and the domestic (national and 
regional) environment. 
13  In addition to wide consultations with involved stakeholders at the beginning of the monito-
ring process, also ex ante impact assessment exercises (such as the Sustainability Impact As-
sessment funded by the EC for the 6 EPA regions) could offer important insights on data a-
vailability and suitable indicators at national and regional level. 
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Result chains should be established in a combined effort with stake-
holders, sector and EPA experts and statisticians for the key sectors 
or products identified. For the different levels of the result chains 
(inputs, outputs, outcomes, impacts), indicators will need to be iden-
tified and selected where appropriate. The selection of indicators has 
to respect the requirements of national EPA concerns. However, at 
least some have to be comparable at the regional level, for instance 
implementation of EPA provisions, amount of development assis-
tance or poverty data, in order to compare and aggregate impacts 
across countries or even at the all-ACP level, to provide information 
and initiate debate on regional reactions such as triggering safe-
guards and adjustment policies.  
It is proposed that a combination of qualitative and quantitative ap-
proaches be used. However, quantitative indicators would remain 
at the core of monitoring and would be supported by qualitative 
indicators. Targets can be established for selected indicators. This 
is particularly obvious for implementation indicators (tariffs 
reduced according to schedules, development assistance according 
to agreements, legislation adopted according to texts). For results, 
targets are more difficult to define due to the long chains from in-
puts to impacts and the large influences of external factors. How-
ever, at least at the level of outcomes targets could be defined, e.g. 
use of new rules of origin by x% of traders, trade flows above x%, 
etc.14 
In addition to results chains, open monitoring elements should be 
added in order to capture important unexpected results, for instance 
a complaint mechanism. 
The quality, availability, reliability and the costs of obtaining data 
will be important criteria for indicator selection. This in turn will 
be influenced by existing statistics and monitoring systems such as 
PRSP, trade, price, production, productivity, social and environ-
mental information systems. In most ACP countries there is scarce 
                                                          
14  Some researchers proposed using the concept of ‘Development milestones’ in EPA monitor-
ing. These milestones would be EPA-induced policy actions and removal of impediments 
(including non-action) by both the EU and ACP countries that are necessary to make progress 
towards the goals of the CPA and the EPA (see Annex 11). 
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capacity even to monitor the import volumes and prices needed to 
trigger basic safeguard mechanisms. To cut costs and use syner-
gies, stakeholders consulted observed that indicators for EPA-
related monitoring should be linked as much as possible to existing 
in-country processes such as the PRSP or monitoring regional inte-
gration. It was, however, also noted that data collected for policy 
tools like the PRSP are often very general. Thus, it is necessary to 
gather sector and trade data. This may be achieved by strengthen-
ing existing systems.15 Some indicators may also be found in inter-
national data bases, though the latter will most probably be even 
less specific to tracing EPA impacts than national systems. EU 
stakeholders should consider building resources and capacity for 
monitoring in ACP countries and regions as a key part of the EPA 
implementation process. Funding for this could be made available 
through EDF resources and the Joint EU AfT Strategy. This would 
also encompass generation and improvement of trade data.  
The final list of indicators should then be discussed with EU au-
thorities, as the establishment of joint indicators will strengthen 
mutual responsibility of both parties in the monitoring exercise. 
However, some flexibility should be maintained in terms of content 
or objects to be monitored so that the national-level methodology 
can be continually adapted to changing conditions throughout the 
subsequent phases of the EPA process. Results chain analysis 
should be complemented by monitoring approaches that are able to 
capture unintended effects of EPAs. 
iii. Information collection at all levels should start very early to provide 
baseline information for the further monitoring process and allow 
comparison with targets. 
iv. A complaint or voluntary reporting mechanism informing the moni-
toring committee and/or an ombudsman could constitute a valuable 
complement. 
 
                                                                                                                               
15  Ethiopia, for instance, started building a data system three years ago to analyse implica- 
tions of policy reforms (for details, see Ethiopian Development Research Institute, 
http://www.edri-et.org/index.htm). 
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v. Finally, there should be a legal commitment on data sharing 
among/by regional ACP neighbours, otherwise it could be difficult 
to coordinate and harmonise national monitoring results at regional 
level. 
The selection and implementation of the methodology will require thorough 
expertise to ensure availability and feasibility of results. Thus, training, 
including training for moderators and statistical experts, may be necessary. 
Examples 
1. Examples of indicators on the development cooperation part of EPA
     include: 
− basic quantitative indicators on commitment and disbursement lev-
els: e.g. volume of EPA-related assistance committed by donors and 
by the country itself in various assistance areas previously agreed; 
share of aid channelled through budget support or other instruments, 
discrepancies between annual commitment and effective disburse-
ment by donors. 
− qualitative indicators to judge aid effectiveness, for example percep-
tion of ownership (integration of trade issues into national develop-
ment programmes including PRSP, knowledge and degree of par-
ticipation of different actors in aid programming) and policy align-
ment (programmes implemented are in line with national develop-
ment strategies). 
2. Interesting examples of indicators in the area of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) that could replicated directly for the EPA-monitoring exercise 
can be found in the context of the NTBs Monitoring Mechanism estab-
lished by the East African Business Council and the East African Com-
munity Secretariats with the objective of facilitating identification, re-
porting and monitoring of the elimination of current and future NTBs 
within the EAC Partner States. 
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1     Introduction 
With the negotiations on economic partnership agreements (EPAs) drawing to 
a close, envisaged by the end of 2007, the issues of whether the agreements 
concluded will ever be properly implemented and whether they will be able to 
deliver on their development goals are becoming more prominent. Many of the 
negotiators and policy makers remain focused on reaching a positive outcome 
of the negotiations. Yet, EPAs are not simply about fostering trade, they were 
conceived first and foremost as instruments for development, as provided for 
by the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA). In ensuring that the develop-
ment promises of the EPAs are fulfilled, close monitoring of the implementa-
tion and impact of EPAs may play a key role. It can help diffuse fears related 
to the challenges posed by EPAs. Adequate monitoring may also help to en-
sure that unwarranted effects of EPAs (or of their non-implementation) will be 
identified and addressed in a timely manner. 
In this context, it is not surprising that African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries, as well as the European Union (EU), have expressed interest in the 
monitoring of EPAs. In 2005, EU Member States committed themselves to 
closely monitor EPAs to ensure that they help achieve development objectives 
and to “(…) establish and implement an improved monitoring mechanism 
against development objectives within the EPA process” (Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2005). This commitment to EPA monitoring was re-emphasized in 
the recent conclusions on EPAs of the General Affairs and External Relations 
Council (GAERC) of 15 May 2007, according to which “[t]he Council reaf-
firms that review clauses as well as mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing 
implementation and development impacts will be a key part of the EPAs. This 
will be an integral function of the EPA institutions.” The Sustainability Impact 
Assessment (SIA) of EPAs, conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers for the 
European Commission, also explicitly recommends the establishment of such a 
monitoring system for EPAs (see Box 1.1 and Annex 6 for a summary). It is 
anticipated that a monitoring mechanism can play a significant role in the 
implementation and adaptation of EPA processes as well as in the communica-
tion between the different partners involved in EPA processes, and should 
therefore be established. 
However important and necessary EPA monitoring is considered, there is hardly 
a study available that reflects in more depth what shape it might take on. 
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This is a serious gap in the EPA literature and for EPA negotiations. A  
closer look at policy monitoring mechanisms shows that monitoring EPAs will 
not be an easy task as various interests and challenges have to be taken into 
account. In general, depending on how contentious the policy to be monitored 
is, and how serious the consequences of findings deriving from monitoring 
may potentially be, a monitoring mechanism must respond to certain require-
ments. This is particularly true for EPAs that are highly contested between 
negotiating partners and within the larger development community, and where 
certain findings would bear important consequences for the future of EPAs, for 
adjustment measures and even for the general political atmosphere between 
EU and ACP countries in general. 
Box 1.1:  Recommendations from Sustainable Impact Assessments (SIA) of 
EPAs on monitoring 
The recommendations developed from the SIA include improvement of data collec-
tion at the national and regional level as well as the development of a permanent 
institutional mechanism to monitor the implementation of EPAs from the perspective 
of economic, social and environmental sustainability. Such a mechanism should 
include a broad range of influential stakeholders and be able to make recommenda-
tions to decision makers in the EU and the ACP countries alike. The key functions 
should include: 
− Compilation and distribution of information. 
− Research and assessments with regard to trade and sustainability. 
− Development of indicators. 
− Interaction and consultation with civil society, including the development of 
guidelines for its participation in the broader EPA process. 
− Co-ordination of technical assistance. 
There are no detailed recommendations on the institutional design of a monitoring 
mechanism and whether it should be at the EU-ACP, the regional or the national 
level.  
Source:   PwC (2007, 86) 
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This study looks further into the underlying rationale for monitoring EPAs. It 
aims to provide information to different stakeholders on the design, scope and 
content of monitoring as well as on feasible methodology. It thus hopes to 
raise awareness with stakeholders, stimulate debate and facilitate informed 
negotiations and decision-making by policy makers. 
More specifically, the study aims to 
− identify and classify the different rationales for monitoring EPAs and the 
scope and content that these may entail, 
− explore methods to monitor the implementation and impacts of EPAs and 
related measures, 
− discuss options for institutional arrangements and the involvement of 
different stakeholders in the monitoring exercise. 
The study concludes with concrete options and recommendations on provi-
sions to be included in the EPA legal text and proposes different steps to be 
taken to allow for a timely establishment of a monitoring mechanism. 
The research and consultations conducted for this study have been guided by 
the following broad questions, which are closely interrelated: 
− Why should EPAs be monitored? 
− What should be the focus of EPA monitoring? 
− Who should be involved in monitoring EPAs? 
− How should the EPAs be monitored in view of the various dimensions 
involved in determining why, who and what to monitor? 
These guiding questions relate to the political, institutional, methodological 
and contextual dimensions of EPA monitoring. The issue of capacity and ca-
pacity building needs in terms of participation of institutions and stakeholders 
in EPA monitoring are also addressed. 
The methodology used for this study builds on three main components: 20 
− a review of literature: building on the seminal study by Bilal and Rampa 
(2006)21, which identified key issues of EPA monitoring, this study under-
takes a systematic review of the literature, with a special focus on the 
                                                          
20  Further information on all workshops available at www.ecdpm.org/trade/epamonitoring. 
21  See Bilal et al. (2007) for a brief overview. 
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monitoring & evaluation literature, the monitoring of free trade agree-
ments and regional integration, and other relevant documents on policy 
monitoring processes and EPAs; 
− broad consultation and interviews with ACP and EU stakeholders of 
EPAs, including trade and development officials, EPA negotiators, ACP 
ambassadors, members of parliament, and representatives of civil society 
and the private sector; this included two seminars organised by European 
Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) in Brussels on 21 
February and 14 June 2007 (see Annexes 1 and 2 for reports) and a debate 
on EPA monitoring at the Meeting of the Committee on Economic Devel-
opment, Finance and Trade of the JPA, on 23 June 2007 in Wiesbaden, 
Germany; 
− two case studies, each based on interviews and a workshop: 
Tanzania: a least-developed country (LDC), a member of the East African 
Community, and currently negotiating an EPA in the SADC configura-
tion; the German Development Institute (DIE) stakeholder workshop was 
organised together with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) in Dar Es Sa-
laam, Tanzania, on 28 February and 1 March 2007 (see Annex 3 for 
documentation), and 
Kenya: a non-LDC, also a member of the East African Community, but 
currently negotiating an EPA in the East and Southern Africa (ESA) con-
figuration; the ECDPM consultative workshop was organised together 
with CUTS NRC (Consumer Unity and Trust Society –International) and 
FES, in cooperation with APRODEV (Association of World Council of 
Churches Related Development Organisations in Europe), in Nairobi, 
Kenya, on 23−24 March 2007 (see Annex 4 for documentation). 
The study does not intend to prescribe a specific approach to monitoring, as 
situations may vary according to national and regional needs and specifica-
tions. Instead, recommendations are presented in terms of general principles 
and concrete options. 
The study is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides some essential defini-
tions concerning monitoring and evaluation and discusses some of the con-
cepts related to EPA monitoring. Chapter 3 discusses the objectives and pur-
poses of EPA monitoring, whereas Chapter 4 addresses the possible scope and 
substance of an EPA monitoring exercise. Chapter 5 reviews some of the key 
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methodological considerations and possible instruments for monitoring the 
implementation of the agreements, and in particular their impact. Addressing 
various constraints in identifying, collecting and analysing data and informa-
tion relevant for EPA monitoring, this chapter introduces results chain analysis 
as the most promising approach in this context. Chapter 6 then looks at the 
political, institutional and procedural dimension of monitoring, paying particu-
lar attention to the participation of various stakeholders and the institutional 
design of EPA monitoring. In doing so, it discusses the issue of capacities of 
and incentives for stakeholders to participate in monitoring. Finally, Chapter 7 
proposes concrete recommendations for monitoring the implementation and 
impact of EPAs. It identifies a range of options for specific provisions related 
to EPA monitoring to be included in an EPA legal text. It also suggests a way 
forward for setting up a monitoring system for EPAs once the agreement has 
been concluded. 
2     Concepts of monitoring 
Monitoring is in principle an activity that is commonplace in both the public 
and private sectors in developed and developing countries. However, in the 
context of EPAs different stakeholders have very different understandings of 
the concept of “monitoring” and the elements it includes. In addition, there are 
confusion and misunderstandings in conjunction with the concept of “evalua-
tion”. The different views can be partially explained by different professional 
backgrounds (private – public, ‘North’ – ‘South’, trade − development,  
project − policy), by the complexities of EPAs and their effects on develop-
ment, but they may also stem from the fact that some of the different monitor-
ing concepts on the market are somewhat fuzzy and in part incoherent. More-
over, in the development community monitoring is often discussed together 
with evaluation under the acronym M&E. This is partly justified because in 
practice there is a symbiotic relationship between the two processes, but as a 
result a clear distinction between the two is often not made (see Chapter 2.3 on 
the difference between the two concepts in the context of this study). 
Consequently, there are considerable differences as to what EPA monitoring 
should and could achieve and how it should and could be integrated into policy 
making and adjustments around EPAs. This leads to different, often contradic-
tory ideas about different purposes, scopes, processes and methodologies of 
EPA monitoring and who should be involved – ideas which are additionally 
biased by the specific interests of the various stakeholders. In fact, monitoring 
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and evaluation are unavoidably embedded in power considerations and the 
political economy surrounding the issues they deal with (see Chapter 6). 
Thus, a clarification of the terminology and the nature of monitoring is indispen-
sable for this study. In the following, we adopt the terminology of development 
cooperation to the purpose of monitoring a complex set of policies (which EPAs 
are) and look at how monitoring is generally linked to political processes. 
2.1 Monitoring in development cooperation – from 
implementation to results 
Germann and Gohl (1996) emphasize that, in the case of development projects, 
monitoring generally aims to help inform management and decision-making 
and has in particular two functions: 
− Checking if everybody in a project and programme is doing what has been 
agreed. Checking can also refer to the efficiency of activities or policies 
(i.e. the ratio of inputs to outputs) or to effectiveness (how good the out-
come is).  
− Reflection and learning: The regular collection and analysis of data pro-
vides opportunities for periodical reflection on and critical assessment of 
action. On the basis of this critical review, learning can take place on suc-
cesses and failures of an action, project or policy and appropriate meas-
ures can be taken for correction and re-orientation. 
Another function mentioned that has been given attention in more recent litera-
ture is increasing accountability of development projects and assistance. 
Seen in conjunction with the commitment to strengthening results-based man-
agement of development cooperation stipulated in the Paris Declaration on 
aid effectiveness (OECD 2005), there is an increasing emphasis on and need 
for monitoring systems that can show that development activities translate into 
improved development results – i.e. outputs and outcomes that change the 
situation at the level of the target groups and development dimensions and lead 
to long-term effects, i.e. impact (see Box 2.1 on terminology and Chapters 4 
and 5 for an adaptation to EPAs). Thus, monitoring in modern development 
practice should increasingly focus on monitoring results, in particular im-
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pacts22. It is only through a focus on results that a monitoring system can actu-
ally contribute to learning and improving by showing that activities carried out 
have improved issues at the target level.23 However, monitoring activities will 
not cease to be of importance, particularly in the case of policies, since their 
implementation is a crucial first step to be systematically checked if any im-
pact is to be expected.  
Monitoring takes place on many different occasions of development coopera-
tion, in small locally administered projects, at the level of national programmes 
or large multilateral organisations. Due to their different focus, different activi-
ties are labelled as ‘monitoring’ and development organisations use different 
definitions of the term (see Annex 5). Common to all these definitions of 
monitoring are four essential features: 
− Monitoring refers to a continuous process of data collection that takes 
place at regular intervals. 
− It can take place at different levels of and around an activity or policy 
(preparedness, processes, inputs, outputs, outcomes, impacts, framework 
conditions, etc.). However, how these levels are defined varies from one 
institution to the other, adding to the relative conceptual fuzziness on the 
terminology of monitoring. 
− It aims to provide insights into trends and ‘sense of direction’ rather than 
to explain causal links; thus it looks at quickly available and probably su-
perficial data rather than undertaking an in-depth analysis. This data can 
later be used to support evaluations. 
                                                          
22  More precisely results since ongoing monitoring activities often tend more to register short-
term outputs and outcomes than long-term impacts. However, the term impact monitoring is 
nowadays widely used. 
23  Theoretically, monitoring systems derived from the planning of a development intervention 
have long known the notion of impact. Particularly the logical framework approach (Rosen-
berg / Posner 1979) widely uses the concepts of impact monitoring and provides for indica-
tors at all those levels. However, in practice monitoring most often concentrated on activities, 
inputs and, at best, outputs, neglecting outcomes and impacts. Indeed, it has even been ar-
gued that impact monitoring is a contradiction in itself because impacts, i.e. long term chan-
ges induced by an activity cannot be grasped through ongoing observations typical for moni-
toring (see Chapter 4 for a reflection of this problem in EPA monitoring). It is only in recent 
times that, induced through the aid effectiveness debate, impact monitoring has come to be 
taken more seriously, and the obvious challenges are now addressed. 
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− It is systematic and systemic, i.e. monitoring needs to be to some extent 
institutionalised and linked to other processes, which makes it an accepted 
basis for decision-making. 
 
Box 2.1:  OECD / DAC key concepts of results-based management 
Development 
intervention 
An instrument for partner (donor and non-donor) support aimed to 
promote development. 
Goal The higher-order objective to which a development intervention is 
intended to contribute. 
Results The output, outcome or impact (intended or unintended, positive and/or 
negative) of a development intervention. 
Impact Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects pro-
duced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or 
unintended. 
Outcome The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an inter-
vention’s outputs. 
Outputs The products, capital goods and services which result from a develop-
ment intervention; may also include changes resulting from the inter-
vention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes. 
Inputs The financial, human, and material resources used for the development 
intervention. 
Activity Actions taken or work performed through which inputs, such as funds, 
technical assistance and other types of resources are mobilized to 
produce specific outputs. 
Indicator Quantitative or qualitative factor or variable that provides a simple and 
reliable means to measure achievement, to reflect the changes con-
nected to an intervention, or to help assess the performance of a devel-
opment actor.  
Source:   OECD (2002) 
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Box 2.2 summarises key lessons and challenges of monitoring. There are obvi-
ously trade-offs, particularly between focus on the one hand and inclusiveness, 
participation and attribution on the other hand. 
Impact monitoring is commonly referred to as a tool to help a programme or 
project match its day-to-day activities with the desired long-term goal of sus-
tainability. The approach reflects the recognition of the importance of regular 
reflection on impact, rather than measuring impact ‘ex post’ via evaluations; 
typically done at a point when the intervention is either already concluded or 
nearing completion. In the context of the Economic Partnership Agreements, 
impact monitoring can play an important role by collecting data that would 
allow for evidence-based reflection among a multitude of stakeholders on 
whether the short term results achieved contribute to the long term objectives 
of the EPAs. A parallel advantage of such a multi-stakeholder reflection and 
validation would be that the exercise itself would contribute to strengthening 
the quality of the partnership. 
Impact monitoring, however, naturally involves costs in terms of human and 
financial resources. The comprehensiveness of the exercise should thus be 
closely attuned to the available capacity and resources of all stakeholders that 
are to be involved. Furthermore, the data should be credible in order to mini-
mise the possibility that they might be contested by involved stakeholders. If 
Box 2.2:  OECD/DAC lessons and challenges for monitoring 
A small amount of reliable data is more useful than a large volume of questionable 
data. 
Focus continuity in monitoring and reporting on a small set of core indicators. 
Combine quantitative and participatory (qualitative) monitoring methods. Tailor-
made monitoring arrangements suit local needs, while “off-the-shelf” models rarely 
fit. 
Build reporting and monitoring systems on local capacities, demands and leadership. 
Take into account the opportunity costs of participatory approaches for the partici-
pants themselves. 
Scale up project monitoring towards programme and policy monitoring, wherever 
possible within the PRS framework. 
Source:   OECD (2003, 58) 
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such conditions are not carefully considered and put in place, the impact moni-
toring may not be of developmental value in the context of the implementation 
of the agreement. It should also be noted that it is advisable to adapt and 
evolve the monitoring system over time, particularly to keep it in accordance 
with the existing (growing) capacity of stakeholders as well as changing priori-
ties, understandings and consequent information needs. These issues are dis-
cussed in more detail in Chapter 5, 6 and 7 of this report. 
Only one of the definitions of ‘monitoring’ presented in Annex 5 explicitly 
mentions the use of targets against which to compare the information col-
lected. However, how to evaluate monitoring data is an important issue. Tar-
gets can be formulated to capture key objectives of the policy and are useful 
for comparing and analysing the collected data. This issue will be addressed in 
Chapter 5.4, where we discuss the use of “benchmarks” as a special kind of 
targets in EPA monitoring.  
2.2 Differences between monitoring and evaluation 
The term monitoring is often used in conjunction with the term evaluation, e.g. 
the concept of monitoring and evaluation (M&E). The reason for this is that in 
principle there should be strong linkages between monitoring and evaluation. 
However, there are also clear differences between monitoring and evaluating 
EPAs. These are (among others):  
− Periodicity: Monitoring is a continuous process that takes place at regular 
and more frequent intervals. Evaluations are usually conducted at a few 
key moments of an intervention or key phases of policy implementation. 
Typical for the project context are ex ante, mid term and ex post evalua-
tions. In the context of EPAs, evaluations could be conducted at regular 
intervals (e.g. every five years), in conjunction with Review Clauses for 
instance. 
− Nature of data and information collected: Whereas monitoring tends to 
concentrate on readily available data of limited scope, an evaluation will 
require larger data sets. Ideally, monitoring should provide time series of 
core data for evaluation, which will make additional attempts to gather 
data through larger one-time surveys or secondary data compilation.  
− Depth and comprehensiveness: Monitoring is more oriented to the opera-
tional level and discerning trends for a limited range of subjects, without 
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trying to comprehensively analyse the (causal) relationship between data 
or between actions and their effects on explanatory and dependent vari-
ables, for instance. Evaluation involves comprehensive analysis and as-
sesses whether the objectives of the policy or interventions have been 
reached by policies and interventions. Ideally, an evaluation should make 
explicit the values underlying this assessment.  
− Consequences: Evaluations are usually conducted with a view to making 
assessments and decisions more fundamental than would be possible on 
the basis of monitoring. Whereas monitoring serves as early warning and 
to discern necessary adjustments in a given phase of a project, programme 
or policy, an evaluation can lead to more significant changes or even a 
shift in approach. 
2.3 From projects and programmes to policies and policy 
cycles 
The monitoring functions in the project context are also relevant for policies 
and thus for EPAs. However, an important difference between monitoring 
development projects or programmes and policies is that projects usually are 
closer to the target groups. It is thus easier to track effects and impacts on the 
target group. It is more difficult to track how a specific policy affects the actors 
of the society it is designed for, as it is more difficult to follow how a policy 
converts into impacts at the level of budget allocations and institutions and, 
finally, on citizens or business actors. The ‘attribution gap’ is wider in the case 
of policies.24 On the other hand, policies are more comprehensive and address 
more framework conditions of a given target group and their activities than a 
project can. This implies that impacts can be stronger and thus better detect-
able in the case of policies, which makes monitoring their impact more feasi-
ble. 
A simplified model of a policy process is illustrated in Figure 2.1. It highlights 
the different steps of the policy cycle and the role monitoring (and evaluation) 
mechanism plays in it. In an ideal and participatory world, all important stake-
holders would be involved at the stages of problem awareness and definition, 
policy formulation, implementation, evaluation and political learning. 
                                                          
24 See Chapter 5.1 for a discussion on causal chains in the context of EPAs. 
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In a stylised way, the “EPA cycle” corresponds to the general policy cycle 
illustrated above. EPAs constitute a whole bundle of political decisions to 
change the economic frameworks in ACP countries and EU-ACP economic 
relations. Some provisions (e.g. tariff reductions) will translate rather directly 
into national or regional policies, others (e.g. investment rules) will still have 
to be incorporated into national policies. 
Distinguishing between monitoring and evaluation (Chapter 2.2), decisions 
stemming from monitoring would aim at minor adaptations and regular ad-
justments of a policy and their implementation (including accompanying 
measures), whereas evaluations, for instance as part of a policy, may help to 
address more substantive issues related to the implementation and impacts of 
the policy. 
In this context, the three basic functions of monitoring are: 
− control: checking whether the adopted policies are effectively imple-
mented 
Figure 2.1:  Monitoring and evaluation in the policy cycle - a simplified 
model 
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Source:   Adapted from Faust / Lauth (2003) 
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− adjustment and learning: refers to collective learning processes by spe-
cific groups of stakeholders (e.g. different kind of business organisations, 
leaders of agricultural cooperatives, government officials) 
− accountability and transparency: as regards the implementation of the 
policy and its results 
3 Objectives and principles of EPA monitoring 
Without guiding objectives and principles, EPA monitoring risks remaining an 
untargeted, useless and ultimately unused exercise, instead of being the guid-
ing mechanism for accompanying and improving the implementation of EPAs 
that it potentially is. The foundations for EPA monitoring are outlined in this 
Chapter. 
3.1 The context of the discussion on an EPA-monitoring 
mechanism 
EPAs have an ambitious agenda. First, they aim at introducing, over time, a 
gradual reciprocal market opening of all parties. This marks a radical shift 
from the over 30 years of unilateral preferential market access granted by the 
EU to ACP products. Many in the ACP are anxious about this new paradigm in 
ACP-EU trade relations. Second, EPAs are not simple free trade agreements 
with a traditional focus on eliminating duties and quotas on, substantially, all 
trade between the parties. EPAs aim at addressing all effective market access 
obstacles, including non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and technical barriers to trade, 
such as standards and certification, sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, 
trade facilitation and rules of origin. Last but not least, EPAs were intended to 
contribute to transforming the ACP economies, strengthening regional integra-
tion processes and creating the institutional, regulatory and economic condi-
tions to foster sustainable development of ACP countries. 
Both parties have repeatedly reaffirmed that EPAs should be first and foremost 
instruments for development. Yet, while these new trade arrangements will 
offer new development opportunities, they will also create serious challenges 
to the ACP countries. 
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The tensions revolving around EPAs arise from their potential to be powerful 
tools for development, their possible negative impact and the high adjustment 
costs that will arise during their implementation. Many stakeholders from ACP 
countries, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and some EU member 
states claim that the current EPA negotiations do not provide sufficient space 
for those elements that are required for economic development and export 
growth to actually occur. 
In this context, it is crucial that EPAs are carefully designed to take into ac-
count the specificities of each ACP country and region. In parallel, accompa-
nying measures and reforms need to be undertaken. This is, or should be, the 
focus of all ACP and EU policy makers and EPA negotiators.  
Once EPAs have been concluded, the challenge of implementing the agree-
ments will need to be addressed. In view of the numerous constraints faced by 
the ACP, this will not be an easy task. The EU will have to facilitate this pro- 
cess and adequately support the ACP efforts through development assistance. 
But as important as it may be, compliance with the terms of the agreement and 
effective implementation are not an end in itself. What is key is that the over-
arching EPA development objectives of sustainable development and poverty 
reduction are achieved. These may not be easy objectives, as EPAs do not 
operate in a vacuum, and many other factors will influence the development of 
ACP countries and regions.  
3.2 Why should EPAs be monitored? 
If EPAs are to deliver on their development dimension, they should not be 
limited to basic questions of market access. By facilitating the integration of 
the ACP countries into the world economy, and building on regional integra-
tion initiatives, EPAs should stimulate economic development and export 
growth, and hence contribute to sustainable development and poverty allevia-
tion. To ensure that they effectively play their role, an EPA-monitoring 
mechanism should make it possible 
i. to check the compliance of the signatories with the provisions of the 
agreement (trade and development) in accordance with the commit-
ments and objectives set by the parties; 
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ii. to check the effective implementation of the accompanying measures 
and policies agreed upon, which is crucial for the credibility and use-
fulness of the agreement; 
iii. to provide plausible indications of the degree to which EPAs have a 
positive impact in terms of trade and development set out in the 
agreements on the basis of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. This 
includes tracking undesired effects and impacts and signalling them to 
EU and ACP decision makers; 
iv. to identify reasons why certain things (implementation or impacts) do 
(not) occur and to use this information to guide additional adaptive 
measures designed to support or remedy the situation. Such reasons 
will basically break down into weaknesses in the EPAs or their accom-
panying measures themselves, wrong assumptions, lack of capacities 
and problems in the larger environment of EPAs (framework condi-
tions). 
EPA monitoring should thus contribute to evidence-based decision making and 
feed back into the policy making process in a transparent way, facilitating and 
de-emotionalising future debates around EPAs and ways of how to adapt and 
accompany them. It should also contribute to medium term evaluations and 
possible larger policy changes. In this way, an effective EPA monitoring 
mechanism can serve the general objectives of monitoring, namely control, 
reflection and learning, accountability and transparency. 
EPA monitoring should also contribute to promoting the coherence between 
EPA-related activities and the context in which an EPA is implemented. This 
includes the pre-conditions and enabling environment required to implement 
an EPA as well as the influence of other (accompanying or subsequent) meas-
ures, policies and reforms, at the domestic and regional level, in the absence of 
which an EPA is unlikely to achieve its objectives.25  
Besides, EPA monitoring may also serve to promote a consultative process in 
the implementation of an EPA, by fostering transparency and inclusiveness of 
the key stakeholders concerned. 
                                                          
25  In this regard, development benchmarks or milestones may prove useful, notably to ensure 
that appropriate policy space is preserved; see Chapter 5.4. 
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For enhanced effectiveness and credibility, it is thus useful to envisage the key 
parameters of a monitoring framework, its objectives and key modalities, at an 
early stage, preferably before the conclusion of the negotiations, so as to en-
sure that they are partly embodied in the agreement, or at least addressed im-
mediately after the signing of an EPA. Early considerations on monitoring may 
help anticipate some of the problems associated with the monitoring exercise. 
Perhaps more importantly, it can contribute to alleviating some of the fears 
about the possible negative effects of an agreement and help build consensus 
among the parties on the core principles, functions, scopes, approaches, institu-
tional designs, modalities, assistance for and use of the monitoring exercise, 
while preserving the necessary flexibility for the effective conduct of EPA 
monitoring. 
Understanding EPA implementation or lack thereof 
One basic condition for the success of an agreement is its effective implemen-
tation. In general, regional trade agreements (RTAs) aim at effectively ad-
dressing trade barriers and creating effective market access.26 In the context of 
EPAs, the objectives go beyond pure market access and include, among other 
things, the establishment of a regulatory environment conducive to business 
and economic activity, with enhanced institutions and trade-related infrastruc-
ture. It is thus important that both parties (the ACP and the EU) comply with 
their commitments under an EPA. In cases of disagreement, a consultation 
mechanism may prove useful to prevent formal litigation under a dispute set-
tlement mechanism. But not all provisions of the agreement may be best ad-
dressed by and subject to dispute settlement: best endeavour type of provisions 
or development cooperation clauses cannot be disputed. More importantly, 
many problems encountered in implementation may be addressed in a more 
informal setting, with the good will of the parties. In this regard, continuously 
monitoring of the effective implementation of the agreement may prove most 
helpful, including in efforts to defuse possible tensions. 
Several reasons may explain the non-compliance or lack of implementation of 
parts of an EPA: 
                                                          
26  See for the instance the market access strategy of the EU, which emphasizes the importance 
of effective dispute settlement provisions and "early warning" approach to monitoring regula-
tions (European Commission 2007). 
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− In general, incomplete compliance with RTA provisions is due to lack of 
(political) will by one of the parties, which tries to evade some of its com-
mitments. Such problems can be addressed through direct dialogue among 
the parties, and if required, on the basis of the appropriate dispute settle-
ment mechanism. 
− However, poor implementation of an EPA may also be due to a lack of 
information, training, technical ability or capacity on the part of the au-
thorities and institutions concerned. This is a likely outcome in many ACP 
countries and regions, whose capacities and resources are extremely con-
strained. In such cases, dispute settlements are of little value. Remedies 
can only be found through dialogue, information, direct assistance and ca-
pacity building initiatives (not only by the EU but also from within the 
country or region concerned). Here again, EPA monitoring can play a cru-
cial role in helping to identify problems and their causes. 
− Finally, improper compliance with the terms of the agreement may be due 
to some inappropriate provisions of an EPA, which may turn out to be in-
adequate for the particular situation of a country or region. In such occur-
rences, monitoring and evaluation may serve as early warning, which can 
then guide the adjustment of the EPA or accompanying measures. 
Understanding the impact of EPAs 
Compliance and implementation is not an end in itself. EPAs should ultimately 
serve development objectives. This makes the task of monitoring both more 
necessary and more complex. A simple monitoring of the implementation of 
trade policy provisions of the agreements will not be sufficient, since there are 
few precedents regarding the direct poverty reducing effects of trade agree-
ments. This is also reflected in the positions of the European Council, the 
European Parliament and the various stakeholders consulted during this  
project: They all consider it as necessary to monitor both the implementation 
and the impacts of EPAs. 
It is thus important to monitor whether EPAs have in effect a (positive) impact 
(a) on trade and the economic environment and (b) on the development and 
poverty alleviation efforts of ACP states and regions. To this end, monitoring 
can contribute to identifying, and thus promptly remedying, possible negative 
effects that would result from the implementation of any provision of an EPA. 
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In doing so, it is useful to be able to distinguish immediate effects of an EPA 
(i.e. narrow / short term outcomes, e.g. on trade flows, fiscal revenues and 
other relevant economic indicators), from the broader, more substantive and 
longer term impacts, notably on sustainable development and poverty allevia-
tion (see Box 2.1 on the terminology of results-based management). This raises 
the question of the necessary focus of the monitoring exercise, extensively 
addressed in Chapter 4, in particular in view of the fact that not all dimensions 
of an EPA can be monitored simultaneously. 
To be practical, the EPA-monitoring exercise should focus on aspects directly 
linked to the agreement and complementary accompanying measures. Yet, to 
remain meaningful EPA monitoring should pay particular attention to pre-
conditions in place in the various ACP countries and regions, as these will 
determine to a great extent the implementation and the impact that an EPA 
may have on development (see above). By the same token, the sequencing of 
measures and policy reforms accompanying the EPA implementation will play 
a key role for the ultimate impact of an EPA. These dimensions (related to 
more generic issues such as regional integration, supply-side constraints and 
institutional development) should thus be captured in the monitoring exercise 
of EPAs. 
3.3 The political dimensions of EPA monitoring 
It is important to emphasize that monitoring the implementation and impacts of 
EPAs is not a purely technical exercise but also has a political dimension. 
As discussed, EPAs are very complex and highly controversial agreements, 
affecting a great number of different stakeholders in the EU and ACP countries 
with different economic and political interests and conceptions regarding de-
velopment. Since monitoring takes place in a political environment (see Chap-
ter 2), the information produced by an EPA-monitoring system is a highly 
political commodity. The different stakeholders of the agreements will try to 
use it to defend their interests and derive benefits from the EPAs. 
What data will be used by the monitoring system, who will be involved in 
collecting, processing and analysing it, who will receive the data, and at what 
stage of the implementation process? These are not simply technical issues, 
they also raise systemic and political concerns, likewise reflecting the needs 
and interests of the actors involved. 
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Given the complexities and the need for simplification and selection, a moni-
toring mechanism cannot be completely neutral. However, in designing a 
monitoring system, the above questions should be kept in mind in order to 
mitigate bias towards one or the other group of stakeholders. The way an EPA-
monitoring system is legally and institutionally framed and the degree to which 
it takes account of the capacities of different stakeholders to access and make 
use of the information it generates will largely determine the ownership of the 
system and with it the degree to which it can contribute to its objectives (see 
Chapter 3.2). It is therefore important to be transparent about the process of 
conceptualisation and design and create space for different types of stake-
holders to participate in this process (see Chapter 6). 
The political nature of the information generated by monitoring systems is also 
the reason why some stakeholders may be reluctant to monitor (specific as-
pects or impacts of) a policy or - in this case - an EPA. For instance, the ex-
perience with PRSP monitoring shows that there tends to be some resistance 
by governmental actors to making certain types of information available to 
non-state and private sector actors (GTZ 2004, 34−35). Stakeholders may want 
to conceal the fact that policy implementation has not been carried out as 
agreed, or they may be reluctant to share information, in particular information 
that makes transparent who stands to gain and who to lose if possible adjust-
ments or corrective activities are triggered which may change that pattern. 
Objective monitoring and evaluation may reduce decisional space concerning 
EPA-accompanying policies and assistance, particularly of the most influential 
actors. 
For the same reasons it is also not realistic to assume that decision making and 
policy implementation around EPAs will be based exclusively on sound in-
formation and analysis and that all stakeholders and policy makers have a 
natural interest in generating such information through monitoring systems 
(see Chapter 6.3). However, the fact that interest in an EPA-monitoring 
mechanism has been expressed by both parties (EU/member states and ACP 
governments) and a broad spectrum of state and non-state actors (NSA)27 is 
therefore already an important “acquis” to build on. 
                                                          
27  Article 6 of the CPA distinguishes between: 
 a) State (local, national, regional, supra-regional) actors 
 b) Non-state actors (divided in three categories: private sector; economic and social partners, 
  and civil society) 
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3.4 General principles of EPA monitoring 
One might argue that a number of general principles should be respected in 
designing EPA-monitoring mechanisms. Figure 3.1 illustrates those principles 
that have been identified and discussed during the consultations with stake-
holders. 
The need to understand the implementation, outcomes and impacts of EPAs 
and to have guidance for adaptive and corrective measures through monitoring 
has been expressed by many. At the same time, any monitoring mechanism 
and the information it delivers will be inherently political. If it is to be ac-
cepted to the maximum extent by all stakeholders, at least as a basis of discus-
sion, the monitoring mechanism chosen has to follow certain principles, many 
of which are closely related. 
                                                                                                                               
 Although the classification in these three categories of non-state actors and the term civil 
 society are debatable, this study in part uses this terminology in the following analysis, as it 
 has the advantage of having the consent of all signatories to the CPA. However, in general 
 more use is made of the term “stakeholder”, which is more generic on the one hand and 
 leaves more space for defining additional sub-categories on the other hand. 
Figure 3.1:    General principles for the institutional design of an EPA-
monitoring mechanism 
ComplementarityInstitutional
Lightness
Credibility
Cost Effectiveness
Ownership
Transparency
Participation
Subsidiarity
Flexibility
Reliability
Accountability
 
Source: Own presentation based on workshop results 
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In general, a monitoring mechanism must be transparent and accountable in 
order to be credible, accepted and useful for and by the different stakeholders. 
The need for a transparent and accountable process of monitoring has in par-
ticular been emphasized by non-state actors and members of parliaments, who 
are usually less well informed about EPAs and policy processes. In addition, 
their concern is to make information on EPA implementation and the impacts 
of these agreements accessible to their respective constituencies. 
Ownership by key stakeholders in the EU and the EPA regions is generally 
regarded as a crucial precondition for an effective monitoring mechanism. A 
number of interlocutors maintained that an early involvement of key stake-
holders in discussions on the purpose and design of a monitoring system was 
the most promising way to achieve ownership. Others emphasized that owner-
ship was also related to sufficient incentives for and capacity of stakeholders to 
contribute to monitoring and make use of the findings. 
There was a broad consensus amongst those consulted that while it would be 
unrealistic to aim for grassroots participation, the institutional framework for 
monitoring EPAs should have participatory elements. These could, for in-
stance, take the form of a systematic involvement of civil society and private 
sector organisations in monitoring bodies, a complaints mechanism easily 
accessible for non state actors, or efforts to promote the dissemination and 
discussion of findings of monitoring exercises to stakeholders via national and 
local media such as radio and newspapers. 
Credibility of the institutional structures responsible for monitoring EPAs and 
reliability of the data generated by them were noted to be principles closely 
associated with ownership. In this context, some interlocutors expressed the 
view that a monitoring mechanism should build on institutions that were 
largely independent from the political institutions and interest groups men-
tioned above. They should not only collect and analyse data on standard indi-
cators but also have the liberty to enquire on matters of concern to specific 
countries or economic actors. Others underlined that monitoring criteria and 
the institutional set-up for a monitoring system would always be negotiated by 
the different parties, and thus be “political”. In their view, negotiated solutions 
would prove more credible and be more widely accepted than solutions de-
signed with a view to scientific considerations only. 
A mechanism that meets these criteria is also more likely to avoid some of the 
political challenges described above. If a broad range of affected stakeholders 
is involved in monitoring, can provide information and be informed about the 
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process, it will be more difficult to withhold information or use it in a strategic 
manner. 
Subsidiarity was mentioned as a principle that should guide the assignment of 
roles for monitoring between the different hierarchical levels. Subsidiarity 
requires that matters be handled by the smallest (or lowest) competent author-
ity. In the political sphere, this would mean that a central authority should only 
perform those tasks which cannot be performed effectively and efficiently at a 
more immediate or local level. Applying this principle to EPA monitoring it 
could be formulated as follows: Only those functions of EPA monitoring that 
can not be exercised effectively and efficiently at the national level should be 
assigned to the regional or even ACP level. 
In consultations, much emphasis was put on the principle of flexibility of any 
monitoring mechanism. It was argued that such a mechanism should be able to 
adapt to changing requirements that may arise in the course of the implementa-
tion of EPAs. So whilst in the beginning the focus of monitoring may mainly 
be on the preparedness and the compliance of both parties with the provisions 
of the agreements, monitoring capacity needs and results would gain impor-
tance in the course of implementation, and even later outcomes and impacts. 
Drawing on experiences with other monitoring mechanisms, a number of inter-
locutors argued that reflections on a monitoring mechanism for EPAs should 
be guided by the principles of institutional lightness. They underlined that 
experience shows that a complex and heavy institutional design often prevents 
a monitoring system from becoming operational or prevents monitoring data 
being produced in a timely manner. 
Cost effectiveness was another principle mentioned during consultations. The 
participants in the consultations did not refer to any guideline or golden rule 
with regard to the costing of a monitoring system. They simply expressed 
concern that a monitoring system for EPAs could become rather costly if it 
were not limited to a small set of key indicators, given the many countries, 
sectors and stakeholders involved. They also drew attention to the fact that key 
stakeholders may either be unable to participate or able opt out of a participa-
tory monitoring process if the opportunity cost is too high for them. 
Looking at these principles together shows that there is trade-off between the 
principles of ownership and participation on the one hand and institutional 
lightness and cost considerations on the other hand. Building an EPA-
monitoring system to whatever extent possible on existing data production 
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processes and looking for synergies and complementarity with other relevant 
M&E systems could help to strike a balance. 
Proposals on how to operationalise and institutionalise these principles are 
found in Chapter 6, following a description of what EPAs could and should be 
monitored and how (in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively). 
4     Scope and substance of EPA monitoring 
In the last sections we have identified the various objectives of a monitoring 
exercise for EPAs as well as key principles that should be respected in the 
design of an institutional framework for monitoring EPAs. The present chapter 
addresses issues related to the identification of what exactly has to be moni-
tored. 
Evidence shows that monitoring trade agreements becomes more effective and 
functional if it is anticipated and specified in the agreement itself (ODI 2002). 
That is why it is important to start discussing the substance and scope of a 
monitoring exercise before the conclusion of EPA negotiations.28  
Some key considerations to be addressed during the process of identifying the 
content of a monitoring exercise can be highlighted: 
− The identification of the monitoring objects (‘what’) cannot be a substitute 
for the careful design of the EPAs themselves, with clear decisions on 
what needs to be done in order to achieve the objectives of the agreement 
and those of the CPA.29 The concrete contents of the EPA legal text must 
be the basis for what exactly should be monitored. 
− Monitoring should not be confused with a thorough evaluation. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, monitoring is a continuous process, with the main 
task of collecting and disseminating up-to-date evidence on capacity, 
                                                          
28  This is also most relevant if a benchmark approach is used to monitor EPAs, which has been 
suggested by some stakeholders (See Annexes 11 and 13 for some further reflections on EPA 
benchmarks and their possible integration in an EPA text). 
29  The overall aim of EPAs is stated in the CPA as “fostering the smooth and gradual integra-
tion of the ACP States into the world economy, with due regard for their political choices and 
development priorities, thereby promoting their sustainable development and contributing to 
poverty eradication in the ACP countries” (ACP-EC 2000, Art. 34[1]). 
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compliance and results. Having made this distinction, the information 
gathered during the monitoring exercise should also serve as the basis for 
longer term evaluations that should feed into EPA-related policy making 
processes, including potentially the review of parts of the agreements. 
− The purpose of monitoring (i.e. ‘why to monitor’, Chapter 3.2) directly 
affects the scope of the monitoring exercise, which leads to a potentially 
very large range of possibilities for monitoring objects. Choosing only one 
area to be monitored (or one set of indicators) is unlikely to lead to a satis-
factory monitoring exercise. On the other hand, even if it might be tempt-
ing to adopt a very ambitious approach to cover interests and objectives of 
all parties involved, it should be kept in mind that this will likely lead to a 
very complex and time- and resource-consuming exercise. Thus focus is 
needed. 
− Monitoring of results can and should take place at different levels, namely 
the input, output, outcome or impact levels (see Section 2.1). This is im-
portant as the often long time span between implementation of EPA provi-
sions and visible changes at the impact level may make it necessary for a 
monitoring system to look at intermediary results which provide plausible 
indications on the direction of impacts (for a more detailed discussion of 
result chain analysis, see Chapter 5). 
In the following section several options are explored on ‘what to monitor’. 
4.1 What to monitor? 
It is not the aim of this study to select most relevant monitoring areas or to 
give advice on what to monitor concretely. The prioritisation, selection and 
sequencing have to be done by the stakeholders involved. It will depend cru-
cially on the final legal text of the agreements and the priorities identified by 
the relevant stakeholders. It may thus differ between different ACP countries 
and regions. Instead, this chapter will present an overview of possible monitor-
ing areas and address some obstacles as well as major contrary positions on the 
questions of what to monitor. 
From the various consultations conducted for this study it became apparent 
that most stakeholders prefer a monitoring mechanism that goes beyond mere 
implementation and also includes impacts of EPAs on development objectives 
as well as the underlying capacity to implement and take advantage of the 
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agreements, accompanying measures and the framework conditions in which 
EPAs will take place. 
Monitoring can cover different dimensions which can be summarised in the 
following categories: 
− The implementation of EPA provisions (trade and development coopera-
tion), 
− EPA results (outputs, outcomes and impacts), 
− The capacity to implement EPAs, 
− The enabling environment, including accompanying measures, framework 
conditions and the EPA implementation process itself  
It should be kept in mind that there are overlaps and inter-linkages between the 
different categories, and the following approach to classifying the monitoring 
‘objects’ does not imply that an either-or decision has to be made in identify-
ing the scope and content of a monitoring system. The actual EPA monitoring 
mechanism will most likely be a mixture of objects from the different catego-
ries. 
Monitoring the implementation of EPAs 
Monitoring the implementation of an agreement per se, not the achievement of 
its objectives could serve compliance purposes and is a necessary precondition 
for monitoring EPA results. Obviously, observed changes at the outcome and 
impact levels can only be the result of EPAs if their provisions (inputs) are in 
fact implemented. Hence, monitoring implementation is a necessary part of 
EPA monitoring. 
Monitoring the results of EPAs 
One area that has been repeatedly stressed by consulted stakeholders to be key 
for monitoring is the identification of positive or negative effects, thus the 
results of EPAs. Monitoring the results of EPAs should trigger certain policy 
adjustments, the formulation of appropriate accompanying measures and pos-
sibly the amendment of certain terms, where relevant. However, aims like 
poverty reduction are very long term and in any case influenced by many other 
factors. It will be difficult to establish clear causal linkages between EPA “in-
puts” and final impacts. This highlights the importance to look, in the frame-
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work of a monitoring system, for intermediary results at the level of outputs 
and outcomes that plausibly indicate the direction of impact. In view of the 
large array of different possible provisions of EPAs, and thus of the even lar-
ger number of outputs, outcomes and paths towards changes at the impact 
level, careful definition and prioritisation of results to be monitored is required 
(for a discussion of how this prioritisation could be done, see Chapter 4.2). 
Monitoring the capacity to implement EPAs 
ACP countries have repeatedly claimed that supply side constraints, such as 
poor trade related infrastructure, weak institutions and lack of skilled labour, 
may prevent them from taking advantage of export opportunities created by 
trade liberalisation through EPAs. For example, as with other international trade 
agreements, EPA implementation may not induce any positive impact since the 
productive capacities are not in place to make use of them (e.g. tariff reductions 
or SPS agreement in the presence of supply side and SPS inspection con-
straints). Hence, before and during implementation the parties should assess the 
capacity of ACP countries, and different stakeholders within them, to imple-
ment EPAs and take advantage of their provisions (as suggested by Box 4.1). 
These capacity assessments should lead to recommendations for accompany-
ing measures and capacity building needs. 
Box 4.1: Institutional preparedness and capacities in the private and public 
sector 
During the workshop conducted in Kenya special emphasis was given to institutional 
preparedness as a precondition for any beneficial results of EPAs. In addition, stake-
holders emphasized the need to monitor the capacity of both the private and the 
public sector. 
− The public sector would need to have the capacity to design, formulate and 
implement necessary policies and programmes. 
− At private sector level, it would be necessary to monitor whether producers 
have the needed capacity in terms of skills development, access to new technol-
ogy, compliance with international standards, capacity to diversify and compete 
effectively, capacity for market and product development as well as capacity to 
access useful timely trade data and information on a regular basis. The latter is 
usually referred to as supply side constraints  
Source:  ECDPM-CUTS-FES Kenya workshop results, 23−24 Apr. 2007 (see Annex 4) 
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Monitoring the enabling environment 
Accompanying measures may consist of internal policy adjustments and/or de-
velopment assistance, usually a mix of both, combined in comprehensive pro-
grammes. The need for ancillary measures that will be a necessary complement 
to the opening of markets is widely recognised and will therefore most likely be 
part of a monitoring exercise. It may be that provisions for capacity building and 
development assistance are part of the EPA legal text as requested by ACP coun-
tries and regions, and in this case compliance with such commitments will also 
be monitored. In any case, a monitoring process that covers accompanying 
measures, EPA-related capacity building and trade-related assistance will estab-
lish a link between the trade provisions of EPAs and development assistance that 
may or not be enshrined in the EPA legal text. Since coherence between trade 
and development policy is a major argument in favour of EPAs, a monitoring 
mechanism that covers both jointly (including methodology, content and institu-
tions) can potentially be a major instrument to assure such coherence. 
EPAs will not happen in a vacuum and thus have to be seen in the broader 
environment, which ideally should be enabling. The framework conditions are 
meant to be those conditions beyond directly EPA-related areas. Framework 
conditions would typically encompass world market prices and general terms 
of trade, other trading regimes that affect EPAs, wider regional integration 
processes beyond EPAs and national macro-economic policies and conditions. 
Inclusion of the enabling environment in EPA monitoring makes it possible to 
collect indications on the causes of the observed results that are not induced by 
EPA and related measures. This could also guide adjusting measures in the 
right direction. An example in Box 4.2 illustrates this. 
Box 4.2: An example for uncertain causal relations illustrating the need for 
monitoring the framework conditions 
A negative meat price and income change for livestock keepers may be due to: 
a. increased meat imports from EU due to dumping or  
b. very low prices for meat imports from third countries or  
c. bumper meat production or stress sales due to failed crop harvest. 
In case a. an EPA safeguard could be required, but in case b. an EPA-specific safeguard 
would not address the problem. In case c. non-border measures have to be taken. 
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Monitoring the framework conditions will help to see EPAs, appropriately, in a 
wider context and remind the stakeholders that despite the importance of EPAs 
they are far from influencing or explaining everything. They can assist in con-
ducting a better policy dialogue. 
Stakeholders consulted maintained that the involvement of a wide range of 
actors, apart from governments, would be vital to ensure the transparency, 
ownership and effectiveness of EPA implementation. Thus, instead of monitor-
ing only the implemented EPA provisions and accompanying measures, moni-
toring the implementation process of the new partnership agreements itself 
could be also considered as an area of the monitoring exercise. This would go 
beyond the mere assessment of compliance with EPA provisions and would 
rather include cross cutting issues like ownership, transparency and the partici-
pation of different stakeholders. 
Linkages between different monitoring areas 
The categorization of broad impact areas above is rather stringent and might 
give the impression that these different areas are stand-alone monitoring exer-
cises. However, there are strong inter-linkages and overlaps between the dif-
ferent monitoring areas. Some guiding questions which a monitoring system 
tries to answer show such linkages: 
− Are EPA provisions implemented, and if not, why – due to capacity prob-
lems? 
− What capacities are in place, are local policies and institutions adapted, 
and how are accompanying measures identified and implemented? 
− Is an enabling framework in place, how does the environment influence 
EPA results and changes at the output, outcome and impact level? 
− How does the combination of these factors influence changes at the results 
level, and is it possible to assess cause-effect relationships, in particular 
with respect to EPAs and EPA support measures? 
The linkages between different monitoring areas are further discussed in Chap-
ter 5, where they are integrated into an overarching approach to identify 
changes induced by EPAs as well as appropriate indicators (see Figure 5.1 for 
an illustration). 
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4.2 Between inclusiveness and efficiency 
Credibility, transparency, and ownership are fundamental ingredients for the 
success of any monitoring exercise (Chapter 3.3). A workable but credible and 
owned monitoring instrument for EPA will likely be a combination of different 
monitoring objects corresponding to the different interests and needs of stake-
holders. During different consultations conducted for this study it became 
apparent that also within each country the views of different interest groups 
differ substantially. For instance, while Kenyan producers often fear an in-
crease of import competition, Kenyan consumer organisations maintained that 
they also expect benefits due to lower food prices.30 Hidden agendas may fur-
ther complicate the acceptance and design of an EPA-monitoring system 
(Chapter 3.2). A monitoring exercise should therefore be designed in a highly 
participatory approach to avoid situations in which concerns of single interest 
groups become too dominant or others are largely neglected. 
An exhaustive monitoring will, however, not be possible. Involving too many 
priorities, as a result of the diverging interests of different stakeholders, entails 
the risk of broadening excessively the scope of monitoring and thus making 
the monitoring exercise, design and management very complex (which might 
also overburden ACPs’ monitoring capacity). The need to maintain focus is 
thus essential and is confirmed by lessons in the existing literature (see Box 
2.2). A prioritisation or sequencing of monitoring exercises therefore is inevi-
table, but criteria will have to be defined carefully. 
Prioritisation could be done according to the chapters of the EPA text (e.g. 
trade measures, non-trade measures, development cooperation), the economic 
sectors (e.g. agriculture, fisheries, textiles, mining, etc.), the involved social 
groups (e.g. consumer, producer, farmers, etc.), or the most serious impedi-
ments to achieving the EPA goals. As examples of how such prioritisation 
could work, in both country workshops conducted for this study working 
groups undertook such prioritisation exercises, identifying key economic sec-
tors and the EPA-related provisions (input) likely to be most important to 
achieving the related objectives (desired impact). Priority sectors identified by 
Tanzanian stakeholders are given in Box 4.3.31  
                                                          
30  For whole interviews, see Annex 4. 
31  They may, however, not be complete; for instance, the tourism sector could be massively 
affected (particularly if services or investment issues are included), but no representatives of 
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Further insights into prioritisation according to sectoral issues are provided in 
Box 4.4. dealing with agriculture, on which the Kenyan workshop focused. 
The example shows that several provisions of an EPA will impact a given 
sector, and it is a challenge to follow their impact in combination. Some par-
ticipants of the Kenyan workshop maintained that the most important area to 
be monitored would be the capacity to formulate relevant policies and imple-
ment EPAs.32  
Both examples are taken from the application of a “results chain analysis”, 
which is further explained in Chapter 5 as a proposed key methodology for 
how to identify intermediary results of EPAs and the respective indicators. 
To avoid a too complex and unmanageable monitoring exercise, parties could 
further decide to sequence different monitoring activities based on the rele-
vance of the implementation process. According to this approach, monitoring 
of capacities and preparedness would come first and result in identification of 
capacity building needs. Accompanying measures such as sector reforms and 
                                                                                                                               
that sector were present. Only a nation-wide stakeholder forum, preceded by a thorough 
analysis of the EPA text and a sensitisation of stakeholders, can comprehensively determine 
the sectors to be affected by EPAs. 
32  Going even more into depth could exclude some sub-sectors if the respective products are 
excluded from EPA liberalisation. However, such exclusion has to be done diligently, since 
there may be cross-linkages (for instance, rice may be excluded from import liberalisation 
into ACP countries, but wheat may be not, although it will also compete with local cereals). 
Box 4.3:   Results of EPAs expected in three key sectors in Tanzania 
In the workshop in Tanzania, three economic sectors were expected to be most af-
fected by EPAs: 
i. Agriculture 
ii. Manufacturing 
iii. Fish industry 
For each of the sectors, the EPA provisions most likely to have a larger impact were 
elicited and provided the basis for a results chain which, importantly, also included 
some possible negative impacts (for more details see Chapter 5). 
Source:   DIE-FES Tanzania workshop, 28 Feb. −1 Mar. 2007 (see Annex 3) 
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EPA related assistance would then be monitored together with compliance 
with the EPA texts, in a second step. EPA results would be monitored accord-
ing to the expected outcomes (e.g. exports, developed capacities, regional 
integration, imports, prices) and impact level indicators, which can be derived 
from the implementation schedule. 
Monitoring EPA-related reforms and adjustment policies should be linked as 
far as possible to existing monitoring mechanisms (like those designed in the 
context of PRSPs, aid for trade monitoring or national monitoring of policies, 
e.g. the Kenyan National Integrated M&E system for national policies (see 
Annex 4, point 1a), where possible, to avoid duplicating efforts. This is espe-
cially true for monitoring accompanying measures and framework conditions 
such as Trade Related Assistance, world prices, governance conditions etc., 
which are designed to address not exclusively EPAs but trade and macro-
economic policies in general. 
According to the principles of subsidiarity (see Chapter 3.4), monitoring could 
be done by cluster (e.g. fisheries, agriculture, service, …) by respective organi-
Box 4.4:   Key policy areas in the Kenyan agriculture sector 
In the multi-stakeholder working group in Kenya, participants decided to categorize 
the priority EPA-related input in three groups: 
i. market access to the EU 
ii. measures to address supply-side constraints 
iii. development resources accompanying EPA 
For each category, the key policy areas were specified more in detail and the respec-
tive goals attached to these were identified. For instance, market access to the EU was 
subdivided into EU tariff and non-tariff barriers, and under the latter category, EU 
rules of origin and sanitary & phytosanitary measures (SPS) were recognised to be the 
most serious impediments to Kenyan export growth. Under ‘measures to address 
supply-side constraints’, ‘firm-level policies and support measures’ were deemed 
crucial, and in this context both behind-the-border (such as fiscal incentives) and 
border interventions (such as tariff reduction to make imports of intermediary goods 
cheaper) should aim at value addition for the Kenyan industries. This exercise was 
done initially taking the example of the Kenyan agriculture sector, but it was recog-
nised that this framework could be applied to other industries as well. 
Source:  ECDPM-CUTS-FES Kenya workshop results, 23−24 Apr. 2007 (see Annex 4) 
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sations at national or regional level. Annex 4 2., point 2b, provides a proposal 
on a Kenyan national monitoring system that would assign the tasks of moni-
toring specific clusters to the respective ministries. This may lead to splitting 
monitoring into several exercises, which may be considered as an option to 
handle the large amount of possible monitoring areas. Having different moni-
toring exercises, however, leads to the question of how to link and co-ordinate 
the different exercises. 
5     Options for methodologies and instruments of EPA 
monitoring 
The selection of an appropriate methodology for monitoring will have to be 
designed in line with the main principles and requirements identified in Chap-
ters 3 and 4. Principles include credibility, mutual ownership, transparency, 
participation, quickness and simplicity but also comprehensiveness, flexibility 
as well as cost effectiveness and therefore compatibility and (as far as possi-
ble) linkages with existing monitoring systems. The shape of an EPA-
monitoring mechanism would depend on partners’ needs and willingness to 
devote resources to it – the full range of monitoring areas encompasses EPA 
implementation capacities, the implementation process and the level of imple-
mentation, accompanying measures both nationally and through development 
assistance, results orientation and the wider enabling environment of EPAs. 
A broad range of methodologies and approaches has been developed to moni-
tor and evaluate the impacts of development projects and programmes. Box 5.1 
presents an overview of a selection of important approaches, selected accord-
ing to EPA-monitoring needs. 
Box 5.1:    Overview of selected monitoring and evaluation approaches 
The logical framework approach 
The logical framework (LogFrame) helps to clarify objectives of any project, pro-
gramme, or policy. It assists in the identification of the expected causal links − the 
“program logic” − in the following results chain: inputs, processes, outputs (including 
coverage or “outreach” across beneficiary groups), outcomes, and impact. It leads to 
the identification of performance indicators at each stage in this chain as well as risks 
which might impede the attainment of the objectives.  The LogFrame is also a vehicle 
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for engaging partners in clarifying objectives and designing activities. During imple-
mentation the LogFrame serves as a useful tool to review progress and take corrective 
action. 
Theory-based evaluation 
Theory-based evaluation has similarities to the LogFrame approach but allows a 
much more in-depth understanding of the workings of a programme or activity − the 
“program theory” or “program logic.” In particular, it need not assume simple linear 
cause-and-effect relationships. By mapping out the determining or causal factors 
judged important for success, and how they might interact, it can then be decided 
which steps should be monitored as the programme develops, to see how well they 
are in fact borne out. This allows the critical success factors to be identified. And 
where the data show these factors have not been achieved, a reasonable conclusion is 
that the programme is less likely to be successful in achieving its objectives. 
Performance indicators 
Performance indicators are measures of inputs, processes, outputs, outcomes, and 
impacts for development projects, programmes, or strategies. When supported with 
sound data collection − perhaps involving formal surveys − analysis and reporting, 
indicators enable managers to track progress, demonstrate results, and take corrective 
action to improve service delivery. Participation of key stakeholders in defining indi-
cators is important because they are then more likely to understand and use indicators 
for management decision-making. 
Formal surveys  
Formal surveys can be used to collect standardised information from a carefully 
selected sample of people or households. Surveys often collect comparable informa-
tion for a relatively large number of people, in particular target groups. 
Rapid appraisal methods 
Rapid appraisal methods are quick, low-cost ways to gather the views and feedback 
of beneficiaries and other stakeholders, in order to respond to decision-makers’ needs 
for information. 
Participatory methods 
Participatory methods provide active involvement in decision-making for those with a 
stake in a project, programme, or strategy and generate a sense of ownership in the 
M&E results and recommendations. 
Source:    World Bank (2004) 
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What is important to note is that these approaches are not all mutually exclu-
sive but can, should and usually are combined to some extent in most monitor-
ing and evaluation systems, though with limitations according to the features 
of each one:33 
For instance, logical frameworks can acknowledge more complex relations 
between activities and impacts, thereby approaching the theory-based evalua-
tion logic. However, complex statistical analyses are usually not applied in 
logical framework-type information gathering, and the one-dimensional regard 
of indicators, without looking into (statistically detectable) interdependencies 
typical for theory-based evaluations, may unduly reduce the complexity of the 
real world problems of policies. Another limitation of the logical framework 
approach is that it can only take into account foreseen (positive or negative) 
impacts, on unforeseen impacts it is a priori blind. 
On the other hand, theory-based evaluations, particularly if combined with 
statistical methods, often require long time-series of data which in poor coun-
tries are rarely available in the necessary quality. Data for the period before the 
policy changes to be analysed may be of no relevance for the evaluation, 
thereby requiring several years of unchanged policy and data collection before 
such an analysis can be carried out. For many policies which affect the quality 
of rules and institutions (e.g. rules of origin, competition rules), there are 
hardly any quantitative indicators available. 
Performance indicators are usually integrated into logical frameworks at sev-
eral levels, from inputs to outcomes and impact. How such indicators are gath-
ered is another question: Formal surveys may be an exception for regular pol-
icy monitoring in developing countries because large, nation-wide surveys are 
very expensive and not quickly available. However, for instance in PRSP 
monitoring, household surveys play a prominent role, though in longer inter-
vals of several years, making them less suitable for monitoring. Many national 
statistics are based on surveys, including, for instance, many crop yield and 
production or price statistics, and could be used for policy monitoring. 
Rapid appraisal and participatory methods would certainly not be applied at 
the grassroots level for monitoring policies, but used to take into account the 
                                                          
33  For more comprehensive reviews of monitoring and evaluation systems, see the correspond-
ing literature in the reference list, particularly World Bank (2004) and the literature men-
tioned there.  
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opinions of non-state actors at the national level, they provide very useful 
tools. They are particularly valuable for taking into account unforeseen effects 
of policies and detecting underlying reasons, processes and influences without 
having to rely on very complex multidimensional (and often still incomplete) 
theory-based approaches. They involve some risks of bias since many of those 
who provide information are at the same time stakeholders, i.e. have some 
stakes in the policy and are therefore not neutral towards the outcomes. On the 
other hand, participation and involvement of stakeholders has been declared to 
be a key for successful EPA monitoring for creating ownership and using in-
ternal knowledge. Therefore, a good mix of “objective” and “subjective” in-
formation will have to be integrated into EPA monitoring. 
However, little practical experience exists so far on monitoring economic poli-
cies in general and trade and trade-related assistance in particular (see Annex 6). 
5.1 Results chain analysis as framework for EPA monitoring 
Taking into account the principles and requirements of EPA monitoring as 
well as the features of different monitoring methods, the result chain approach 
was found to offer many interesting features. The result chains approach pro-
vides a systematic framework for identifying expected effects (both positive 
and negative) at different levels of results, and due to a given set of inputs (i.e. 
EPAs and accompanying measures) it facilitates the targeting of monitoring 
areas and the subsequent definition of indicators. However, it has also some 
important flaws which are important to recognise. Therefore, other monitoring 
approaches are also recommended. 
Arguments for results chain analysis 
Results chain analysis is a merger of different approaches that makes it possi-
ble to accommodate the different demands of EPA monitoring: 
− The approach allows for rather complex cause-effect relations (including 
combined and contradictory effects and negative impacts of some “in-
puts”) that may be reasonably assumed for EPAs and accompanying 
measures. 
− It makes it possible to systematically identify result indicators that are 
useful for monitoring (as opposed to evaluation, see Chapter 2), i.e. quick, 
indicative; on the output and outcome level rather than on the impact level; 
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not answering fundamental questions and raising fundamental discus-
sions, but able to guide EPA management decisions. There is space for 
quantitative as well as qualitative data within the results chain frame-
work. 
i. Quantitative indicators would form the backbone of the system in order 
to provide “objective” orientation data. For implementation monitor-
ing, indicators such as tariffs and development assistance would be 
used. For impact monitoring, performance indicators such as trade vol-
umes, price, investment, employment and income data (based on na-
tional statistics and probably surveys) are most likely to be chosen. 
Where available, links should be established to poverty and, more gen-
erally, Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) – monitoring systems. For 
environmental sustainability, indicators describing the status of key re-
sources affected by EPAs could be defined and/or searched for in the 
existing statistical systems. For monitoring the framework conditions, 
national and international comparative databases can be drawn upon. 
ii. There is ample space for qualitative and participatory approaches in 
several respects: in the definition of the monitoring areas, the result 
chains, the formulation of indicators, indicators can be themselves 
qualitative and participatory in nature. The embedding of the monitor-
ing exercise in the policy cycle (see Chapter 2 and Figure 2.1) can and 
should be participative in nature. 
Some apparently attractive alternatives to results chain analysis have been 
screened but were found to be less appropriate for EPA monitoring: Open 
approaches (e.g. Most Significant Change [MSC] approach, Davies / Dart 
[2005] or Method for Impact Assessment of Programmes and Projects 
[MAPP], Neubert [2004]) do not assume pre-determined changes but ask for 
changes at the impact level (i.e. poverty) ex post and then try to identify the 
importance of the intervention in question amongst the array of other factors 
having contributed to change. One drawback is that they rely exclusively on 
consultations with stakeholders, which provides little chance to avoid bias in 
perception or communication. Stakeholders may not be able to link changes at 
impact level to EPA provisions over the long impact chain - most people 
would certainly need quality information to be able to make an informed 
judgement on these cause-relation chains. In addition, due to the wide range of 
actors potentially affected by EPAs, it is a challenge to identify all relevant 
representative stakeholders or organisations (if available) to be consulted. 
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Another drawback of these approaches is that they look at impacts only ex 
post, which requires a larger time frame than would be acceptable for monitor-
ing. Consideration of intermediate results (outputs, outcomes) that are impor-
tant for timely indications of change are not systematically taken into account. 
Other alternatives sometimes indicated for EPA monitoring are more instru-
ments for evaluation, and they are too time, data and skill consuming for ongo-
ing monitoring – sustainability impact assessments, Computable General Equi-
librium Models or other trade policy assessment methods (see Annex 6). 
The proposal on the results chain analysis as central framework for EPA moni-
toring is also in line with some recent works and recommendations on policy 
monitoring: An overview of methodological approaches compiled for the 
World Bank (Baker 2000, 11) points out that a “theory based” evaluation (see 
Box 5.1) that describes the intermediate “micro-steps” between the measures 
and the expected impact can be useful for assessing the impacts of complex 
policies. A study by Kirkpatrick and Lee (2002) elaborating a general method-
ology for ex ante Sustainability Impact Assessments of trade agreements 
states: “Causal chain analysis34 should provide a useful structured framework 
for monitoring the impacts on sustainable development resulting from the 
implementation of a trade agreement .... These ex post studies should consider 
not only the economic, environmental and social impacts resulting from the 
trade agreement (i.e. the end products) but also the outcomes on each of the 
more important links within the causal chain (i.e. the intermediate products). 
This will provide a deeper understanding of the sustainability impacts of trade 
agreements and of the mechanisms through which they have resulted.”  
Finally, also the generic Monitoring of Policy Impacts (MPI) approach devel-
oped by Metz (2005) for Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as a policy 
management instrument recommends that results chain analysis be applied in a 
logical framework context (see Box 5.2). 
However, using anticipated results chains as a guideline for identifying issues 
and indicators for EPA monitoring also has some important drawbacks which 
have to be corrected by appropriate measures throughout the process:  
− They do not take into account unexpected results (which may be consider-
able in the case of EPAs, with their weak information base), and  
− They do not provide an answer to the question of which criteria should be 
used to judge the monitoring findings. 
                                                          
34  A method similar to results chain analysis. 
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− Finally, they do not a priori indicate the right mix between quantitative 
and qualitative as well as objective and subjective indicators; but that is a 
flaw which every monitoring methodology has to deal with. 
These issues will be further discussed in later sections of this chapter. Before, 
the terminology of results chain analysis for EPA monitoring is clarified. 
Box 5.2:    The generic Monitoring Policy Impacts (MPI) approach 
Monitoring Policy Impacts (MPI) is designed as a policy management instrument, to 
be applied to improve the efficacy of policies in reaching their objectives. MPI is 
conceived to identify diversions of reality from plan when they occur, as well as the 
causes of such diversions, thus allowing immediate corrections, if required, and re-
spective adjustments in policy design and implementation. 
MPI focuses on: 
− policies rather than on programmes and projects, but considers monitoring of 
programmes and projects to the extent that they form part of a policy implementa-
tion strategy 
− impacts rather than on implementation, but taking into account that monitoring 
of the implementation process is a prerequisite for tracing impacts 
− monitoring rather than evaluation, accompanying the implementation process and 
putting emphasis on the generation of current evidence on performance and im-
pacts which allows real-time adjustments in policy, programme and project de-
sign and/or implementation if deemed necessary 
An MPI should be conducted in eight methodological steps: 
Step 1:  Initiation and preparation of MPI 
Step 2:  Review and analysis of the policy to be monitored 
Step 3:  Development of impact model 
Step 4:  Selection of indicators 
Step 5:  Research design 
Step 6:  Data collection / survey execution 
Step 7:  Data compilation, processing and analysis 
Step 8:  Communication and presentation of results of MPI to policy makers, cli-
ents, public 
Source:    Metz (2005) 
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Proposed terminology and concept for results chain analysis in EPAs 
There is no uniform terminology in the literature for the proposed approach on 
monitoring and evaluation. The overall concept is referred to as “causal chain 
analysis”, “impact chain analysis”, “impact routes" or other terms. The models 
usually refer to a sequence of steps or levels through which an input passes 
into a development process to translate into an impact. The terminology on the 
different steps is also not uniform. 
A common understanding of the EPA-monitoring terminology, however, is not 
only of overarching importance for conceptualising EPA monitoring but even 
more crucial for its implementation in a large number of countries with very 
different capacities, languages, monitoring track records, etc. This paper will 
propose the harmonised terminology agreed in the OECD Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) for a results-based management (see Box 5.3) applied 
to the different types and levels of EPA inputs and results. 
Box 5.3:    Adaptation of the results chain approach to the EPA context 
Inputs are the financial, human, material, technological, administrative and regulatory 
resources provided by the government and donors. In the context of EPAs commit-
ments to change certain policies can be considered as inputs. 
Example 1:  Commitment to reduce import tariffs for livestock imports 
Example 2: The establishment of a fund for informing horticulture co-operatives 
and assisting them to meet phytosanitary standards for exports to the 
EU (can be committed to in the EPA text or as a formally independent 
accompanying measure). 
Results are changes in a state or condition which derive from a cause-and-effect 
relationship. The three types of results (which can be positive and negative) are out-
puts, outcomes and impacts. 
Outputs are the products and services which result from the use of inputs. Outputs can 
be completely controlled by the responsible institution. In the EPA context, these 
would be the actual policy changes, e.g. effectively lower applied tariffs or applica-
tion of simplified rules of origin. The output may differ from the input, e.g. if tariffs 
were not applied in the first place, or the reduction is not implemented. 
Example 1: Lower applied tariffs on livestock imports 
Example 2: Information and assistance workshops are held for members of horti-
cultural co-operatives, who then are better informed on phytosanitary 
standards of the EU. 
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Outcomes refer to the results in terms of target group benefits. 
Example 1: Increased intra-regional livestock trade (direct outcome)  
Higher incomes for livestock producers in exporting countries (indirect 
outcomes) 
Example 2: More vegetable producers comply with phytosanitary standards of the 
EU (direct outcome) 
Vegetable exports to the EU increase (indirect outcome) 
Safety standards in handling pesticides are improved (indirect out-
come) 
Higher income for vegetable farmers and farm workers (indirect out-
come) 
Impacts are the long-term consequences of the outcomes. They measure the general 
achievements of objectives in terms of national development and poverty reduction, 
but also include negative and unintended effects. 
Example 1: Income poverty amongst livestock herders has been reduced 
Example 2: Income poverty amongst vegetable farmers (and farm workers) is 
reduced 
 Health problems related to pesticides are reduced 
Source:   OECD (2002) and own examples 
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the linkages of the different broad monitor-
ing areas and the OECD / DAC terminology, with causal relations assumed 
from the bottom (inputs) to the top (impacts). Box 5.3 gives further defini-
tional clarification and some examples of how the terminology of results-based 
monitoring can be applied to EPAs. 
The three inputs in the dotted lower left cells are examples for EPA provisions 
that are expected to be implemented. The white cells in the upper half are re-
sults, with the impacts at the level of EPA (and CPA) development goals over-
arching a wide range of intermediate outputs and outcomes. The dashed lower 
middle right cells are accompanying measures, capacity building or domestic 
policy inputs that should aim at influencing the capacity of ACP countries 
toimplement EPA provisions and support EPAs objectives, regardless of 
whether they will be binding provisions of EPAs or not. The grey outer lower 
cells form the enabling environment for EPAs, they may be objects of EPA 
monitoring but are not part of the EPA policy system. However, this general  
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picture does not yet tell us much about the specific issues to be monitored in a 
given EPA. 
Steps in applying the results chain framework 
Since the results chains for policy packages like EPAs (plus accompanying 
measures) are inherently complex, any attempt to monitor all possible linkages 
and transmission mechanisms would be extremely demanding and probably 
not feasible – focus in monitoring is an absolute requirement (see Chapter 4). 
Decision on the focus can be based on an ex ante impact assessment and/or 
consultations with representative stakeholders and scientists (Metz 2005; PwC 
Figure 5.1:    Linkages between broad monitoring areas in a results chain 
approach 
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Impacts
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/
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Source:    Own design 
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2007). Hence, the identification of results chains could probably be achieved 
best in a step-by-step approach (which might entail more detailed sub-steps): 
1. Determination of general areas that will be monitored regardless of coun-
try focus. These will be particularly EPA implementation and trade flows. 
In addition, development assistance for EPAs would certainly be among 
those general areas if it is decided to include them in EPA monitoring. In-
formation in these areas is indispensable for several reasons: to assess the 
genuine effects of EPAs on trade flows to the EU, to the ACP countries, 
and within regions; for perceiving sector differentiation and indicating po-
tentially problematic developments; for triggering safeguard mechanisms. 
Such general areas of monitoring could also include some aspects of the 
framework conditions (such as general terms of trade for individual coun-
tries and ACP regions, general economic governance indicators such as 
the doing business indicators, etc.), or general trade capacity. Indicators on 
framework conditions can be obtained easily and at low cost from interna-
tional indicator data bases (see Chapter 5.2.1). 
2. Identification of the key sectors and issues where the largest risks and 
opportunities are expected to be triggered by EPAs (see Box 4.3 for an ex-
ample). This exercise has to be participatory and should involve a very 
broad range of stakeholders and government agencies. It must be taken 
into account that some specifically vulnerable sub-sectors may have been 
taken out of EPAs or will be liberalised only with a long delay (for in-
stance sensitive agricultural goods). These sub-sectors can probably be left 
out of EPA monitoring, or their monitoring can be delayed. According to 
the general EPA schedule, a sequence of the anticipated changes in the 
identified key sectors and issues can be established. This sequence would 
provide the schedule for the further steps which have to be carried out by 
sector or issue. 
3. Based on the second step, experts on the selected area/sector from gov-
ernment and NSA could identify a detailed results chain (see Figure 5.2 
for an example) or a set of several chains (see Box 4.4. for how EPA pro-
visions can provide the starting points for setting up result chains). 
4. Indicators have to be proposed and attributed at the different levels of 
inputs, outputs and outcomes (see Figure 5.2 for how some indicators are 
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attributed to a results chain, and Box 5.4 for further examples of indicators 
at the outcome and impact level). The availability of data, timeliness, 
quality and prices/costing of possible indicators are important information 
to be collected, and for a pre-selection be made. 
5. The individual result chains must be merged where appropriate. In many 
cases, partial results chains will overlap in some aspects. For instance, in-
dependent results chains for export agriculture and import of agricultural 
products can converge in the same farming systems, or result chains de-
parting from different instruments such as tariffs or investment could 
touch the same industries. 
6. A final selection of indicators must be made on the basis of criteria men-
tioned in step 4. 
For each critical sector, a rule of thumb could be to select up to 10 indicators, 
including capacity, implementation, process and results, but a definite limit is 
certainly difficult to determine given the complexities of EPAs and the needs 
of stakeholders for different types of information. It must also be taken into 
account that some indicators will be of a composite nature, for instance tariff, 
trade and price data have to be compiled for many goods, implementation of 
rules of origin or of SPS aspects of EPAs will have to combine quantitative 
and qualitative aspects, income data for several subgroups of society and may 
then be aggregated into an index. 
Flexibility should be an important feature of any EPA-monitoring system 
(Chapter 4.2). This must also apply to the selection of monitoring areas and 
indicators. Some selected areas may prove to be of low relevance, while oth-
ers, which may not be (sufficiently) perceived initially, may prove to be highly 
sensitive. The latter will particularly occur for unexpected results which can 
only be detected through open monitoring instruments, which should be 
adopted in complementing the results chain approach (see Chapter 5.4). There 
should also be sufficient flexibility in the monitoring system to add selected 
new aspects, for instance during regular revision of the basic result chains 
during assessment phases (national and regional policy dialogue) of the moni-
toring reports (Chapter 5.4). 
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Box 5.4:    Results of EPAs expected in three key sectors in Tanzania 
For each of the three sectors covered in the Tanzania workshop, a list of possible 
indicators at the level of outcomes and impacts was established. While these lists 
would have to be completed and screened for their usefulness in EPA monitoring 
according to criteria set out in the text, they do provide a good impression of the 
range of options.* 
*Note that some indicators would have to be further specified. 
Agriculture Manufacturing  Fish Industry 
- Agriculture value 
added per worker 
- Cereal yield 
- Growth in agricul-
tural value added 
- Agricultural policy 
costs index 
- Crop production 
index 
- Livestock produc-
tion index 
- Volume of exports 
- Volume of imports 
- Firms’ sales 
- Proportion of large 
firms 
- Change of technol-
ogy in  
manufacturing 
- Growth of export 
manufacturing 
- Ratio of export to 
production 
- Export of primary 
goods 
- Consumption of 
local goods 
- Foreign direct in-
vestment 
- Labour productivity 
- Industry productiv-
ity 
Positive impacts 
- Job creation indicators (Number of 
fishermen employed in the fishing 
sector) 
- Commercial fishing indicators 
(Number of fishing ships and 
processing factories, Data on fish-
ing capacities, Trade volumes 
overall) 
- Increased support for hygiene 
standards - Indicators (Expenses in 
investment & capacity building, 
Share of fish export rejected, 
Number of fish in metric tonnes 
per year in commercial fishing) 
Negative impacts 
- Loss of subsistence livelihoods - 
Indicators (Number of subsistence 
fishermen over time, Statistics on 
traditional fishing boats, Change 
of eating habit - level of protein in 
diets (surveys) 
- Overfishing - Indicators (Annual 
fishing statistics, Number of sub-
sistence fishermen over time, Sta-
tistics on traditional fishing boats) 
Source: DIE-FES Tanzania workshop, 28 Feb. − 1 Mar. 2007 
  Fi
gu
re
 5
.2
:  
  E
xa
m
pl
e 
of
 a
n 
EP
A
 r
es
ul
t c
ha
in
 − 
th
e 
ca
se
 o
f f
is
h 
ex
po
rt
s i
n 
Ta
nz
an
ia
 
   
N
o
. 
o
f 
  
  
  
 
fi
sh
e
rm
a
n
 
e
m
p
lo
y
e
d
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
o
f 
tr
a
d
it
io
n
a
l 
fi
sh
e
rm
a
n
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
d
A
n
im
a
l
fi
sh
st
o
c
k
s
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
fo
r 
fi
sh
 f
a
rm
in
g
 &
 
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
M
e
a
su
re
s 
a
g
a
in
st
 
o
v
e
re
x
p
lo
it
a
ti
o
n
A
d
o
p
t 
q
u
o
ta
-
sy
st
e
m
P
ro
m
o
te
 f
is
h
-
fa
rm
in
g
In
c
re
a
se
d
 
d
o
m
e
st
ic
 
d
e
m
a
n
d
O
u
tb
re
a
k
o
f 
tr
a
n
sm
it
te
d
d
e
se
a
se
In
c
re
a
se
d
 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
D
e
m
a
n
d
 f
ro
m
 
o
u
ts
id
e
 
E
U
 m
a
rk
e
ts
Im
p
o
rt
 c
h
e
c
k
s 
fr
o
m
 E
U
P
o
ll
u
ti
o
n
th
ro
u
g
h
 c
h
e
m
ic
a
ls
S
o
c
io
p
o
li
ti
c
a
l
in
st
a
b
il
it
y
L
o
ss
 o
f 
e
n
d
e
m
ic
 
a
n
d
 r
a
re
 s
p
e
c
ie
s
D
e
c
re
a
se
 o
f 
m
o
sq
u
it
o
-e
a
ti
n
g
 f
is
h
e
s
L
o
ss
 o
f 
li
v
e
li
h
o
o
d
s 
fr
o
m
 
su
b
si
st
e
n
c
e
 
fi
sh
in
g
F
a
m
il
y
 
d
is
-
in
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
In
p
u
ts
 &
In
st
r
u
m
e
n
ts
Im
p
a
ct
s
O
u
tc
o
m
e
s
M
o
re
 
M
a
la
ri
a
F
o
o
d
 
se
c
u
ri
ty
O
v
e
rf
is
h
in
g
In
c
re
a
se
d
 l
a
b
o
u
r 
sa
v
in
g
 t
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
ie
s
N
e
g
le
c
t 
o
f 
a
g
ri
c
u
lt
u
re
Jo
b
 c
re
a
ti
o
n
O
th
e
r 
fa
c
to
rs
 
w
it
h
 l
ik
e
ly
 
si
m
il
a
r 
im
p
a
c
ta
s
C
h
a
n
g
e
 o
f 
e
a
ti
n
g
 
h
a
b
it
s
N
o
. 
o
f 
c
a
rg
o
 
p
la
n
s 
c
a
rr
y
in
g
 
fi
sh
E
x
p
a
n
si
o
n
 o
f 
fi
sh
 m
a
rk
e
ts
R
e
g
io
n
a
l 
tr
a
d
e
 
in
te
g
ra
ti
o
n
E
a
sy
 a
c
c
e
ss
 o
f 
E
U
 m
a
rk
e
ts
R
u
le
s 
o
f 
o
ri
g
in
 
(T
Z
, 
K
E
, 
U
G
)
Im
p
o
rt
 c
h
e
c
k
s 
fr
o
m
 E
U
A
id
 f
o
r 
tr
a
d
e
N
o
. 
o
f 
fi
sh
 
c
a
tc
h
e
s 
in
 
m
e
tr
ic
 t
o
n
s 
p
e
r 
y
e
a
r
C
o
m
m
e
rc
ia
l 
fi
sh
in
g
N
o
. 
o
f 
fi
sh
in
g
 
sh
ip
s 
&
 
p
ro
c
e
ss
in
g
 
fa
ct
o
ri
e
s
 
 So
ur
ce
:  
  o
w
n 
de
si
gn
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
D
IE
 T
an
za
ni
a 
w
or
ks
ho
p,
 2
8 
Fe
b.
 - 
1 
M
ar
. 2
00
7 
Michael Brüntrup et al.
 German Development Institute 70
Technically, steps 3 to 6 are the most demanding parts of the methodology. As 
was pointed out above, and affirmed in the workshops, result chains are not 
linear (with one input leading to one output which affects only one outcome 
which in turn affects only one impact), but usually more complex: one output 
influences more than one outcome − e.g. reduced tariffs result in increased 
imports and lower government revenues − and at the same time one outcome 
usually is influenced by more than one input − e.g. increased exports can be 
the result of a combination of simplified rules of origin and improved compli-
ance with standards. Therefore, a monitoring system must not limit itself to 
investigating the effectiveness of individual policy measures but instead must 
particularly examine the adequacy of the overall package. 
The impact chains also have a time dimension which needs to be considered. 
Policies as “inputs” often need time before the outputs (such as operational 
institutions) essential to their implementation are available. Also, outcomes 
only emerge after a certain time and often many years must pass before they 
become fully effective. 
In the workshops in Tanzania and Kenya, steps 2, 3 (and partially 4) could be 
carried out in spite of a very limited time frame (one day only) and a less than 
comprehensive representation of stakeholders (see the boxes and figures men-
tioned). With more time and a more systematic selection of participants, it is 
certainly possible to define result chains of a quality sufficient for a compre-
hensive monitoring system. This could also include the definition of indicators 
(more on indicator selection in the next chapter, 5.2). Some lessons on results 
chain analysis and indicator selection can be learned from the workshops: 
− It is possible and recommendable to construct results chains both from a 
sector perspective (which effects for a given sector can be expected from 
different EPAs provisions) and from on an EPA-provision perspective 
(which effects can a given EPA provision have on different sectors), and 
later combine them. 
− Results chains tend to be unrealistically complex and go too far in the 
attribution of indirect effects (e.g. from lack of income to criminality). A 
necessary part of the results chain analysis must be to draw realistic sys-
tem borders where EPA impacts are blurred by impacts from other 
framework conditions. 
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− Experienced sector policy specialists must guide working groups in order 
to provide initial orientation, detailed knowledge on studies, existing 
monitoring systems, sector weaknesses etc. 
− Statisticians would need to assist experts and working groups in order to 
provide insights into quality standards of existing indicators and issues to 
be taken into account for indicators to be established (practicality, costs, 
etc.). 
− In order to select cost-effective and realistic indicators on the base of re-
sult chains, experts and statisticians should assess which data are available 
at what price and compile a list from which to chose informational value 
for money. If this step is not taken, some results chains, and particularly 
those with far-reaching assumptions, quickly risk becoming in-
operational. 
− Moderation skills are crucial in order to foster discussions and include 
stakeholders with sometimes very different knowledge and skills.  
5.2 Selection of indicators for EPA monitoring 
A monitoring system relies on meaningful and reliable indicators which are 
either readily available or can be generated and updated on a regular basis. The 
latter should be considered if important implementation decisions are contin-
gent on information that is not readily available.  
The selection of good indicators is a crucial issue in any monitoring system. 
One collection of features of a good indicator is summarised in Box 5.5. There 
are numerous other attempts to guide indicator selection.35 In selecting any sort 
of indicator, it is important to pay attention to the trade-offs that exist between 
the different criteria. It certainly does not make sense to watch an indicator 
over time if its likely measurement error is greater than the expected changes 
in its value due to policy changes. For practical reasons, the validity of the 
indicator might have to be weighed against other qualities and thus a second-
best solution chosen, for example because it is faster or considerably cheaper 
or more complete in other aspects. However, such data must then not be over-
interpreted. 
                                                          
35  For more details, cf. textbooks on empirical research or M&E divisions of development 
agencies or see Monitoring and Evaluation News (www.MandE.co.uk). 
Michael Brüntrup et al.
 German Development Institute 72
Usually, given the very wide array of results that an EPA monitoring can po-
tentially deal with (by sector, impact type, actors and institution, etc., see 
Chapter 4), and since appreciation of data availability and quality varies 
widely across countries, indicators have to be chosen jointly by EPA stake-
holders with the help of national sector specialists and statisticians. This holds 
regardless of whether they are chosen among indicators readily available, 
whether they have to be newly generated through analysis and/or combination 
of already existing data, or whether they have to be created through genuine 
data collection. Only national specialists will know what is available and fea-
sible. 
5.2.1 Sources for indicators 
National statistics 
In almost all countries, a significant number of indicators in areas related to 
EPAs should exist (though many may be incomplete, inaccurate or not up-to-
date): 
− In most countries, trade data are relatively easily available. Sometimes, for 
certain products such data are even generated several times, for instance 
by customs administration and specific boards. Their reliability is, how-
Box 5.5: Features of a good indicator 
A good indicator 
− is a direct and unambiguous measure of progress—more (or less) is unmistaka-
bly better; 
− is relevant - it measures factors that reflect the objectives; 
− varies across areas, groups, over time, and is sensitive to changes in policies, 
programmes, and institutions; 
− is not easily diverted by unrelated developments and cannot be easily manipu-
lated to show achievement where none exists; and 
− can be tracked (better if already available), is available frequently, and is not too 
costly to track. 
Source:   World Bank, PRSP monitoring and evaluation 
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ever, often weak, particularly in the poorest countries, where government 
services are often understaffed, poorly equipped and suffering from cor-
ruption. There are striking examples that trade data for key commodities 
under such circumstances do not even indicate the direction of change 
(e.g. Baffes 2002 for cotton in Tanzania, or for intraregional trade 
Meagher 2003 and UNECA 2004).36 The use of mirror data from the EU 
can only partially compensate for the lack of reliable national data because 
of coherence problems of timing, attribution, fob (freight or free on board) 
versus cif (cost, insurance and freight) data, etc. In many cases, transmis-
sion and consolidation at the national level must be improved or acceler-
ated. This is particularly important if safeguards against import surges are 
to be triggered by trade data. The same is true for import price informa-
tion. In the area of trade data, important synergies can be achieved for 
EPA monitoring if combined with trade facilitation and capacity building 
efforts. 
− Other economic data will form the bulk of the output and outcome indica-
tors, especially prices, production, consumption (see Table 5.1). If they 
are to serve EPA-monitoring purposes they have to be disaggregated by 
sectors, regions, and other relevant criteria, e.g. gender of producers or 
size of companies. Such data are usually even less readily available than 
trade data, but for selected cases they exist. Since they are also (poten-
tially) relevant for informing other policies, the EPA-monitoring mecha-
nisms should co-operate closely with theses sector policy networks. Often, 
particular attention will have to be made on data reliability and timeliness, 
support in the form of capacity development, of payments for data or as-
sociation of non-state actors as a control mechanism can enhance these. 
− At the level of impacts on final goals of EPAs (poverty, environmental 
sustainability, etc.), in many poorer ACP countries indicators are collected 
for monitoring PRSs (Baker 2000; GTZ 2004). The advantage of such in-
ternationally accompanied poverty monitoring systems is that they have 
(in principle at least) developed over the years to allow for disaggregation 
according to regions, vulnerable groups and gender. Better-off countries 
                                                          
36  A very relevant problem is the compilation of customs data (generated usually for revenue 
reasons only) into trade data reflecting volume, value and direction of trade at the necessary 
levels of disaggregation (6- to 8-digit in the HS-format). Only then can changes in trade 
flows be attributed to changes in tariffs. 
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do not always have internationally backed PRSs and associated poverty 
monitoring, and if poverty-related statistics are available at all, their inter-
national comparability may be questionable. MDG indicators are usually 
available for almost all (developing) countries, but some of these data are 
only produced in long intervals and are therefore of little use for EPA 
monitoring. A poor data situation may also be given for environmental in-
dicators. In any case, data on poverty and environmental sustainability is 
often readily available at national level only, sub-national level data will 
only be available by going back to the original (often not easily available) 
data bases. Thus, identifying impacts of EPAs, which will be concentrated 
on special (liberalised) sectors, will at least require additional analysis of 
existing data (if such data is available). It should be kept in mind that cre-
ating entirely new data at the impact level for EPA-monitoring purposes 
would require substantial funds and capacities. 
Table 5.1:    Selection of international databases by broad monitoring area 
Trade UNCTAD, UN-Comtrade, WTO, UNDP  
Economic  
Development 
(incl. agriculture 
and infrastructure) 
UNDP (Human Development Indicators), FAO, UNIDO, 
World Bank, MDG indicators 
Investment Climate Earth trends, Bertelsmann Transformation Index,  
World Bank (doing business) 
Economic  
Governance 
Freedom of the World Index, Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index, Afrobarometer, Corruption Perception Index 
Poverty and  
Nutrition 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG)   Indicators, 
FAOSTAT, Earthtrends 
Health and  
Education 
UNDP (Human Development Indicators) 
Development  
assistance 
OECD, EUROPAID 
Source:    own compilation 
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− The potential synergies between EPA monitoring and the monitoring 
mechanisms for Aid for Trade (AfT), proposed by the World Trade Or-
ganization (WTO) and to be adopted by the EU, are obvious, but may be 
tricky in detail (see Box 7.2). Particular attention has to be given to defini-
tions and separate accounts for different types of AfT, EPA related assis-
tance etc. For instance, some support for supply side constraints or for 
compensation of government revenue losses from EPA tariff reductions is 
not part of the current more narrow definition of AfT used by the EU to 
define trade-related assistance and capacity building until now. Fiscal 
support as well as assistance to the productive sectors and trade related in-
frastructure is, however, part of the wider definition of AfT endorsed by 
all OECD members, including the EU. There is need for clarification be-
tween partners regarding monitoring of both inputs and impacts of the 
various categories of AfT. Arguably, EPA-related assistance categories 
need to match international AfT classifications. 
It has to be reiterated that assessing (and improving) the capacity and quality 
of national statistical systems and statistics is crucial for EPA monitoring, 
particularly if important decisions such as safeguards are to be triggered by 
such indicators. For further discussion, see Chapter 6.2. 
International databases 
Increasingly, a wide range of statistics and indicators are produced or compiled 
by intergovernmental agencies and international NGOs. Most are easily acces-
sible via the Internet. They can provide important information on the frame-
work conditions or general impact level, such as terms of trade, general quality 
of governance, level of education, health status, and others (see Table 5.1). 
In Annex 9, a selection of the most prominent databases for the broad monitor-
ing areas of EPAs is compiled and the indicators are listed (Governance, 
Economy, Poverty, Sustainability, Trade Development Assistance, Tables 
A93−A9.8). For Tanzania, Annex 9 presents the most recent data from the 
above mentioned international databases, and notes whether they have actually 
been surveyed for that database, from other international databases or com-
piled from national systems (Tables A9.9−A9.14). Both compilations can 
serve to inspire and guide the selection of indicators during a results chain 
design exercise. In many cases even national experts are not aware of these 
data bases for their countries (though they may know the original sources and 
may be able to asses the quality of the [underlying] data). 
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There are also attempts to provide composite indicators specifically for trade 
policy. The trade and development index (TDI) of United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, Box 5.6) provides a good example of 
a composite indicator (for the whole set of indicators in the background, see 
Annex 10). TDI values can serve as a tool to track progress of countries in 
respect to trade and development performance across countries (TDI rank) and 
over time (TDI score or rank). This can also be used for EPA-monitoring pur-
poses, where the TDI can serve as an indicator to compare the performance of 
the ACP countries with that of a “control group” of countries in a similar situa-
tion. 
Despite the advantages of these international databases, particularly availabil-
ity, they also have disadvantages for EPA monitoring. One is that, even less 
Box 5.6:    UNCTAD Trade and Development Index 
UNCTAD developed a Trade and Development Index ranking 110 countries on the 
basis of how well they manage the complex interplay of factors that determine both 
trade progress and human development. The index is based on several assumptions: 
that the contribution of trade to development depends to a large extent on the context 
in which it works; and that the trade and development performance of a country can 
not be seen as the mere sum of economic growth and export performance. In looking 
systematically at the interactions among different factors that determine trade and 
human development outcomes, the TDI has three main functions: (i) monitoring the 
trade and development performance of countries; (ii) diagnosing and identifying 
factors affecting their performance; and (iii) providing a policy tool for national and 
international action to keep trade focused on development and poverty reduction. 
The TDI considers three sets of determinants of trade and development performance, 
referred to as dimensions (structural and institutional factors; trade policies and 
processes; and level of development). Each dimension is composed of a number of 
components, which are derived from a set of indicators. The relationship among the 
components is considered to be complex, mutually interacting and multi-
dimensional, and thus each of the components is seen both a cause of change in 
others and an outcome of the influence of the latter. 
The TDI is then the weighted sum of the components. A higher value reflects a 
higher trade and development performance. An increase of TDI over time reflects an 
overall improvement of a country performance. The TDI ranking gives an assessment 
of countries performance relative to other countries or a change in relative perform-
ance (in comparison to others) over time. 
Source:    UNCTAD (2007), see Annex 10 
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than national data, they are not directly linked and linkable to EPAs, which 
would require sector or sub-sector level data. Ownership could be a problem at 
least with some of them (e.g. corruption indices). Quality should be a concern, 
too - in many cases international indicators cannot be better than the national 
statistics they are derived from. As argued above, these are often very weak. If 
composite indicators are used, consideration should be given to what primary 
indicators have been used to construct them (risk of “garbage in - garbage 
out”). In any case, a careful analysis of the methodology for the determination 
of any indicator is indispensable. Another disadvantage is that international 
databases do not always include all ACP countries. However, a cautious use of 
international databases will in many cases be better than not to use them in 
view of the limited capacities in ACP countries and realism concerning capac-
ity building for generating new indicators. 
Indicators specifically developed for EPAs 
It is very likely that some indicators will have to be developed specifically for 
EPAs. This seems necessary for several reasons: the general (international) 
databases are not specific enough to be very sensitive (see Box 5.6) to changes 
induced by EPAs; some requirements (monitoring capacities, EPA processes, 
EPA accompanying measures) ask for EPA-specific indicators; the dimensions 
of EPAs, opportunities and risks, are sufficiently large to justify such efforts 
(see Chapter 4). 
The indicators to be developed can be classified into different categories: 
− Compilation of existing data in new indicators, e.g. trade data summarised 
for those products that are affected by EPA liberalisation in general or for 
specific sensitive products or sectors in particular, or analysis of poverty 
data according to sectors or products that are EPA and poverty sensitive, 
such as important export or import products and prices. 
− Modification of existing data collection exercises in order to support EPA 
questions, e.g. including specific questions or selecting specific entrepre-
neurs in doing business surveys or orienting capacity assessments towards 
EPA relevant sectors, organisations or networks. 
− Specific indicators will be necessary for assessing EPA implementation, 
e.g. for monitoring whether EPA provisions are being translated into na-
tional legislation and how the regulatory quality is appreciated. 
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The particular challenge of developing specific EPA indicators is that at least 
some of them will have to be harmonised at the regional if not ACP level in 
order to make compatible and comparable observations on the overall EPA 
implementation and impact. This will require considerable coordination efforts 
of the responsible EU-ACP institutions (see Chapters 5.3 and 6.2). 
5.2.2 Types of indicators 
Qualitative and quantitative approaches and indicators 
A common distinction between qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
impact assessment that is also applicable to EPA monitoring is summarised in 
Table 5.2. 
Qualitative approaches allow for a focus on in-depth understanding of pro-
cesses, behaviours, and perceptions of population groups and representatives 
of sectors under study. They often rely on participants’ knowledge of the con-
ditions surrounding the policy being evaluated, or participatory evaluations in 
which stakeholders are involved in all stages of the evaluation − determining 
the objectives of the study, identifying and selecting indicators to be used, and 
participating in data collection and analysis. Quantitative approaches are 
Table 5.2   Main features of quantitative and qualitative approaches in impact 
assessment  
 Quantitative Approach Qualitative Approach 
Main pur-
pose  
To assess causality and 
reach conclusions that 
can be generalised 
To understand processes, behaviours and 
conditions as perceived by the groups or 
individuals being studied 
Sampling  Probability sampling Purposive sampling 
Methodol-
ogy for 
analysis  
Predominantly statistical 
analysis 
Triangulation (i.e. simultaneous use of 
several different sources and means of 
gathering information) 
Systematic content analysis 
Gradual aggregation of data based on 
selected themes 
Source:   Metz (2005) 
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mainly used to generate, evidence that is easy to digest and clear, though 
sometimes superficial. Individually, quantitative indicators are easy to aggre-
gate and to present as tables or graphics of means or measures of variation. 
They can also be used for later statistical analysis to test for hypotheses on 
underlying relations. Both have to obey to procedures in sampling and analy-
sis, but for quantitative indicators the standards are usually higher. 
Clearly, both quantitative and qualitative approaches and indicators can and 
should be used in EPA monitoring, and the results chain analysis allows for 
both. In the following it is argued that some quantitative indicators should 
form the backbone of EPA monitoring. This backbone must be bolstered with 
qualitative indicators and probably some further quantitative ones. This argu-
ment is based on the following observations: 
− Some of the most important and successful monitoring systems in devel-
opment (MDGs, PRSPs, the increasing number of programme based ap-
proaches) have a core of quantitative indicators. 
− Quantitative indicators are particularly useful if results are to be compared 
against quantifiable commitments (e.g. tariff reductions, development as-
sistance) or across countries (aggregated EPA monitoring at regional 
level. 
− For some proposed uses of EPA monitoring, quantitative indicators are 
required (e.g. triggering safeguards). 
− Some issues in EPAs are clearly qualitative in nature and must be ad-
dressed by qualitative methods (e.g. alleviation of non-tariff barriers, im-
plementation of national policies accompanying EPA-implementation). 
− Participatory monitoring approaches are very often qualitative in nature. 
In summary, the plea for a backbone of quantitative indicators derives from the 
proven importance of speedy, simple, comparable, aggregatable information in 
successful monitoring systems. Purely qualitative assessment exercises (see 
Annex 7 for the Structural Adjustment Programme Review Initiative (SAPRI) 
experience on structural adjustment policies) do not seem to have had much 
impact. This does not mean that only quantitative methods have to be used in 
EPA monitoring. An important distinction to be made is between qualitative 
approaches/methods and qualitative indicators/data. As Figure 5.3 illustrates, 
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not only quantitative but also qualitative methods may generate quantitative 
indicators.37 For instance, assessment of progress in implementation of certain 
qualitative EPA provisions, adaptive policies, participation or development 
assistance could be ranked according to an ordinate scale (e.g. 1−10), with a 
description attached to assist in making assessment comparable. Documenting 
why specific rating scores have been attributed will greatly facilitate interpre-
tation and drawing the right conclusions for adaptive action. This is particu-
larly important for the national level, where most adaptive strategies have to be 
formulated and implemented. 
Figure 5.3:    Relations between qualitative and quantitative issues and methods 
 
Quality Subjective welfare Ethnographic approaches 
Issue to be 
monitored     
 
Standard household surveys 
on household composition Economic anthropology 
Quantity       
 Quantity Methods Quality  
Source:    Adapted from Yaron (2006, 13) 
There are several other benefits of using integrated approaches for a compre-
hensive monitoring exercise, among them: 
− Consistency checks can be built in through the use of triangulation proce-
dures that permit two or more independent estimates to be made for key 
variables. For example, an assessment of who benefits from improved 
marketing opportunities, e.g. commercial plantations or small scale farm-
ers. 
                                                          
37  Though calculating with such data in a scientifically precise way is tricky, this would be less 
important for monitoring. 
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− Different perspectives can be obtained. For example, larger companies in 
ACP countries may believe that reformed rules of origin are workable for 
them, while small and medium sized companies may still face major ob-
stacles. 
− Analysis can be conducted on different levels. There are many qualitative 
methods designed to analyse issues such as social process, institutional 
behaviour, social structure, and conflict. 
− Opportunities can be provided for feedback to help interpret findings. In 
most quantitative research, once the data collection phase is completed it 
is not possible to check on apparent inconsistencies. The greater flexibility 
of qualitative research means that it is often possible to gather additional 
data. Survey researchers also use qualitative methods to check on out- 
liers − responses that diverge from the general patterns. 
A last area involved in combining quantitative and qualitative approaches in 
EPA monitoring is at the stage of interpretation of assembled monitoring in-
formation. In Chapter 5.4 more will be said about the assessment of monitor-
ing data through the use of formal ex ante and ex post as well as open partici-
patory approaches. 
The selection of indicators should be done in a participatory way based on the 
information value of each indicator, keeping transparency about the limitations 
of the selection. 
5.3 Monitoring regional integration  
Most EPA monitoring will target changes that can be measured at the national 
level and later be aggregated to regional level (provided this aggregation has 
been planned for and coordinated at a higher level). However, national moni-
toring and regional aggregation finds limits when it comes to monitoring re-
gional integration. More than any other object of EPA monitoring, regional 
integration will have to be based on strong supra-national coordination within 
and across regions.  
Regional integration is a key intended outcome of EPAs, as a goal in itself and 
as a stepping stone for world market integration of ACP countries. On the 
other hand, many critics of EPAs argue that they will be more a threat to re-
gional integration than a chance. This threat is obviously most sensitive in 
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cases where existing regional economic communities would not be identical 
with EPA configurations. This problem is particularly evident in Eastern and 
Southern Africa. Hence, the monitoring of regional integration in the EPA 
context needs to look at the interaction of the processes in the EPAs with 
autonomous integration initiatives. The institutional question that follows from 
this is whether the regional monitoring mechanism should be based in the 
regional EPA structures, which hardly exist yet in some regions, or in the bet-
ter established regional economic structures, which already have (albeit often 
weak) existing structures. The African Union could play an important role, too, 
since it has the mandate to oversee and harmonise regional integration schemes 
as stepping stones towards a African common market. 
As said, EPAs may weaken or strengthen regional integration, depending on 
EPA configuration, convergence or divergence of contents of different EPAs, 
development assistance to both EPA implementation and genuine integration 
processes, and political dynamics that will be triggered by EPAs. Given the 
critical importance attributed to regional integration by almost all stakeholders, 
the effects of EPAs on regional integration can be the subject of EPA monitor-
ing (Venables 2003; Hinkle / Newfarmer 2005; South Centre 2007). 
However, monitoring regional integration is a very complex task. A paper by 
the United Nations University Centre for Regional Integration Studies (Lom-
baerde / Langenhove 2004) describes regional integration “as a multidimen-
sional process that implies, next to economic cooperation, also dimensions of 
politics, diplomacy, security, culture, etc.” The paper presents a framework for 
the construction of a System of Indicators for Regional Integration (SIRI) 
which distinguishes between six categories of variables: actors, structural fac-
tors, institutionalisation, implementation, effects and interdependence. To 
monitor regional integration the authors use an input-output approach where 
integration is then implicitly seen as a process in which some variables act as 
inputs, some as outputs. The framework is presented in Table 5.3. 
Monitoring processes at regional level − whether they are part of EPA moni-
toring or of other regional monitoring initiatives − with genuine monitoring 
tasks (beyond mere coordination and harmonisation) will serve to strengthen  
regional competences, increase the interest of the regional organisation for 
timely quality results and strengthen the role of regions in the overall monitor-
ing processes. Synergies should be built between EPA monitoring and regional 
integration monitoring. EPA monitoring should further facilitate the identifi-
cation of a co-ordinated regional position towards the EU when it comes to  
Monitoring Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
German Development Institute 83 
Table 5.3:    Framework to classify variables of regional integration according to 
the results chain logic* 
Effect  
(of regional  
integration 
policies) 
(Impact) 
Development, growth, trade, migration…  
(Actors take steps that are supposed to contribute to regional 
integration and the institutionalisation of that region which affect 
different areas (social, cultural, economic). Mobility of persons, 
political interdependence (existence of common policies or de 
facto co-ordination of policies, conflicts, tension…) 
Interdepend-
ence  
(real de facto 
integration) 
(Outcome) 
Economic interdependence (trade flows, capital flows...) 
Information and knowledge flows 
Effects of integration (together with structural conditions and 
exogenous influences) can explain the degree and evolution of 
interdependence between regional actors. 
Degree of interdependence can be assessed on different dimen-
sions (cultural, economic, political …) 
Implementa-
tion 
(Output) 
Status of implementation of general treaties  
Status of implementation of specific agreements 
Institutionalisa-
tion 
(Input) 
Number and content of treaties, time frames of treaties… 
Institutional basis on which the whole integration process rests 
(constitution-based or treaty-based)  
Arrangements on common policies and/or policy coordination 
Institutional activity has quantitative (no. of treaties) and qualita-
tive (content of treaties) aspects and should be analysed on differ-
ent levels 
Actors 
 
Number and type of actors involved and their behaviour, level of 
activity… 
Overlapping membership 
Structural  
factors 
 
Structural characteristics of integration grouping that are related 
to the integration group and its members, e.g. scale of arrange-
ment, geographical proximity/distance of actors… 
* Effects of integration, structural conditions and exogenous influences can explain the degree 
of interdependence. Thus, effects are caused by policies, whereas interdependence is 
autonomously measured and reflects the evolution of interdependence (de facto integration) 
on different dimensions.  
Source:    Lombaerde / Langenhove (2004), results chain terminology added 
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modifications in the implementation of the EPA agreements or accompanying 
measures. A co-ordinated regional approach is also necessary when it comes to 
the application of specific safeguard measures, since the EPA regions are sup-
posed to function as customs unions, and therefore any increase in protection 
would affect all members of an EPA region, but not necessarily those of the 
genuine Regional Economic Communities. The necessary regional co-
ordination and decision making mechanism will have to constitute a key ele-
ment in the monitoring of regional integration as well as national level impacts 
(see Chapter 6.2). 
5.4 Options for the assessment of monitoring results – targets 
and analytical instruments for further clarifying EPA 
impact 
The assessment of the results of a monitoring exercise, i.e. how the informa-
tion is to be interpreted, depends on the level and the manner in which moni-
toring will be linked to the implementation and decision making in the EPA 
context. It may be recalled here that any assessment or “valuation” of the 
EPAs is inherently political and therefore potentially a source of disagreement 
and conflicts (see Section 3.3).38 A question that the parties to an EPA need to 
answer is to what extent they recognise this fact up front, and set up a regular 
political dialogue on the results of the monitoring, and to what extent they aim 
                                                          
38  The importance of the assessment step of any M&E system may be illustrated with a well-
known example which is one of the origins of EPAs: One of the most common arguments for 
the need for new principles for trade relations between the EU and the ACP has been the in-
effectiveness of the unilateral preferences of the Lomé conventions in increasing ACP ex-
ports to the EU. This ineffectiveness is commonly proved by the decrease of the share of im-
ports from ACP countries relative to that of other developing countries without preferential 
access. However, the conclusion that unilateral preferences were instrumental for the poor 
performance of ACP countries is debatable. An alternative interpretations is that the trade 
preferences were insufficient and blurred by restrictive rules of origin and other non-tariff 
barriers. An indicator in support of this interpretation would be that more positive trade de-
velopments were in fact experienced in many sectors where the preferences were substantial 
enough to provide a real advantage against competitors. Other interpretations of weak ACP 
export performance may relate to weak capacities to profit from preferences, or colonial de-
pendencies. The fact that it is ineffectiveness of unilateral preferences that dominated the in-
terpretation was certainly supported by some political and economic considerations, but one 
reason was definitely that no formal M&E framework for assessing Lomé impact had been 
defined.  
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to “rationalise” and “formalise” the valuation of the results. It is important that 
these discussions can take place on a regular basis and take into account the 
positions of all relevant stakeholders. Some aspects of this are discussed in the 
recommendations on stakeholders and institutional issues (Chapter 7), but 
methodological aspects of interpreting monitoring results will play a role for 
better decision making as well. 
Targets and benchmarks 
The interpretation of the monitoring results could to a certain extent be formal-
ised and rationalised by establishing quantitative or qualitative targets. If these 
targets are then missed, this would serve as an indication that something is 
going “wrong” with the EPAs, and processes should start concerning how to 
determine an appropriate response. Whether targets for indicators are set in 
advance or not depends on the circumstances and the possible reactions. For 
example, one clear quantitative target to be set for a safeguard mechanism 
could be that imports of a certain product from the EU into an EPA country or 
region increase by more than X % in 12 months. In that case, the EPA country 
or region would automatically have the right to increase tariffs by Y %. In this 
case the country or region should, however, try to assess the reasons for the 
surge (e.g. import competition or internal production drop) and whether safe-
guards are the right answer. At the same time, no pre-defined target may be set 
for the increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows from the EU into 
the tourism sector in the same region, once the sector has been opened under 
the EPA. However, the monitoring may find that changes in FDI flows can be 
observed, and the respective EPA region may want to discuss this with the EU. 
What and if any changes in the implementation or the actual provisions of the 
EPA in question would result from this would not be pre-determined. 
Targets could be established during ex ante Sustainability Impact Assessments 
(SIA, see Annex 6, point 1). For example, economic modelling could result in 
a forecast that fully liberalised market access to the EU would increase sugar 
exports from Mozambique by, say, 50 %. If exports increase by a significantly 
lower amount, say, less than 25 %, this could trigger a more in depth study on 
why exports did not increase in the projected manner. Targets could also be 
agreed in the absence of an SIA, through direct negotiations between the par-
ties to the EPA. This would essentially front-load part of the political debate 
on the interpretation of the monitoring results. These “negotiations” on the 
definition of targets and triggers do not have to, and perhaps should not be, 
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part of the negotiation of the EPA text as such. They could rather be carried 
out by joint monitoring bodies of the EPA partners, including the EU, in the 
early stages of the monitoring process itself. 
An alternative proposal for comparing targets with (monitoring) results of 
EPAs is to use development benchmarks.39 Two separate phases of the devel-
opment benchmarks process should be distinguished. First, an appropriate set 
of sustainable development benchmarks is designed in a consultative or par-
ticipatory manner. Second, progress of EPAs is assessed relative to the “devel-
opment benchmarks” earlier defined. Benchmarks would not only be defined 
for the goal level but also for the intermediate levels, including capacities, 
development assistance and other intermediate steps along results chains as-
sumed to be necessary to attain EPA goals. However, to make implementation, 
and in particular tariff liberalisation, conditional on the achievement of devel-
opment benchmarks is currently incompatible with WTO rules, notably GATT 
Art. XXIV. 
Analytical tools to establish the base for assessments and to further understand 
causal relationships 
Regardless of whether targets have been established or not, another fundamen-
tal task during the assessment of the monitoring data is to further isolate EPA 
impact, i.e. determine whether changes are due to the actual impacts of EPA 
implementation or to other factors or events that are correlated with the out-
comes and impacts but are not caused by the project or policy. This is neces-
sary because any results chain approach can only to a certain, limited extent 
foresee which framework conditions have to be taken into account by collect-
ing indicator data on them and which intermediate indicators can help in un-
derstanding causal relationships between inputs and goal level changes. Fur-
thermore, any impact monitoring has to sacrifice comprehensiveness for sim-
plicity and cost effectiveness (Chapters 4 and 6). 
The methodologically most rigorous approach is the establishment of a “coun-
terfactual”, an estimate of what would have happened had the EPA never been 
implemented. A number of methods for this have been developed for project 
evaluations; they fall into the broad categories: 
                                                          
39  See Annexes 11 to 13 for some further reflections on EPA benchmarks and their possible 
integration in an EPA text. 
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− randomised experimental designs - are analytically the most rigorous, 
− non-randomised quasi-experimental designs, 
− designs with a constructed counterfactual. 
These approaches are usually very demanding in terms of data and statistical 
methodology and typically belong to evaluation exercises. If they are briefly 
discussed here, it is with the intention to show that the quantitative assessment 
of monitoring results, or the formal linkage of monitoring and evaluation, can 
have far reaching consequences for data and capacity needs. Some methods 
(e.g. experimental designs) are even impossible to implement if specific EPA 
indicators or even regional or country specific EPA indicators are used, since 
they would require the existence of such data for matching groups. 
Experimental and quasi-experimental designs rely on the identification of a 
“control group” of individuals which are not benefiting from the programme. 
The main challenge is how to select a control group which has similar proper-
ties at the outset. Randomised experimental designs with individuals can not 
be used in evaluation and monitoring of national policies, since it is by defini-
tion not possible to identify a “control group” which is not affected by the 
policy change. For comparisons between countries, experimental designs with 
a randomised selection of a control group of non-EPA/ACP countries is hardly 
feasible. Non-randomised, quasi experimental designs can also be used to a 
limited extent only. Approaches that can be useful to some extent are: 
− Matching methods or constructed controls (Baker 2000, 4), in which one 
tries to pick an ideal comparison that matches the treatment group from a 
larger survey. This method could be applied for the evaluation and moni-
toring of policy impacts, by creating an “inter-country” control group. For 
example, comparing ACP-LDCs with ACP non-LDCs with similar eco-
nomic and trade structures could be relevant for assessing the impacts of 
EPAs. The indicators would normally be on the outcome level, for exam-
ple changes in exports to the EU either aggregated or in specific sectors. 
However, for monitoring purposes, data for this comparison group would 
also have to be collected and analysed on a continuous basis, which would 
be beyond the scope of EPA monitoring. Where key economic and trade 
data for other LDCs are readily available, the comparison with those from 
LDCs that are part of EPAs can provide important information. 
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− Reflective comparison, in which a baseline survey of participants, here the 
EPA countries, is done before implementation and a follow-up survey is 
done afterwards (Baker 2000, 4). The baseline provides the “comparison 
group” and impact is measured by the change in outcome indicators be-
fore and after implementation. This method could be applied relatively 
easily for the evaluation of EPAs, since they are not in force yet; this 
would allow for conducting a pre-EPA baseline survey that  could then be 
compared to a follow-up survey after (some of) the provisions are imple-
mented and have had time to create impact. Depending on the availability 
of data, the changes on some indicators can be observed during implemen-
tation, and thereby serve monitoring purposes. However, the use of base-
line data is problematic for economic developments over longer time peri-
ods, the “attribution problem” is particularly strong. The question of the 
extent to which the observed changes on indicators can be attributed to the 
policy or to other influences is not directly addressed. 
A counterfactual can be constructed through simulation and (economic) mod-
elling. The most comprehensive approach is through Computable General 
Equilibrium models (CGE). These models seek to trace the operation of the 
real economy and are generally based on detailed social accounting matrices 
collected from data on national accounts, household expenditure surveys, and 
other survey data. CGE models do produce outcomes for the counterfactual, 
though the strength of the model is entirely dependent on the validity of the 
assumptions, which are often based on the idea of perfect markets and there-
fore “heroic” for most ACP countries. Another problem is that  parameters 
have to be estimated based on time series data which do not reflect new poli-
cies, institutions and capacities, and that databases are often incomplete and 
many of the parameters have not been estimated at all by formal econometric 
methods. CGE models are also very time consuming, cumbersome, and expen-
sive to generate. The more non-economic impacts like environmental and 
social effects are captured, the more complex and demanding in terms of data 
requirements the modelling exercise becomes. It seems to be precisely for 
those reasons that CGEs have hardly been used in practice to assess the im-
pacts of trade agreements, even in the case of North America Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA), in spite of being identified conceptually as a very suitable method 
(see Annex 7, point 2). Hence, it seems unlikely that CGE models will play a 
major role in the monitoring and evaluation of EPAs in the short and medium 
term. 
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In order to simulate the counterfactual for specific sectors of the economies, 
partial equilibrium models can be used to estimate the effects of a policy on 
one or more variables, by holding other potentially affected variables constant. 
These models often emphasize regression analysis, to determine the statistical 
relevance of the relation of the observed variables (Abbott 2004, 4). This ap-
proach can be useful to identify impacts in one particular sector, and can po-
tentially provide detailed estimates for changes on different levels of the result 
chain. However, they can by definition not identify linkages to other sectors, 
e.g. if farm workers who may lose their employment in agriculture will find 
new jobs in manufacturing or services. 
Open approaches to assess monitoring results 
Open approaches that do not rely (exclusively) on ex ante hypotheses of results 
chains can in any case be useful complements for a monitoring exercise based 
on results chain analysis. They should provide the possibility for a systematic 
though not predetermined comparison of monitoring results with other per-
ceived influencing factors, or more generally an assessment/valuation of find-
ings against own (subjective) measures. The entire process of channelling 
monitoring results into the policy cycle and discussing them for purposes of 
learning and management decision can and should be designed in such a way 
(Chapter 6, particularly 6.4). Elements of these open approaches should also be 
built into the ongoing monitoring process, e.g. through the establishment of a 
complaint mechanism (see Chapter 5.2), that allows affected stakeholders to 
voice concerns in areas that are not in the focus of the predetermined monitor-
ing exercise. 
The proposal for a complaint mechanism 
One feature or complement of a future monitoring system that was repeatedly 
proposed in interviews and consultations is a complaint mechanism. The large 
advantage of such a mechanism is that it is able to capture unexpected (mostly 
negative) results. The mandate and institutional set-up of such an institution 
were not discussed in detail during the consultations, but the following general 
features were mentioned: The mechanism should  
− be responsible for eliciting complaints, 
− have the authority and means to launch its own enquiries, 
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− be highly accessible and responsive to non-state stakeholders (civil soci-
ety, private sector), 
− be sufficiently independent from political institutions, 
− have the mandate to alert and make recommendations to decision-makers. 
In the view of the advocates of such a complaint mechanism, an e-mail portal 
to which complaints could be addressed and where those complaining could 
track the status of enquiry and measures taken would be a desirable feature. 
The complaints received by such a mechanism could be an additional source of 
information for monitoring. Potential complaints could result from non-
implementation or ineffective implementation of provisions, or negative out-
comes, e.g. for employment. However, such a complaint mechanism should be 
clearly distinguished from a formal litigation mechanism (see Chapter 6.5). 
5.5 Reporting on EPA monitoring 
The preceding chapters have provided information about the setting up of 
results chains, the selection and compilation of indicators, the provision for an 
instrument for collecting and documenting non-expected (mainly negative) 
results, the special challenges of monitoring regional integration, and the chal-
lenges of interpreting such results, i.e. the right benchmarks. It will have be-
come clear that the need to be focused and limit the number of indicators to an 
operational number will also limit their potential to comprehensively document 
and explain how EPAs have been implemented, what have been capacity con-
straints, what accompanying measures have been taken to facilitate implemen-
tation and overcome constraints, and how all these factors have worked to-
gether within the given framework conditions to generate results at output, 
outcome and impact level. Given also the wide variety of stakeholders and 
their often limited capacity to participate and understand the complex realities 
around EPAs, there will be a need for further guidance through the results and 
their interpretation. 
A good way to satisfy this need for interpretation assistance will be to have the 
monitoring data assembled and commented on by credible institutions, by 
preference-independent think tanks or research institutions. They could pro-
vide the necessary competences to put monitoring results into a wider perspec-
tive, for instance, sector data in wider sector development at national, regional 
and international level. If no institution assembles all the necessary capacity, a 
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split up of responsibilities across more specialised institutions could be useful 
under the supervision of a lead agency. These institutions could also greatly 
assist in providing capacity to stakeholders to understand and participate in the 
monitoring exercise, thereby creating capacity for participation in EPA and 
other policy processes (see also Chapter 6.4 on institutional issues of EPA 
monitoring, particularly the ideas around an EPA observatory). 
6     Stakeholders and institutions of EPA monitoring 
Having considered the purpose and scope of and key instruments for monitor-
ing EPAs, this chapter looks at the potential stakeholders to be involved and a 
possible institutional framework. It concentrates on the following questions: 
− Who are the stakeholders in monitoring the implementation and impacts 
of EPAs? What can their role be in EPA monitoring?  
− What are the capacities of and incentives for different stakeholders to 
contribute to EPA monitoring? 
− At what level should monitoring take place? On what basis should moni-
toring functions be assigned to organisations and institutions at the na-
tional or regional level? 
6.1 Key stakeholders in EPA monitoring 
EPAs will affect countries and regions at large, including not only govern-
ments and their institutions, but also a wide range of non-state actors (private 
sector, workers, consumers, civil society, etc.) in the EU and the ACP who 
may have a stake in the EPA-monitoring exercise. Figure 6.1 presents the main 
(groups) of stakeholders with an interest in EPAs. 
Involving a broad variety of stakeholders in reflecting on institutional modali-
ties for EPA monitoring and later in process of monitoring can generate accep-
tance for a more evidence-based approach to political decision-making. It can 
also help to make implementation of EPAs more participatory, transparent and 
accountable to a wider range of stakeholders (see Section 3.3). Moreover, 
since poverty reduction is a core objective of EPAs, it is necessary to ensure 
that representatives of specifically vulnerable groups are fully involved in the 
monitoring process, both at the level of government (ministries for agriculture, 
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environment, etc.) and private sector and civil society (small agricultural pro-
ducers, fisherfolk, landless workers, informal sector workers etc.). 
 
The actors to be involved in monitoring and evaluating EPAs will be active at 
different levels (from the local to the supra-national level)40: 
National and regional state entities in both the EU and the ACP are directly or 
indirectly involved in negotiating EPAs. Other non-state actors, such as private 
sector associations (trade unions, business associations, farmer associations 
etc.) and non profit organisations (e.g. consumer organisations, fair trade net-
works, development NGOs), also have a stake in the negotiation and the im-
plementation of trade agreements. Moreover, research institutes and the media 
will articulate their views and findings and can therefore also be considered 
stakeholders in the debate on a monitoring mechanism for EPAs. Most civil 
society groups, and certainly the media are mainly active on a national level, 
while the private sector and economic social partners work on both the na-
                                                          
40  For more details on the state actors, see Annex 8. 
Figure 6.1:    Key stakeholder groups in EPAs and EPA monitoring 
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tional and the supra-national level. The groups of stakeholders in ACP and EU 
regions and countries will thus be mainly the same. However, it is important to 
emphasize that in most ACP countries and regions, non-state actors tend to 
have less access to information and be less equipped in terms of the capacities 
and financial resources needed to participate in this debate than their counter-
parts in Europe. 
The joint ACP-EU institutions also provide a framework for dialogue on all 
aspects of the CPA. The joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers has the overall 
political oversight of the agreement. Next to other Joint institutions like the 
Joint ACP-EU-Committee of Ambassadors, it is complemented by a Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly (JPA), whose role of scrutiny, democratic dialogue 
and recommendation is useful in the context of EPAs as well. With regard to 
the aid component of the partnership, including trade related projects and pro-
grammes of development cooperation, the Development Finance Cooperation 
Committee, a sub-committee of the ACP-EC Committee of Ambassadors, is 
responsible for ensuring joint monitoring and evaluation of operations.  
6.2 Some considerations on EPA-monitoring capacities 
One of the lessons learned from other policy monitoring processes refers to 
institutional capacities: “The institutional structure and complexity of a moni-
toring mechanism needs to take account of available capacity. A monitoring 
mechanism that requires unrealistically high levels of capacity building will 
not work” (GTZ 2004, 40; see also Section 3.3). 
Undoubtedly, it is highly desirable to map capacities before setting-up new 
monitoring structures. However, it is impossible, in the context of this study 
and without the concrete EPA texts, to assess the institutional capacity of the 
various stakeholders to monitor EPAs.41 Capacity in most ACP countries and 
regions is generally relatively weak. There are, for instance, severe capacity 
constraints when it comes to producing and collecting reliable statistics (see 
Annex 9, Table A9.1), or to analysing them. Other capacities that determine 
the quality of monitoring (e.g. capacities to facilitate the participation of dif-
ferent stakeholders in the monitoring process, to present and communicate data 
in a user friendly way etc.) are also often limited. 
                                                          
41  All indications in the following on capacities of individual stakeholders have to be regarded 
with this limitation. 
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The following points, which emerged from interviews and consultations with 
stakeholders, highlight some aspects that should be considered in a more in-
depth assessment of capacities prior to a monitoring exercise: 
− The experience and capacities within the European Commission to moni-
tor the impact of EPAs appear to be rather weak at the present stage. Ac-
cording to the joint evaluation unit of AIDCO, Directorate General (DG) 
Development and DG RELEX, there are not yet any tested methods for 
monitoring the implementation of policies at the national or regional level 
and their impacts on the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement. The 
evaluation unit is only starting strategic reflections on policy monitoring. 
Moreover, the evaluation unit acknowledges that the Commission is pres-
ently ill equipped to monitor the impact of trade policies and its develop-
ment co-operation on poverty, as this concept has not yet been conceptual-
ised for the purpose.42 This is of course not a problem facing only the 
Commission, it is also a methodological challenge for the aid administra-
tions of all EU Member States. 
− EU member state aid agencies are active in many different ACP countries 
and sectors, often deploying substantial personal and financial resources. 
However, as yet few bilateral interventions have been undertaken to assist 
the implementation of EPAs, and these are weakly coordinated, although 
it is already clear that the European Commission alone will not have the 
capacity to respond to all needs. EU member states have committed them-
selves and will have to step up their support in favour of EPA implemen-
tation. Thus, an important step of the design of EPA-monitoring mecha-
nism(s) should be (i) to map existing bilateral aid projects and pro-
grammes that aim to accompany the implementation of EPAs, (ii) to as-
sess how to draw on their resources and capacities for monitoring and (iii) 
to coordinate their efforts. Such exercise could usefully build on the ex-
perience of the Regional Preparatory Task Forces (RPTFs) put in place 
during the EPA negotiations. 
− While stakeholders from the Caribbean appear quite confident that re-
gional institutions could manage newly arising monitoring tasks, many of 
the stakeholders consulted in Tanzania and Kenya considered SADC and 
ESA too weak to assume a significant role in monitoring. In any case, re-
                                                          
42  See presentation by the head of the joint evaluation unit, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Brussels, 08.03.07. 
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gional institutions could and should play an important role in ensuring the 
regional coherence and comparability of the monitoring exercise. They 
could, for instance, ensure a certain degree of co-ordination of national 
monitoring processes, provide a forum for discussion of the results and 
their conclusions and monitor issues which cannot be addressed at the na-
tional level - primarily the process of regional integration itself (see Chap-
ter 5). Stakeholders also pointed to the fact that in Eastern Africa, business 
and civil society organisations (CSOs) have so far hardly operated at re-
gional level, and they therefore plead for a strong national component of 
an EPA-monitoring mechanism for the region. 
− There was a broad consensus among those consulted that monitoring 
should focus on the national level. This would be in line with the principle 
of subsidiarity (Section 3.3). A lot of relevant data is already being col-
lected and processed at the national level. Data collection and data quality 
would, however, in many cases have to be improved, certified and com-
piled in coherent ways. These data will also have to be complemented by 
additional information on indicators relating to the specific issues covered 
in the EPAs (see Chapter 5). At the organisational level, the key institu-
tions set to establish the procedures of the monitoring process and to take 
on concrete tasks are the responsible ministries (trade, agriculture, indus-
try, planning, social affairs), the offices of statistics, and to some extent 
academic institutions and specialised bodies (e.g. observatories of em-
ployment, human development or food security of the kind that exist in a 
number of African countries). As for the identification of monitoring pri-
orities, interpretation of results and their feedback into the policy cycle, 
parliaments and non-state actors also have an important role to play. Their 
participation could be achieved more easily at the national than at the re-
gional level, where they are more strongly organised. Investing in partici-
patory approaches to monitoring EPAs at the national level may also be 
worthwhile with regard to raising awareness and drawing public attention 
in ACP countries to the strong influence EPAs will have on the national 
business environment. This could subsequently create pressure for 
stronger national policy formulation. 
− Many ACP countries already receive assistance for strengthening their 
statistical capacities and policy monitoring under various schemes (sup-
port to PRSPs, Medium Term Expenditure Reviews etc.). It is worthwhile 
to explore to what extent this assistance already addresses capacity build-
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ing needs that would arise in the context of setting up an EPA-monitoring 
system and what additional support would have to be mobilised. 
− There appear to be strong incentives for business associations to get in-
volved in EPA monitoring, as they want to ensure that EPAs are beneficial 
for their members. Especially, the larger business associations in the Car-
ibbean and Eastern and Southern Africa are making efforts to beef up their 
capacities to participate in EPA negotiations and follow up the implemen-
tation of the agreements.43 Initiatives by private sector organisations, such 
as the Business Trade Forum EU Southern Africa (BTFES), an association 
of business associations from the EU and SADC, illustrate this interest. 
− Experience with monitoring the implementation of PRSPs has further 
shown that especially smaller civil society and private sector organisations 
without a base in the capital tend to find it difficult to participate in moni-
toring frameworks. They often cannot afford to set aside staff to regularly 
attend, prepare inputs and follow up on meetings. Moreover, they may not 
have enough staff at the policy and analytical level to take an active role in 
the discussions. Participation in such monitoring frameworks also involves 
high opportunity costs for these organisations. National level representa-
tive organisations could facilitate the participation of these smaller organi-
sations, but often these are not yet in place or weak. 
6.3 Incentives for participation in EPA monitoring 
It may be concluded from our consultations that the biggest incentives for 
stakeholders to participate in an EPA-monitoring process are that:  
i. the information and assessments they provide are considered in the 
process and affect the outcome (i.e. are reflected in monitoring re-
ports); 
ii.  these outcomes have a real impact on political decision making and 
the implementation / adaptation of the agreement or of accompanying 
measures; 
                                                          
43  They tend, however, to interpret the term “monitoring” in a different way than the definition 
provided in Chapter 2, linking it strongly to their lobbying activities (e.g. preparation of posi-
tion papers, proposals or studies that reflect the specific interests of the businesses they repre-
sent). 
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iii.  stakeholders gain access to other relevant information on the imple-
mentation and impacts of EPAs and can thus hold policy makers ac-
countable for the consequences of their implementation. 
A monitoring system that aims to involve different stakeholders, including 
civil society and the private sector, will need to give great attention to commu-
nicating with these stakeholders in an adequate way. This means, for instance, 
investing in appropriate reporting formats as well as information channels and 
feedback loops that take account of the specific capacities of the different 
groups of stakeholders to digest and contribute information (e.g. use of rural 
radios, simple formats, translation of information into local languages, prod-
uct-/branch-specific reporting). 
The suggestion that it is possible to assign clear-cut formal responsibilities to 
state and non-state actors and ‘define’ their relationship in collecting, analys-
ing and using monitoring data is a somewhat idealistic view. It does not ade-
quately take account of the political dimension of monitoring (see Chapter 
3.3). As monitoring experiences in other fields of policy indicate, monitoring 
EPAs may take place not only in the official monitoring framework but also 
within several different frameworks and parallel processes. Non-state actors 
and advocacy groups may set up “shadow monitoring mechanisms” if they feel 
that their views are not sufficiently taken into account (see, for instance, the 
example given in Annex 4, point 3). Moreover, they may decide to monitor 
specific trends or issues that they consider particularly important or relevant 
for their target groups and use results to attract attention to these issues. Scien-
tists have their own independent interests in analysing EPAs and their impacts. 
A participatory, credible and transparent M&E system should be able to make 
use of the information generated in such parallel processes to evaluate and 
compare it with the information gathered within the official framework. Hence 
there should be formal mechanisms through which different stakeholder 
groups could submit their own assessments and discuss them with other groups 
of stakeholders. 
The more transparent, participatory and “owned” an official EPA-monitoring 
framework is, the less need will be felt for “shadow monitoring.” If non-state 
actors feel that their information is taken into account and affects decision 
making, they will be ready to use or generate own resources for participation 
in the monitoring process, or actively look for assistance to enhance their ca-
pacity to do so. On the other hand, if monitoring is considered merely as an 
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exercise done just for the sake of meeting the respective provisions in the 
agreement, but not credibly designed to allow for actual changes in the way 
EPAs operate, even generous offers of assistance and capacity building may do 
little to enhance acceptance and participation, especially of non-state actors. 
6.4 Current reflections on institutional structures for EPA 
monitoring and references in text of the agreements  
While the first cases made for EPA monitoring have remained quite general, 
more concrete options have recently been discussed in EU and ACP fora. The 
focus has been primarily on which institutions should be responsible or should 
be set up to design and implement EPA monitoring, how the results should 
feed back into the policy cycles and decision making systems around EPA 
implementation and accompanying measures, and which resources they can 
count upon. 
Indeed, before any methodological approach is put into practice, the necessary 
legal and institutional provisions have to be established. This should cover 
organisational aspects such as the responsibilities and institutions involved in 
data collection, processing and publication as well as the different state and 
non-state actors to be involved in the monitoring exercise. The EPA legal 
framework could usefully refer to appropriate institutions and the actors to be 
involved in the monitoring process (at the national, regional and ACP-EU 
level). 
There was a broad consensus among all stakeholders consulted that the text of 
the EPAs should explicitly mention that the implementation and impacts of 
EPAs will be monitored. 
Some experts pointed to evidence that showed that if the scope, structures and 
procedures for monitoring were defined in the agreement, the monitoring 
mechanism would be more effective. They also argued that in order to track 
changes induced by EPA implementation, it was important for monitoring to 
start right at the beginning of the implementation process. Otherwise there 
would be a substantial risk that monitoring would never become operational. 
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Representatives of civil society agreed and pleaded for a reference to the par-
ticipatory elements of a future EPA-monitoring system that would allow civil 
society to take an active part in the process of monitoring.44 
In interviews, representatives of the Commission and of some EU Member 
States recognised that there is no blueprint for an institutional framework for 
monitoring EPAs. They nevertheless hoped that a basic institutional structure 
with a Joint EPA Council and Implementation Committees could prove feasi-
ble and appropriate for all regions. They felt that it would be sufficient to refer 
to the objective of monitoring implementation and impacts in the agreements 
and official review mechanisms. Details on the scope and specific institutional 
arrangements could be addressed in an annex to the agreement and defined at a 
later stage. They emphasized that the main objective for 2007 was to agree on 
the substance of the EPAs so that they could be signed at the end of the year. 
In particular, methodological aspects of a future EPA-monitoring system could 
be discussed at a later stage. 
The institutional framework proposed in draft EPAs 
As mentioned above, negotiations on institutions for monitoring the implemen-
tation and impacts of EPAs are most advanced with CARIFORUM45. Accord-
ing to Commission and Caribbean sources, the draft EU-CARIFORUM EPA 
provides for the following structures: 
− A joint EPA Council at the ministerial level, which would supervise the 
implementation of the agreement and serve as the main decision-making 
body. It would take decisions and make recommendations on all issues re-
lated to the agreement between the signatory parties46. This Council would 
meet regularly to discuss matters regarding the agreement between the 
European Union and CARIFORUM. It could also convene if urgent mat-
                                                          
44  Such participatory elements are also advocated by PwC (2007), see Box 1.1 
45  The Caribbean Forum of ACP States was created in 1992 for the purpose of coordinating 
with the European Commission and jointly monitoring resources coming from the European 
Development Fund. The following countries are members of CARIFORUM: Antigua and 
Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guy-
ana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
and Trinidad and Tobago.  
46  The term parties will include European Member States and the European Commission, ACP 
countries and for some regions relevant regional entities, as defined by the internal institu-
tional setting. 
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ters should arise. Rules of procedure would be agreed upon during the in-
auguration meeting. 
− A Joint EPA Implementation Committee composed of representatives of 
the signatory parties at senior official level. This committee would assist 
the Council in trade matters, including recommendations on cooperation 
priorities in this regard. Its responsibilities would, amongst others, include 
supervising compliance of signatories with the provisions of the agree-
ment, monitoring and assessing the implementation of the EPA and its 
impacts on trade, regional integration and development objectives. This 
committee could also further work out provisions of the agreement, if nec-
essary, including concrete modalities for monitoring impacts at the re-
gional level. The trade committee would meet on an annual basis to re-
view the implementation of the EPA as well as at any other time consid-
ered necessary. The committee would further be responsible for avoiding 
and resolving disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or appli-
cation of the agreement. 
− A Joint EPA Development Committee that would assist the Joint Council 
on matters of development co-operation falling under the EPA. Like the 
implementation committee on trade, it would be composed of senior offi-
cials of signatories, meet annually for a review of implementation and if 
necessary at any other time. This committee would be responsible, among 
other things, for monitoring the implementation of provisions related to 
development cooperation in the context of EPAs. 
− A Joint EPA Parliamentary Committee with consultative functions. It 
would be composed of Members of the European Parliament, on the one 
hand, and of members the parliaments of CARIFORUM states, on the 
other hand. This consultative body could request information on the im-
plementation and impacts of EPAs and related development assistance, 
make recommendations and be an actor of democratic control. How often 
this body would meet was not mentioned in interviews. 
− The Joint Committee Representing Civil Society and the Private Sector 
would be a second body with consultative functions. Its task would be to 
assist the Joint EPA Council in promoting dialogue and cooperation be-
tween non-state actors, including academic institutions, social partners and 
private sector organisations. This joint committee could make recommen-
dations, e.g. with regard to monitoring the EPA. 
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The draft EU-ESA Partnership Agreement of 24 August 2006 contains only 
similar and rather vague references to monitoring functions. They relate to 
specific fields of cooperation and corrective measures.47 Also, this text does 
not mention how monitoring should be organised and who should be involved 
in or associated with monitoring the agreement. 
While these proposals already provide a rough institutional framework for 
monitoring EPAs, they are limited to official bodies. These will meet at a 
rather low frequency and thus focus more on reviews than do the monitoring 
itself. The actual data collection and analysis will have to be done by technical 
departments or institutions at the regional and/or national level. Which institu-
tions could take on these tasks and how they would have to relate to the above 
mentioned structures has not yet been discussed.48 
The response of the Council of Ministers 
The above proposals were called into question by the General Affairs and 
External Relations Council at its meeting on 15 May 2007 (Council of the 
European Union 2007, 9). The Council expressed the view that a single im-
plementation committee that monitors the trade provisions and the related 
development assistance at the same time would be preferable. The Council 
further voiced concern over whether regional parliamentary and civil society 
committees were feasible as many new institutions would challenge the ca-
pacities of the ACP countries. It proposed to use existing CPA institutions in 
this context. However, the relationship between the CPA institution and EPA 
institutions was not yet clarified.49  
                                                          
47  The draft EPA for Eastern and Southern Africa refers, for instance, to the need to monitor 
“the implementation and administration of articles on rules of origin and of other customs 
matters related to market access” as well as “serious balance of payments and external fi-
nancial difficulties or threats” as a result of EPAs, so that corrective measures can be taken. 
Another reference to monitoring is made in Art. 30 on sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures. 
This article emphasizes the need to monitor progress made with regard to ensuring transpar-
ency and harmonization of legislation etc. and highlights the important role of communica-
tion and feedback. 
48  Commission officials underlined in interviews that “the Commission had no interest to 
develop into a research organization” and was not in possession of the human and financial 
resources necessary to conduct impact studies or generate a vast variety of monitoring data. 
49  This concern was expressed in discussions with Council members and is reflected in the fact 
that the Council conclusions of 15 May do not mention such committees. 
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Views from the Joint Parliamentary Assembly 
The Economic Development, Finance and Trade Committee of the Joint Par-
liamentary Assembly discussed the issue of an EPA-monitoring mechanism as 
an agenda point of their meeting on 23, June 2007. The discussions reflected 
the concern of ACP and EU parliamentarians to get more involved in the 
monitoring of the implementation and impacts of EPAs. 
No official proposal of the Joint Assembly was formulated at this meeting, but 
the following concerns and suggestions were articulated in a lively debate: 
− A reference to a monitoring mechanism should be included in the pream-
ble of the legal text of each EPA and wherever appropriate in other chap-
ters (e.g. in the chapter dealing with a safeguard mechanism, as the latter 
could be guided by monitoring reports). 
− The text of the EPAs should contain a specific chapter outlining key ele-
ments of the monitoring mechanism. 
− Monitoring should be a participatory process allowing ACP parliamentari-
ans to be involved in the exercise, and this mandate should be formalised. 
One option mentioned in this context was to invite a number of ACP par-
liamentarians to participate in the preparation of monitoring reports (e.g. 
by making them members of a task force that prepares these reports). An-
other option referred to the possibility of formalising the process of an an-
nual review of EPA implementation and formulation of recommendations 
by the Joint Parliamentarian Assembly. 
− The text of the EPAs should include a provision for capacity building for 
ACP members of parliaments in order to enable them to contribute to EPA 
monitoring and to make use of the information generated by a monitoring 
mechanism. 
These points are the outcomes of an initial exchange in the Joint Parliamentary 
Assembly. They do not reflect the official position of the Joint Assembly. The 
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latter will probably address the issue of a monitoring mechanism in more detail 
later this year.50  
The idea of an EPA observatory 
The idea of an EPA observatory was raised in the initial brainstorming work-
shop. The purpose of such an observatory would be to generate independent 
and reliable monitoring data and to analyse these data and disseminate them to 
the different stakeholders in an appropriate format. Other uses for an observa-
tory are conceivable as well.51  
The institutional features of such an observatory have not been further dis-
cussed, but those favouring this type of institution pleaded for a “light struc-
ture” or a “network approach” that would make it possible to draw on data 
from EU and ACP countries’ statistical services and ask research institutes or 
consultants to conduct studies on specific themes or sectors. 
Especially in those regions where the structures at the regional level are weak, 
it may be worthwhile to consider placing, in a first step, the responsibility for 
generating and analysing monitoring data with specialised institutions. 
6.5 Monitoring and dispute settlement 
The idea of linking monitoring and dispute settlement mechanisms has not 
been followed further. These two mechanisms serve distinct functions which 
are not easily reconcilable. Monitoring is supposed to look at the broad direc-
tion of implementation and impacts of EPAs (both positive and negative). 
Dispute settlement is meant to deal with concrete negative impacts on a partner 
                                                          
50  Judging by the key principles identified in Chapters 3 and 4, in particular with regard to the 
principle of independence of a monitoring mechanism and concern for minimizing political 
bias, the idea of associating parliamentarians in the drafting of monitoring reports may be 
controversial. The option of an annual review of monitoring reports by the JPA and the for-
mulation of recommendation to the Joint ACP-EU Council would appear to be much more in 
line with the role of parliaments as a political institution scrutinizing the actions of govern-
ment. 
51  In the context of international trade agreements like EPAs and the WTO, the Ivory Coast 
private sector has called for an observatory to monitor (and increase) competitiveness as well 
as for creation of a committee of customs officials and private sector representatives to ana-
lyse problems in export chains.  
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that result from non-compliance with a treaty provision. Therefore, creating 
that direct link would burden the monitoring system with strong political and 
economic interests and probably make its results more adversarial, hence re-
ducing its legitimacy.52 In addition, dispute settlements usually need very in-
depth data which are usually beyond the scope of a monitoring exercise. 
While monitoring results may be used as early warning, they should not be 
used for litigation purposes. 
6.6 Funding EPA monitoring 
Comprehensive EPA monitoring with participatory elements is a costly exer-
cise. The benefits of monitoring therefore have to be balanced against the re-
sources it will require, which arguably may be diverted from other develop-
ment objectives (see Chapter 3.5). However, the benefits from targeted moni-
toring in terms of more effective EPA implementation with greater develop-
ment impact may be worthwhile. In development projects, a rule of thumb is to 
devote 2−5 % of total funds to M&E. Applying this rule of thumb to estimates 
of economic impact at stake (hundreds of millions or even billions of euros per 
year), it would be justifiable to spend relatively significant amounts of money 
on EPA monitoring. 
The EPA negotiations have not yet touched upon the issue of resources for a 
monitoring mechanism and related capacity building. Although all stake-
holders consulted expressed interest in monitoring the implementation and 
impact of EPAs, there was also widespread concern about the associated costs. 
As for potential sources of funding, several stakeholders referred to the Euro-
pean Development Fund (EDF) and the Joint EU Aid for Trade (AfT) Initia-
tive (see Annex 2). 
While many ACP representatives appear to assume that the resources provided 
for setting up and running a monitoring system would be taken over by the 
European side, representatives from the Commission voiced concern about the 
resulting costs. They emphasized that according to their experience, many 
monitoring systems remained non-operational because of neglect of the costs 
                                                          
52  It is for similar reasons that in the WTO the Trade Policy Review Mechanism is kept separate 
from the Dispute Settlement system, and the information provided for the national reviews 
cannot be used for formal complaints. 
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attached to running them. They pleaded for a “very pragmatic approach,” 
mainly focusing on monitoring implementation. With regard to impacts, those 
interlocutors that had reflected on costs favoured a narrow approach, concen-
trating ‘on what goes wrong’ rather than systematically monitoring a series of 
impact indicators in each country. 
Experts also called for a careful consideration of the cost implications when 
choosing between different options for monitoring mechanisms. They argued 
for an approach that would consist in jointly defining a small number of indi-
cators, which would make it possible to monitor positive and negative trends. 
This approach should help to get a better understanding of EPA impacts in 
general as well as to identify the winners and losers. The advocates of this 
approach held the view that the best strategy to reduce monitoring costs was to 
draw on existing data and institutions (see Section 5.2). 
Views within civil society on who should bear the costs of an EPA-monitoring 
system differed quite substantially, a fact explained by the different mandates 
and resource bases of the respective organisations. Some development NGOs 
pointed to the problem that charities may find it difficult to mobilise sufficient 
resources to contribute to official monitoring mechanisms. Their funders rather 
expected them to allocate their resources to activities that would lead to visible 
improvements of the living conditions of their target groups. In the view of 
these organisations, the EU, its Member States and ACP governments should 
therefore co-finance a contribution of NGOs to EPA monitoring, by providing 
financial facilities that interested NGOs could draw on and capacity develop-
ment in the field of monitoring EPAs. 
There is evidence that business associations, in particular the larger ones, are 
able and willing to finance their own monitoring activities in the context of 
lobbying. As far as other organisations are concerned, activities in the field of 
monitoring EPAs are part of their mandate, and their main concern was not the 
cost of contributing to monitoring EPAs but the cost of accessing information 
on the present state of discussion on this issue. They called on the European 
Commission to provide them and their members with more information on 
what their role could be in a future monitoring system so that they could pre-
pare accordingly. In this context it should also be noted that, in principle, the 
Cotonou Agreement provides funding for monitoring ACP-EU co-operation. 
However, to what extent these funds can be tapped by private sector and civil 
society actors in a specific country or region for activities in the field of EPA 
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monitoring depends largely on the focus of National and Regional Indicative 
Programmes. 
However, money allocated for monitoring of EPAs, wherever it comes from, 
will not be available for other activities. It might be advisable to set aside a 
certain amount of future EDF resources for supporting activities of non-state 
actors related to monitoring EPAs, including capacity-building and the dis-
semination of information, if this is seen as a priority by the partners to the 
agreement. Applying the lessons learned from a recent analysis of the EDF 
programming processes conducted by EUROSTEP, it can be concluded that it 
is necessary to thoroughly discuss the benefits and opportunity costs of allocat-
ing EDF resources for an EPA-monitoring mechanism and capacity building 
for non-state actors and to listen to their priorities and concerns (EUROstep 
2006). 
As discussed in Sections 6.2 and 6.3, a crucial question for stakeholders is to 
what extent monitoring actually impacts on the implementation of the EPA 
provisions. This is also the central criterion for the allocation of public re-
sources. A monitoring system that serves mainly compliance and information 
purposes can and should be relatively inexpensive. On the other hand, a system 
that assesses the results of EPAs and has major consequences for the imple-
mentation of provisions such as assistance will need more information and 
inputs to have the credibility it needs, and it will therefore require bigger re-
sources. Which option is more desirable is ultimately a political choice. 
7 Key principles and the way forward for monitoring EPAs 
To make the monitoring mechanism useful and operational, it is important to 
establish some key guidelines as part of the EPA provisions. The first task is 
thus to identify those features that should be covered by the legal text. After an 
agreement is signed, some steps will be necessary to develop a workable and 
effective monitoring of EPA implementation and impacts. Drawing on the key 
messages of the study, and without trying to identify the precise mechanism 
and substance of a monitoring instrument (that will vary from region to region 
and country to country depending on the different contexts and priorities), 
elements of the mechanism to be included in the EPA texts as well as recom-
mendations on making the process operational need to be identified. The fol-
lowing sections are a first attempt to do so. 
Monitoring Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
German Development Institute 107 
7.1 What should be included in the legal EPA text? 
For the establishment of an effective and workable monitoring mechanism, it 
is important that the design and process of monitoring be carefully thought out. 
Yet, to be of use a monitoring mechanism must remain flexible and adaptable 
to unforeseen and evolving circumstances. 
In determining the appropriate provisions on monitoring in an EPA text, the 
key considerations should be to provide for the conditions needed to establish 
a credible, transparent, workable and effective monitoring mechanism. These 
could include: 
1. The principles of monitoring 
2. The key functions of monitoring 
3. The scope of monitoring 
4. The use of the results of monitoring 
5. The basic institutional setting for monitoring 
6. The related cooperation and development assistance for monitoring 
7. Indications on the possible methods to be used and procedures to be 
followed for monitoring 
The following gives an overview on what could be included in an EPA legal 
text. The list is neither exhaustive nor should it be seen as an ‘either-or’ 
choice; it seeks instead to structure the different elements that could be agreed 
on in an EPA legal text. When such different elements are discussed (e.g. prin-
ciples, key functions of monitoring, etc.), a choice will have to be made, 
firstly, on whether or not to include (clusters of) provisions for each specific 
element and, secondly, at what level of detail those provisions should regulate 
the respective area. In this context, it has to be kept in mind that the benefit of 
greater concreteness always has to be balanced against flexibility. 
7.1.1 Principles of monitoring 
Basic Objective 
In order to follow up EPA implementation and ensure that it generates positive 
outcomes, monitoring will be essential. To ensure that such a monitoring 
mechanism becomes fully operational and effective it may be useful to con-
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tractualise the commitment of both parties to monitor implementation and 
results of EPAs in line with agreed principles. 
Options 
Contractualising the principles of monitoring can be done in different ways 
and in different parts of the agreement: 
i. The introduction/preamble of the agreement refers to the need to 
regularly monitor implementation and results of the agreement  
ii.  A monitoring chapter in the agreement contains detailed provisions 
on the design, institutions and functions of monitoring 
iii.  Relevant chapters could explicitly refer to the need for monitoring 
(e.g. in the Free Movement of Goods Chapter as in the Eastern & 
Southern Africa (ESA) region proposal (ESA 2007), see example 7.2 
below; the Chapter on Development, see Annex 12; example 4 below: 
environmental monitoring of sustainable development) 
Principles would indicate the fundamental features of the monitoring exercise 
(e.g. ownership, transparency, mutual accountability, participation) and could 
either be newly established or refer to those agreed in the broader ACP-EU 
cooperation framework (as embodied in the CPA). 
Discussion 
The need to have a general provision on monitoring in the EPA legal text is 
generally accepted. However, views differ on the level of detail into which 
such provisions should go. In general it should be kept in mind that trade-offs 
exist between the need for policy space and flexibility53 (see Chapter 3) on the 
one hand and the need for concrete provisions on the other, in order to ensure 
the timely establishment of a credible, workable and effective monitoring 
mechanism. While the establishment of one ‘EPA-monitoring mechanism’ 
entails the danger of duplicating efforts, without the contractualised commit-
ment and resources needed to build up a monitoring mechanism for EPAs, a 
reliable monitoring of EPA implementation and impacts may not be feasible. 
                                                          
53  During stakeholder consultations, much emphasis was put on the principle of flexibility. It 
was argued that any future monitoring mechanism should be able to adapt to changing re-
quirements that may arise in the course of the implementation of EPAs. 
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According to some observers, an exercise of pro-development monitoring 
could institutionalise, for the first time, a systematic assessment of how the 
economic, trade and development aspects of ACP-EU cooperation are linked 
together and complement one another in pursuit of the CPA objectives. This 
would therefore go beyond the simple monitoring function to be performed by 
one of the various institutions envisaged in an EPA text, to become a broader 
formal assessment of how the different dimensions of the ACP-EU partner-
ship, the EPA-related interventions, and the various parts of an EPA agreement 
interconnect and contribute to poverty reduction and development. Such an 
approach would assign to monitoring a very central role, to be reflected also in 
the principles of an EPA legal text. 
Examples of provisions 
1. “The objective of monitoring and evaluation shall consist in the regular as-
sessment of the implementation and results of EPAs (outputs, outcomes, im-
pact) with a view to foster positive outcomes of EPAs and their beneficial im-
plementation.” (Adapted from Article 32, Chapter 5 ‘Monitoring and Evalua-
tion’, Annex IV CPA) 
2. “The monitoring exercise should be aligned with jointly agreed principles de-
rived from the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), including ownership, 
transparency, and mutual accountability, with a view to improving the EPA 
implementation process as a whole.” 
3. “The Parties undertake to continuously monitor the operation of the Agree-
ment through their respective participative processes and institutions, as well 
as those set up under this Agreement, to cooperate in order to ensure that the 
objectives of the Agreement are realized and to maximise the benefits for 
men, women and young people deriving from their Partnership. The Parties 
also undertake to consult each other promptly over any problem arising.” 
(Draft provision proposed for an EPA text) 
4. “… Parties agree to work cooperatively towards the realisation of a sustain-
able development centred on the human person, who is the main beneficiary 
of development. The Parties undertake to continuously monitor the operation 
of the Agreement in this respect, to cooperate in order to maximise the bene-
fits for their people deriving from the Partnership, in particular the most vul-
nerable groups, and to consult each other promptly over any problem aris-
ing.” (Draft provision proposed for an EPA text) 
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5. “The Parties reaffirm their commitment to promoting the development of in-
ternational trade in such a way as to ensure sustainable and sound manage-
ment of the environment, in accordance with their undertakings in this area 
including the international conventions to which they are party and with due 
regard to their respective level of development. In this regard the Parties re-
cognise the importance of reviewing, monitoring and assessing the impact of 
the Agreement implementation on sustainable development through their 
respective participative processes and institutions, as well as those set up un-
der this Agreement.” (Draft provision in the environmental chapter proposed 
for an EPA text)  
6. Article 3.8 Review 
“1 The Partnership Committee shall establish procedures for the monitoring 
and regular review of the implementation, operation and performance of this 
Agreement. To assist it with these tasks a report on relevant matters shall be 
prepared annually by the Secretariat, which shall be distributed to the Parties 
to this Agreement. 
2 The Partnership Committee shall conduct a general review of the imple-
mentation, operation and performance of this Agreement no later than 2011 
after the Agreement comes into force and every 5 years thereafter. The review 
shall assess the extent to which the objectives of this Agreement are being 
achieved and what further actions should be taken to better achieve the ob-
jectives.  
3 At the meeting of the Partnership Committee the Committee may make any 
decisions it considers necessary or desirable, consistent with this Agreement, 
to better implement or further the objectives of the provisions of this Agree-
ment.” (EU-Pacific 2006) 
7.1.2 Key functions of monitoring 
Basic objectives 
In order to prevent monitoring from becoming an end in itself, it is necessary 
to reach agreement on the purposes and related functions of an EPA-
monitoring mechanism. Specifying the main functions of monitoring in the 
legal EPA text would enhance the credibility of the monitoring exercise. It 
should notably clarify the main purposes of monitoring (e.g. compliance, im-
pacts, etc.) and specify how the parties will use the results of the monitoring 
exercise, feeding into policy making processes. 
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Options 
A provision on key functions of monitoring could be rather vague and include 
only general functions of monitoring (like control, learning and accountability) 
or its broad overall objectives (such as facilitating implementation of EPA and 
related further policy changes in a manner that fosters sustainable development 
of ACP countries) (example 1 below). 
Alternatively, it could be more specific, defining the concrete functions of a 
mechanism monitoring the implementation of an EPA as well as the implications 
of EPA monitoring for the policy-cycle of these trade agreements, from the iden-
tification of problems (gathering of information) to the assessment of changes 
required (information analysis) and to policy changes (decision-making by the 
parties) (example 2). Specific monitoring functions could include information 
gathering only, or the analysis of information collected, or both. 
Discussion 
The distinction between information gathering and analysis resembles the one 
between monitoring and evaluation (in the context of aid projects, for instance), 
i.e. the continuous process that takes place in regular and frequent intervals, 
associated with monitoring and describing trends (impacts) versus the compre-
hensive analysis of interventions and policies (usually conducted only at key 
moments of policy implementation) with the aim of explaining trends (impacts), 
associated with an evaluation exercise, and resulting in an informed judgment. 
An EPA-monitoring mechanism could be given only a narrow monitoring 
function (to describe broad trends for urgent decision-making), or also a more 
comprehensive analysis function (with deeper analysis of trends providing 
input for possible adaptation of the agreement). This shows that the function of 
monitoring is closely related to the issue of the use of monitoring results (dis-
cussed under heading 4 below), with an obvious impact on other elements of 
the monitoring exercise (scope, institutional setting, methodologies, costs, etc). 
Thus, the function and the ‘response dimension’ could be regulated in one 
single chapter. 
Examples 
1. “The functions of the monitoring exercise will include control, learning and ac-
countability, with a view to facilitating implementation of EPA and related fur-
ther policy changes in a manner that fosters sustainable development of ACP 
countries.” 
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2. “The function of the monitoring mechanism will be the regular collection and 
analysis of information to assist timely decision making, ensure accountability 
and provide the basis for evaluation and learning. On the basis of this monitor-
ing process, the parties agree to periodically review the results of EPA and make 
the necessary adjustments that would help optimising its development out-
comes.” 
7.1.3 Scope of monitoring 
Basic objectives 
Parties may agree to define the scope of monitoring in the EPA legal text. This 
will serve the aim of better defining what should be monitored and not leave it 
to the interpretation or discretion of one of the parties. 
Options 
i. The text could explicitly mention that compliance with and impacts of 
EPAs will be monitored, as well as the capacity development needs of 
the stakeholders involved and framework conditions in which EPAs 
will take place. 
ii. Another option would be to have a formal monitoring process con-
tractualised in the agreement, while parts of monitoring would be 
‘sourced out’ to independent institutions (e.g. compliance by govern-
ment, impact on certain sectors, by independent institutions). This 
may imply that only those areas are mentioned in the legal texts that 
are monitored by official EPA-monitoring bodies. Monitoring areas to 
be contractualised in an EPA can include: 
a. The capacity to implement EPAs (i.e. capacity to comply with 
EPA commitments); 
b. The implementation of EPA provisions (including on develop-
ment cooperation); 
c. Results (outputs, outcomes and impacts) of EPAs; 
d. The enabling environment. 
iii. In addition to areas broadly defined as above, parties could agree to 
include in the text a provision on what to monitor exactly, by: 
a. identifying specific dimensions of implementation of EPA (ca-
pacity, impacts, compliance, etc.) for certain (priority) parts of 
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the agreement: market access, supply side active policies/ policy 
spaces, development resources, etc. (example 1); 
b. including specific implementation and results only in certain 
chapters of the agreement (e.g. trade rules); 
c. (given limited resources) reserving for monitoring only priority 
areas referred to in parts of the agreement (e.g. the impact of 
market access on the rural poor; or only environmental and labour 
issues, or ACP firms’ competitiveness, examples 2 and 3). 
Discussion 
It may be difficult to precisely define the scope of monitoring EPAs and, ac-
cordingly, to contractualise it in an EPA text. The advantage of defining the 
content and scope of monitoring in an EPA legal text lies in the commitment 
both parties would make, with the possibility to commit to comprehensively 
monitor implementation and results of EPAs, beyond the mere monitoring of 
compliance. Contractualising the scope of monitoring would also define 
boundaries and thus clarify what to monitor and what aspects should not be 
considered in the context of EPAs. Particularly the inclusion of capacity and 
accompanying measures will have to be carefully selected, but would substan-
tially enhance the comprehensiveness of an EPA-monitoring mechanism and 
its usefulness for creating more coherence between trade and aid policies. On 
the other hand, contractualisation reduces flexibility and may lead to a duplica-
tion of efforts in those countries where certain EPA relevant aspects (like ca-
pacity building measures) are already monitored in other contexts, unless oth-
erwise specified. Final decisions about what exactly will be monitored should 
build on the concrete EPA legal texts. 
Examples 
1. “The parties commit themselves to jointly monitor progress in the implementation of 
the Agreement and in the attainment of development objectives that may derive from it 
[…]. The monitoring and reviews will also cover the implementation of the trade-
supported strategies that the Agreement would sustain, and will be based on qualita-
tive as well as quantitative indicators and benchmarks that will be related to three 
categories: (a) Effective enhancement by the EU of market access and fair treatment 
for ESA countries’ exports; (b) overcoming capability constraints and improving com-
petitiveness of ESA’s production sectors, including through the implementation of sup-
ply-side development policies which would eventually need flexibilities in trade rules; 
and (c) EU contribution of additional resources for development, distinct from existing 
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EDF, to facilitate institutional adjustments required for compliance with the EPA, as 
well as the implementation of supply-side policies that would be supported by the 
Agreement.” (See Annex 12, point 2)  
2. The NAFTA agreement provides additional side agreements for monitoring 
environmental and labour issues to provide information for development as-
sistance and accompanying measures. Monitoring is, however, not formally 
linked to the trade agreement (see Box 7.1) 
3.  “Monitoring and evaluation will take place on three levels, including a global 
assessment of Aid-for-Trade flows (using data compiled by the OECD-DAC); indi-
vidual donor and agency progress on additionality and effectiveness (using self-
assessments); and in-country evaluations (based on inputs from the IF and TPRs, 
national Aid-for-Trade Committees, and other relevant mechanisms).” (AfT Task 
force on monitoring; see also Box 7.2) 
 
Box 7.1: Provision for monitoring labour and environmental issues in NAFTA 
The North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) came 
into force on 1 January 1994, as an overarching framework for environmental coop-
eration. It is a side agreement to NAFTA and complements the environmental provi-
sions of NAFTA. The NAAEC, aiming to be more than a set of environmental regu-
lations, established the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation 
(CEC), a mechanism for addressing regional environmental concerns, helping pre-
vent potential trade and environmental conflicts, and promoting the effective en-
forcement of environmental law. The CEC has a mandate to monitor the environ-
mental effects of the North American Free Trade Agreement. It provides a mecha-
nism both for investigating allegations of non-enforcement of national environmental 
laws and for monitoring the adverse environmental impacts of the NAFTA and moni-
toring compliance with the NAAEC. 
“The CEC’s efforts to document the environmental effects of trade liberalization 
in North America result in reviews and assessments that are utilized by trade and 
environment officials, nongovernmental organizations and the public to inform 
both trade and environmental policies in the three Parties.” Tasks related to this 
project: “Organize and conduct high-level North American symposia on assess-
ing the environmental impacts of trade; examine emerging environmental trends 
and conduct monitoring and sectoral analyses; and explore mechanisms to as-
sess the environmental effects of NAFTA.” 
Source:    CEC (2006) 
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7.1.4 Use of results 
Basic objectives 
The primary aim is to ensure that results of the monitoring exercise feed back 
into the design and implementation of the agreement or accompanying meas-
ures. Defining the ‘response’ dimension of monitoring – e.g. the way monitor-
ing results are used and trigger adjustments, safeguards or accompanying 
measures - in a legally binding manner would contribute to increasing the 
effectiveness and credibility of the monitoring process, and hence of the EPAs. 
It could also alleviate fears that possible negative effects of an EPA (in terms 
of non compliance or development impact, for instance) would not be ad-
dressed by the parties, and would further contribute to policy coherence. 
Options 
The response dimension can be either defined in the monitoring chapter itself 
or in the respective chapters (safeguard measures, accompanying measures, ...) 
which could refer to results of monitoring activities. Monitoring could specifi-
cally shape the form of and trigger the application of built-in flexibilities such 
Box 7.2:    Proposal by the World Trade Organization for monitoring Aid for 
Trade  
“7. Country-based monitoring and evaluation will provide a more focused, coun-
try-specific perspective on whether trade needs are being met, financial resources 
are being provided, and Aid for Trade is effective on the ground. A monitoring 
exercise that involves all country-based stakeholders can also provide incentives 
to foster mutual accountability. An obligation to report regularly on the delivery 
and effectiveness of Aid for Trade can also help to focus minds on managing for 
results. The Task Force encouraged recipient countries "to report on trade main-
streaming in national development strategies, such as PRSPs, the formulation of 
trade strategies, Aid-for-Trade needs, donor responses, and implementation and 
impact". Different mechanisms can be used to achieve these objectives. The Task 
Force suggests that "the primary responsibility for reporting to the global moni-
toring body would lie with National Aid-for-Trade Committees", and urges ade-
quate funding for this work.”  
Source:    WTO (2006) 
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as safeguards or trade-related assistance. In addition, the outcome of monitor-
ing could feed into the periodic formal reviews and evaluation of the EPA. 
The monitoring results could also be used for transparency and public aware-
ness purposes, for example by forwarding the reports to national parliaments 
and other interested stakeholders (example 4). 
Discussion 
What happens with the findings of the monitoring exercise will depend on the 
level of and the manner in which monitoring is linked to implementation and 
decision making in the EPA context. Some stakeholders may opt for an ap-
proach based on a discussion of the results of the monitoring, without any 
binding linkages to adjustment or assistance clauses. It may be difficult to 
determine and agree on an appropriate response, but having a legal basis for 
the outcome of the monitoring to feed (back) into the implementation of the 
agreement (in terms of the possible remedies, adjustments, development assis-
tance or revisions of the agreement) will ensure credibility of the monitoring 
mechanism. The monitoring mechanism should, however, not be formally 
linked to a dispute settlement system, as this would most probably lead to 
reluctance of some parties to share information. 
Examples 
1. The monitoring exercise will provide information for the adoption of appro-
priate measures, adjustments and review of the agreement necessary to en-
sure the proper implementation of the EPA and the achievement of its ob-
jectives.   
2. The monitoring of EPAs may provide the necessary information to activate 
the safeguards mechanism, through a price or quantitative trigger; in paral-
lel, monitoring results on how the safeguards mechanism operates (and the 
ability of ACP parties to use it) should inform potential revisions of the 
safeguard provisions or accompanying measures.    
3. “Not withstanding Article 14 (Tariff Elimination) of this agreement, in the 
event a specific country has not attained the development benchmarks, it 
may apply for the derogation of tariff reductions set out in this Title and 
make provisions for corrective measures”. (ESA 2007, § 19.3). 
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4. In order to strengthen the transparency of the EPA implementation process 
and public awareness on its results, the reports of the monitoring exercise 
will be forwarded to national parliaments, the Joint Parliamentary Assem-
bly, and other interested stakeholders that may so request (including the 
media).  
7.1.5 Basic institutional setting for monitoring 
Basic objectives 
The aim is to determine the institutional framework for the political oversight 
of the monitoring exercise and the use of its results, and possibly for the con-
duct of and consultation process for EPA monitoring. The EPA text could 
specify the respective roles and responsibilities of the different institutions and 
stakeholders involved in the national, regional and joint ACP-EU monitoring 
bodies. 
Options 
i. One option would be for a Joint EPA Council and its subcommittees 
(established for each region) to be given all the EPA implementation 
functions, including monitoring. 
a. The EC has initially proposed to establish for each regional  
EPA a Joint EPA Council at ministerial level, with different sub-
committees, namely a Trade Committee (called ‘Implementation 
Committee’), a Development Committee, a Parliamentary Committee 
and a non-state actors committee (called ‘Consultative Committee’). 
b. The EU Council has proposed not to distinguish between trade and 
development and to establish a Joint Implementation Committee re-
sponsible for both (including monitoring). 
ii. A Joint EPA Council could instruct the regional/national authorities to 
identify (or establish, if new) appropriate monitoring institutions (that 
could also take the form of an independent ‘EPA observatory’), give 
them the directions to take for operational monitoring and then jointly 
consider follow-up on the monitoring reports. The regional bodies could 
be responsible for harmonising national monitoring. 
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iii. Another option would be to simply refer to the need for regional coordi-
nation without, however, defining new or responsible institutions. 
iv. The national-level framework could be defined in the agreement, with 
national monitoring bodies (be they part of government, NSA, or parlia-
ments) to present their results to the regional body and the joint EPA 
Council and affiliated institutions. In this case, the roles of the different 
national-level institutions/actors involved in monitoring bodies (or task 
forces) could be specified.  
v. The EPA text could further contractualise the role, if any, of existing 
ACP-EU joint institutions established by the CPA (such as the Joint 
Ministerial Trade Committee or the Joint Parliamentary Assembly, JPA) 
(example 2) and other institutions with important mandates on the future 
of the ACP and Europe (such as the African Union or the European Par-
liament, see example 3). 
vi. Some have proposed the creation of a regional entity or an observatory 
body in charge of the monitoring of the EPA (and possibly regional inte-
gration). 
vii. Other stakeholders have proposed specific types of institutions capturing 
the interests of specific set of actors (e.g. civil society, private sector) 
with more or less formal roles in the implementation and monitoring of 
the agreement (example 4). 
Discussion 
To ensure credibility, accountability and ownership, the monitoring exercise 
should not only involve government officials but also parliamentarians and 
representatives from the private sector, civil society and other non-state actors. 
On both the ACP and EU levels, regional and national authorities should be 
involved. In this respect, the involvement of EU member states may be crucial 
as most trade issues fall within the exclusive competences of the Community, 
though not development assistance. 
To increase ownership and accountability, monitoring should be conducted 
mainly at national level and coordinated by a regional body (task division can 
follow the principle of subsidiarity, i.e. the regional level would only perform 
those monitoring tasks that cannot be effectively exercised at the national 
level). 
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However, duplication of existing mechanisms and proliferation of consultative 
structures should be avoided, so where appropriate, national and regional bod-
ies that were established to prepare for EPA negotiations (or other trade and 
development policies fora) could be responsible for monitoring (the whole 
agreement or parts of it, see examples 5 and 6). Thus, the establishment of an 
additional regional structure for EPA monitoring may be contradictory to this 
principle in regions were appropriate structures are already in place. In addi-
tion, it will be very costly, and thus some stakeholders may deem this a rigid 
and costly structure and may wish to leave it to the countries and regions to 
establish or identify appropriate bodies without having provisions in the 
agreements. 
In the case of other stakeholders’ involvement, the principle of independence 
of a monitoring mechanism (to minimise political bias or vested interests) 
should be taken into account. For instance, the idea to directly entrust Parlia-
mentarians with the conduct of monitoring may not be desirable. The option of 
annual reviews of monitoring reports by parliaments (and the ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly - JPA) with the formulation of recommendations to 
the relevant joint EPA institutions is much more in line with the role of par-
liaments as political institutions scrutinizing the actions of government. 
Examples 
1. “The Council recalls that Joint EPA Councils with the effective participation of 
the relevant ACP States and regions, the EU Member States and the European 
Commission shall be established for each EPA region so as to ensure that EPAs 
operate effectively and meet their development objectives. These Joint EPA 
Councils shall be assisted in the first place by Joint Implementation Committees 
that will assess the progress made and formulate recommendations on measures 
for further achievements, including on development co-operation. The concrete 
institutional setup will be agreed upon by the respective Joint EPA Councils. 
The Joint EPA Council will have the power to take decisions in respect of all 
matters covered by the EPAs. The Council underlines that the Cotonou Agree-
ment remains the basis for the EPAs and that the Joint EPA Councils will report 
to the ACP-EU-Council of Ministers on all matters of common concern to the 
entire ACP Group of States and the Community … The Council reaffirms that 
review clauses as well as mechanisms for monitoring and reviewing implemen-
tation and development impacts will be a key part of the EPAs. This will be an 
integral function of the EPA institutions.” (Conclusions of the Council 2007) 
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2. Following the model for parliamentary scrutiny adopted by the ACP and 
the EU for their development cooperation (10th EDF), the parties may 
commit to: “transmit the reports of the monitoring exercise of each EPA 
to the JPA for information at the same time as they are transmitted to 
the joint EPA implementation institutions”. National ACP parliaments 
could be similarly engaged, and be forwarded the same documents. 
3. Following the model for parliamentary scrutiny adopted by the EU for its 
new development cooperation, External Instruments (for non-ACP 
countries), the European Parliament could be involved as follows: “The 
EP’s Development Committee will examine the national and regional 
reports of the monitoring exercise of each EPA to give a political as-
sessment of the progress of implementation and coherence of EPA with 
EU development policy. Results of such scrutiny will inform resolutions 
by the Parliament to be forwarded to the joint EPA implementation in-
stitutions”.  
4. “Delegates call for the establishment of a Joint Consultative Committee bringing 
together non-state actors from Caribbean countries and the EU, within the EPA 
institutional framework. This Joint Consultative Committee would have a man-
date to make recommendations on the implementation of the future EPA. It is re-
commended that the Steering Committee of the ‘Caribbean Non-State Actor 
Network’ be included in this Joint Consultative Committee.” (Regional Seminar 
of ACP-EU Economic and Social Interest Groups 2007). 
5. In Kenya, the National Integrated M&E System (NIMES, coordinated by 
the Ministry of Planning and National Development with linkages across 
line ministries and civil society) monitors all government policies and is 
responsible for collating, coordinating, and disseminating information. 
Any M&E subsystem including the one to be designed for the EPAs is 
envisaged to plug into NIMES (see Annex 4, point 1). 
6. As some ACP regions like COMESA are in the process of establishing 
monitoring frameworks for their regional integration, steps could be 
taken to measure the impact of EPAs as part of such regional integration 
surveillance mechanisms. The East African Business Council and the 
East African Community Secretariats jointly developed a Non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTBs) Monitoring Mechanism, with the objective to facilitate 
identification, reporting and monitoring of the elimination of current and 
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future NTBs within the EAC Partner States. This mechanism could be 
allocated the task of monitoring NTBs under EPA. 
7. “A permanent institutional mechanism should be developed to monitor the im-
plementation of the EPAs from the perspective of economic, environmental, and 
social sustainability.” (PwC 2007, Recommendation No. 12). 
7.1.6 Cooperation and development assistance 
Basic objectives 
Knowing that monitoring is a costly exercise and that resources and capacity in 
ACP countries and regions are highly constrained, the text of the agreement 
may further contain provisions for assistance by the EU to support the opera-
tion of the EPA-monitoring system, including inter alia assistance for the 
establishment of regional and national level monitoring frameworks, participa-
tion of different actors, and the collection/analysis of monitoring data. 
Options 
Development assistance to allow the ACP to conduct the monitoring exercise 
may be addressed through the Joint EU Aid for Trade (AfT) Initiative or the 
EDF, bearing in mind the Paris Declaration principles on aid effectiveness 
(ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results, and mutual ac-
countability). Provisions on development assistance for monitoring capacity 
may be rather vague in terms of a reference to capacity building assistance in 
the context of the AfT Initiative or be part of a specific development or moni-
toring chapter and thus be a formal component of EPA implementation. The 
parties may further decide to clarify in the legal text the links between EDF 
financing, the Joint EU AfT Strategy and assistance for the EPA-monitoring 
system. If scarce resources do not allow capacity building (CB) for all in-
volved actors and support to monitoring all relevant actions, the text could 
include provisions for assistance to specific ‘priority’ actors (example 2) or 
actions. 
Discussion 
In this context different stakeholders repeatedly claimed that in most ACP 
countries data availability is problematic and there is scarce capacity for moni-
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toring (even to implement basic safeguard mechanisms as part of existing trade 
agreements). The EPA provisions on monitoring could thus refer to the need 
for technical and financial assistance in this respect. Reference could be made, 
for instance, to support made available through existing schemes and mecha-
nisms, like the EDF or within the context of the AfT Initiative. 
The absence of any reference in an EPA to the cost of monitoring and the se-
vere capacity constraints faced by the ACP, and hence their need for support in 
conducting a monitoring exercise, may greatly reduce the credibility of any 
EPA provision on monitoring. 
Examples 
1. The EU is committed to use its resources (Community and Member 
States) for capacity building for monitoring EPA, including by provid-
ing assistance programmes for data collection/ national statistical system 
reforms. 
2. The parties agree that they should both invest in capacity building for 
Members of Parliaments, in order to enable them to contribute to EPA 
monitoring and make use of the information generated by a monitoring 
mechanism.  
3. “Development cooperation should focus on technical assistance for collecting 
information and data on trade and sustainability, in order to support sound  
policy development.” (PwC 2007, Recommendation No. 10). 
7.1.7 Methods and procedures  
Basic objectives 
The aim is for the parties to commit to a sound, evidence-based approach and 
analysis to monitoring and its results. Specifying in the EPA text the basic 
methodological approach and procedures for the operationalization of a moni-
toring mechanism could ensure concrete follow-up to its establishment and 
definition of principles. In addition, agreeing on methodologies and quantita-
tive/qualitative indicators/targets (against which to monitor outcomes of EPAs 
against development objectives) would to a certain extent formalize the moni-
toring results within a jointly agreed framework and thus promote an evidence-
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based interpretation (which otherwise risks becoming too polemical and politi-
cal). 
Options 
Methods, procedures and/or indicators can be: 
i. left outside the agreement, with the understanding that the parties to 
each EPA will discuss them in the implementation phase, through the 
respective responsible institutions; 
ii. identified after an agreement has been signed, but with a joint com-
mitment through an EPA provision that stresses the importance of a 
results-based monitoring approach, calls for a minimum of harmoni-
sation and comparability, and perhaps concretely names the different 
institutions that are to develop it (by an agreed deadline), or (example 
1); 
iii. agreed upon beforehand and included in a protocol or an annex to the 
agreement (examples 2 and 3 below). 
Discussion 
The main argument for inclusion of indicators in the legal text of an agreement 
is that without clear targets that form the basis and framework for monitoring 
the agreements’ results, it would be difficult to assess the development dimen-
sion of EPAs, which would remain too vague and broad a term. The same is 
valid for procedures, for instance bearing on the institutional setting for moni-
toring: including in the EPA text parliamentary scrutiny or involvement of 
non-sate actors as a principle of monitoring may not be sufficient if their inter-
action in the monitoring exercise and with joint EPA committees involved in 
monitoring is not defined. 
On the other hand, it may be difficult to agree, before the conclusion of the 
negotiations, on methodologies, indicators and procedures that are valid for all 
parties. Some stakeholders are reluctant to include legally binding targets in 
the agreement, arguing, for instance, that it is not feasible to define indicators 
in a negotiating environment, that this should be preceded by the assessment of 
capacities and by the identification of appropriate methods for monitoring. Key 
to these concerns is the notion that legally binding commitments on the moni-
toring approach would conflict with the principle of flexibility required for the 
Michael Brüntrup et al.
 German Development Institute 124
monitoring exercise to be effective. A possible compromise would be to in-
clude in the legal text a mandate for the appropriate (independent) agencies to 
prepare proposals on methods and procedures to be brought to the joint im-
plementation bodies, thus avoiding entanglements in technical/bureaucratic 
issues while ensuring follow-up. 
It has also been noted that while the European Union has committed itself to 
systematically conduct sustainability impact assessments prior to the conclu-
sion of any trade agreement, an EPA could refer to the need of an ex post sus-
tainability impact assessment on the implementation of EPAs. Continuous 
EPA monitoring could usefully feed into such an assessment. Such an ap-
proach could be spelled out in an EPA text. 
Examples of provisions 
1. “Therefore, the parties commit themselves to: Agree on the benchmarks, indica-
tors and detailed methodologies to be used in the monitoring and review  
processes within a period of NN days after having signed the Agreement, and 
initiate the corresponding processes immediately after. To this end, an advisory 
group integrated by trade and development experts from independent organiza-
tions (e.g. UNECA; UNCTAD; WB; OECD; UNDP), will be commissioned the 
preparation of a detailed proposal on benchmarks, indicators and procedures 
for the monitoring and review processes, which will be brought to the considera-
tion of (a joint body of) the parties within a period of XX days after having 
signed the Agreement”. (see Annex 12) 
2. Provisions proposed by ESA for an EPA text: 
“1. The parties agree to regularly review progress in the implementation of this 
Title within the relevant institution and will propose as appropriate any remedial 
measures.  
2. Every five years the ESA-EU EPA Council shall undertake a formal and com-
prehensive review in order to: 
i) assess the contribution of Parts XXXX and XXXX towards the achievement of 
development benchmarks as set out in annex XXXX which shall be derived from 
ESA national development programs  
ii)  ascertain if the development benchmarks have been attained by the individ-
ual ESA countries as well as determine whether the Community’s trade and de-
velopment polices and assistance have contributed to individual ESA countries 
achieving the development benchmarks 
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   iii) monitor policies and the release of resources towards financing activities 
aimed at building the ESA regional market based on the regional integration 
agendas” (ESA 2007, Article 19 ESA EPA text Development Benchmarks and 
Review Clause) 
3. The procedures for parliamentary scrutiny of the EPA-monitoring exercise 
provide for the transmission of the reports of the monitoring exercise to 
the national parliaments and the regional parliaments of the parties, in-
cluding the JPA. The conclusions and recommendations of each parlia-
ment will be considered by the joint EPA implementation institutions for 
possible remedies and action. 
4. “To determine success towards poverty reduction targets set in the Ghana Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (GPRS)  poverty indicators will be monitored and evaluated 
using data from the GSS Welfare monitoring system. This will be supplemented by 
specific community surveys to be carried out by the GPRS Monitoring and Evalua-
tion system.” (Republic of Ghana 2003; viii). 
7.2 Process to make EPA monitoring operational 
Taking into account the above recommendations, and to ensure that the moni-
toring mechanism becomes operational, a number of steps should be taken 
after the signing of an EPA. The non-exhaustive list of suggestions presented 
below also aims at ensuring that monitoring in fact serves to strengthen the 
ownership and transparency of the EPA processes as a whole.  
Once the necessary legal basis, functions and basic features have been estab-
lished by the parties through an EPA legal text, a credible EPA-monitoring 
mechanism requires a consultative and participatory process to broadly discuss 
and make decisions on various operational aspects. Only the stakeholders 
involved can determine concretely the detailed objectives, scope, procedures, 
and institutions for monitoring in a specific country or region (Section I below) 
as well as the exact content, indicators, targets, methodology and timing of the 
exercise (Section II). The actual steps to make the monitoring mechanism 
credible, transparent, workable and effective will vary depending on the speci-
ficities of each ACP country and region and on what has already been included 
in the EPA legal text. 
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7.2.1 Institutions and stakeholders 
A national monitoring committee – comprising civil society, private sector and 
government officials, and possibly parliamentarians – should be established (if 
new) or identified as a result of a participatory process in the ACP countries. 
Such a process should be initiated immediately after the possible signature of 
an EPA agreement and before the implementation of specific EPA commit-
ments. In parallel, each EPA region should define a regional framework (if not 
defined in the legal EPA text) to coordinate national monitoring exercises and 
harmonise results as well as decide on transparent procedures to operationalise 
the linkages between national monitoring and regional-level EPA decision-
making processes. 
The next step would be to conduct a first stocktaking exercise on existing 
capacity to participate in monitoring exercises at national level, subsequent 
quantification of capacity building needs, and possible sources of funding. 
This is crucial as current capacity, existing institutions, and availability of 
capacity building resources will largely determine what is feasible in a specific 
country in terms of actual monitoring. After this second step, an adjustment of 
stakeholder composition, stakeholder capacity needs and capacity building 
resources may be necessary once the priority sectors and issues are identified 
and stakeholders can be targeted more precisely. An adjustment of the make-
up of the national committee could be necessary if new, particularly marginal-
ised actors have been identified and are to be associated with EPA monitoring.  
Since different stakeholders have very different priorities for and interests in 
an EPA (for instance, between public and private sector or between consumers 
and producers), the involvement of different actors in monitoring should be 
guaranteed and the exact contribution and role of each actor clearly identified 
(provided they have not been defined in the EPA legal text). In particular, the 
roles of the following bodies should be addressed: 
− national parliaments 
− existing monitoring mechanisms (such as PRSP or national policy evalua-
tion frameworks54) 
                                                          
54  An example may be seen in the National Integrated Monitoring & Evaluation System 
(NIMES) in Kenya. For a brief description of NIMES see the Report of ECDPM-DIE Moni-
toring EPA Workshop (23−24 April, Nairobi, Kenya), available in Annex 4, point 1. 
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− national and regional bodies that were established to prepare for EPA 
negotiations (such as the RPTFs55, or NDTPF in the ESA region56) 
Monitoring results might be biased if some actors are better organised while 
others lack the capacity to fully engage in a monitoring mechanism. Non-state 
actors in certain sectors, for instance small farmers, may not have an effective 
representation (especially in certain countries in Africa, and often at the re-
gional level) and may not receive support for establishing appropriate organi-
sations. Thus the capacity of each involved group of stakeholders to monitor 
should be assessed and gaps should be addressed. 
Importantly, flexibility should be a key feature of any monitoring instrument 
so that it can be continually adapted to changing conditions throughout the 
subsequent phases of the EPA process. In this context, it may be useful to 
define in each country a set of actors that are responsible in the first phases of 
monitoring, with the flexibility needed for others to step in for certain sectors 
(e.g. depending on the schedules and sequencing of implementation of EPA 
provisions). 
In addition, incentives are needed to get stakeholders seriously involved. A 
major incentive would be to ensure transparency of results and to equip the 
monitoring mechanism with teeth (enforcement power). In this context, a 
process for the establishment of a national monitoring mechanism should also 
decide how to use the monitoring results, apart from the formal links to EPA 
legal commitments (see example in Section 7.1). Options include, for instance, 
to create awareness and disseminate public information, or to interact with an 
independent “observatory” on the EPA process. It may be particularly impor-
tant for the monitoring system to include a sort of ‘ombudsman’ mechanism to 
allow the private sector to make its case directly to the highest level of ACP-
EU EPA decision-making (a Regional Joint EPA council or others) (instead of 
going first through slow national-level bureaucracy/procedures) when harm to 
the business environment is caused by actions (or non-actions) by the EU or 
                                                          
55  Regional Preparatory Task Forces were set up, outside but closely linked to the formal setting 
of EPA negotiations, to contribute ideas for cooperation activities, to help in the identifica-
tion of sources of assistance required for EPA-related capacity building and to facilitate the 
efficient delivery of such support. 
56  National Development and Trade Policy Fora were established in countries belonging to the 
Eastern and Southern African EPA configuration as consultative bodies responsible for for-
mulating national positions on EPA. 
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the national government as part of EPA-implementation or support pro-
grammes.57 However the monitoring mechanism should remain separate from 
EPA dispute settlement procedures.58 
A national monitoring committee may decide to establish sub-committees 
keyed to different monitoring functions (e.g. compliance, impact, development 
cooperation, etc) or clusters of monitoring (e.g. impact on consum-
ers/farmers/exporters). Some of the stakeholders consulted emphasized that 
monitoring should be done by industries (agriculture, fisheries, service...) so 
that the private sector has better chances of playing a leading role in the 
mechanism. In this case results could be reported to the competent authorities 
of the specific cluster (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture) so that these are best 
placed to implement effectively the required changes.59 
Alternatively, the national monitoring committee could be comprised of sepa-
rate fora for private sector, civil society, and government officials. Accord-
ingly, and in line with the suggestion for 'independent monitoring', government 
officials could be in charge of monitoring compliance, the private sector of 
assessing the impact on the economy (and related capacity issues), and civil 
society in charge of monitoring the impact on the poor and other social out-
comes of EPA. 60 
                                                          
57  For instance, some private sector stakeholders consulted mentioned that more transparency 
and government accountability are badly needed, as issues related to corruption, red-tape, and 
lack of implementation of business environment/trade facilitation reforms are the most seri-
ous impediments to growth for the Kenyan private sector. 
58  Feeding monitoring results directly into the dispute settlement system is likely to lead to a 
reluctance of parties to share information. Dispute settlement is meant to deal with negative 
impacts on other partners that result from non-compliance with the treaty provisions. Moni-
toring on the other hand is supposed to look at the impacts (both positive and negative) on the 
implementing country itself. For similar reasons in the WTO, the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism is kept separate from the Dispute Settlement system, and the information pro-
vided for the national reviews cannot be used for formal complaints. 
59  For example, the fisheries industry in Kenya has previous experience of a collaboration with 
the government to monitor implementation of certain policies (for instance, eco-labelling of 
products), whereby the Kenyan producers appointed an independent monitoring body (such 
as a consultancy firm) and used its reports to ask the government to make certain legisla-
tive/regulatory changes. 
60 It emerged from consultations in Kenya and Tanzania, for instance, that there is a pool of 
researchers, including universities (with increasing numbers of PhD students) and CSOs 
(such as the Consumer Information Network, Economic Affairs Institute, Econews, or Ox-
fam), that have improved their ability to undertake relevant trade-related research of the kind 
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However, before transferring exclusive monitoring tasks to actors with stakes 
in the EPAs, it should be ensured that the associated risks of bias can be con-
trolled and managed, since monitoring is an immanently political issue (see 
Chapter 3.3). In many cases participatory approaches will better serve EPA 
monitoring purposes. 
Examples 
1. One interesting example of institutional design for national-level moni-
toring is provided in Annex 4. Stakeholders in Kenya observed that the 
Ministry of Planning and National Development (MPND) should take on 
the coordination function, while the concrete monitoring exercise should 
be done by clusters in the respective line ministries. For each cluster a 
forum should be established to bring together private sector and CSOs to 
feed into reporting. The institutional linkage with the Ministry of Plan-
ning, coordinating ODA resources and development budget disburse-
ments, would ensure that enough resources are provided for monitoring. 
Furthermore, coordination of the NIMES is already located with the 
Monitoring & Evaluation Directorate (MED) of the Ministry of Plan-
ning. The concrete monitoring would be done by Central Planning Units 
(CPU) in the respective line ministries, which are already in charge of 
conducting the annual reports of each Ministry, and they in turn would 
report their results to the Ministry of Planning. The costs of monitoring 
would be reduced by using these existing structures,.  
2. An example of a sub-committee of the national monitoring mechanism 
would be a development committee. Its tasks, varying greatly depending 
on whether development cooperation commitments are included in the 
EPA text or the mandate of a monitoring mechanism, may include: 
− assessment of the development cooperation needs of each actor in-
volved concerning EPA monitoring; 
− phasing and prioritization of identified needs and sequencing; 
                                                                                                                               
needed for EPA monitoring. With appropriate resources and under the supervision and man-
date of the Ministry of Trade & Industry they could undertake such important exercises for 
data collection. Also, Tanzania has interesting capacities for carrying out EPA monitoring 
(see Annexes 3 and 4). 
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− identification of possible funding sources in addition to funds al-
ready programmed (EDF, etc), e.g. domestic sources, including pri-
vate commercial banks, regional instruments, Cotonou, bilateral do-
nors, aid for trade initiatives. 
3. An example of ways to concretely involve ACP regional organisations in 
the operationalization of monitoring would be to assign regional organi-
sations the exclusive competence for and task of monitoring regional in-
tegration within the overall EPA implementation process. This will be 
particularly relevant for some regions that have already induced endoge-
nous initiatives for monitoring regional integration, like the SADC and 
the COMESA region. 
7.2.2 Methodology and substance of monitoring 
In addition to clear institutional design and broad involvement of stakeholders, 
a methodology for and exact content of monitoring EPAs at the national level 
should be defined as soon as possible. As it is impossible to exhaustively 
monitor all areas of interest to actors involved in EPAs, it will be necessary to 
identify, at national and regional level, priority sectors and those inputs (in 
terms of EPA provisions and EPA-related accompanying measures) that are 
likely to have a major impact. Given the range of issues and the limited capac-
ity to address them all, it is necessary to prioritize, or at least sequence, what 
needs to be monitored. This could be done by prioritizing, along the chapters 
of the EPA Agreement, economic sectors, social groups involved, or the most 
serious impediments to achieving the EPA goals (see Chapters 4.2. and 5). 
Given that the overall final assessment and prioritization will depend on the 
importance and weight given to each monitored area, the weighting exercise 
and the underlying assumptions61 must be made explicit through the consulta-
tive process and identification of the methodology. 
Once the broad methodological approach for monitoring has been identified 
through a national participatory process, it will be necessary to define the exact 
content of monitoring and the related definition of indicators.  
                                                          
61  For instance, on the possible causal linkages between the EPA and the domestic (national and 
regional) environment. 
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The methodology for national-level monitoring of EPA should encompass in 
particular: 
i. EPA relevant indicators to be monitored. The identification of indica-
tors should build on a pre-selection using a participatory process of all 
stakeholders involved in EPAs. A thorough impact assessment, if 
available (see Annex 6), can help to identify priority sectors, impact 
domains and inputs.62 
ii. This study proposes to identify indicators that can be based on a re-
sults chain analysis. Result chains link EPA instruments and accom-
panying measures (national policies and development assistance) over 
a succession of intermediary outputs and outcomes with expected 
(positive and/or negative) changes at the impact level of EPAs, i.e. 
poverty reduction and sustainable development. Capacities to imple-
ment EPAs and draw benefits from them can be part of the result 
chains, as can certain indicators of the wider framework conditions 
that are known to influence the effects of EPAs and the impact level.  
Result chains would be established in a combined effort with stake-
holders, sector and EPA experts and statisticians for the identified key 
sectors or areas. For the different levels of the result chains (inputs, 
outputs, outcomes, impacts), indicators will be identified and selected 
where appropriate. The selection of indicators has to respect the re-
quirements of national EPA concerns. However, at least some indica-
tors have to be comparable at the regional level, for instance imple-
mentation of EPA provisions, amount of development assistance or 
understanding of poverty, in order to compare and aggregate impacts 
across countries or even at all-ACP level, to provide information and 
initiate debate on regional reactions such as triggering safeguards and 
adjustment policies. 
It is proposed to apply a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
approaches. However, quantitative indicators would remain at the 
core of monitoring and would be supported by qualitative indicators. 
                                                          
62  In addition to wide consultations with involved stakeholders at the beginning of the monitor-
ing process, also ex ante impact assessment exercises (such as the Sustainability Impact As-
sessment funded by the EC for the 6 EPA regions) could offer important insights on data 
availability and suitable indicators at national and regional level. 
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Targets can be established for selected indicators. This is particularly 
necessary for implementation indicators (tariffs reduced according to 
schedules, development assistance according to agreements, legisla-
tion adopted according to texts). For results, targets are more difficult 
to define due to the long chains from inputs to impacts and the large 
influences of external factors. However, at least at the level of out-
comes, targets could be defined, for instance use of new rules of ori-
gin by x % of traders, trade flows above x %, etc.63 
In addition to results chains, open monitoring elements should be 
added in order to capture important unexpected results, for instance a 
complaint mechanism. 
The quality, availability, reliability and the costs of obtaining data 
will be important criteria for indicator selection. This in turn will be 
influenced by existing statistics and monitoring systems such as 
PRSP, trade, price, production, productivity, social and environmental 
information systems. In most ACP countries there is scarce capacity 
even to monitor import volumes and prices needed to trigger basic 
safeguard mechanisms. To cut costs and harness synergies, consulted 
stakeholders observed, indicators for EPA-related monitoring should 
be linked as much as possible to existing in-country processes such as 
the PRSP or regional integration monitoring. It was, however, also 
noted that often data collected for policy tools like the PRSP are very 
general. Thus, sector and trade date have to be gathered. This may be 
achieved by strengthening existing systems.64 Some indicators may 
also be found in international data bases, though the latter will most 
probably be even less specific to tracing EPA impacts than national 
systems. EU stakeholders should consider building resources and ca-
pacity for monitoring in ACP countries and regions as a key part of 
the EPA implementation process. Funding for this could be made 
available through EDF resources and the Joint EU-AfT Strategy. 
                                                          
63 Some researchers proposed using the concept ‘Development milestones’ for EPA monitoring. 
These milestones would be EPA-induced policy actions and removal of impediments (includ-
ing non-action) by both the EU and ACP countries that are necessary to make progress to-
wards the goals of the CPA and the EPA (see Annex 11). 
64  Ethiopia, for instance, started building a data system three years ago to analyse impli- 
cations of policy reforms (for details, see Ethiopian Development Research Institute, 
http://www.edri-et.org/index.htm). 
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The final list of indicators should then be discussed with EU authori-
ties as the establishment of joint indicators will strengthen mutual re-
sponsibility of both parties in the monitoring exercise. However, in 
terms of content or objects to be monitored, a certain flexibility 
should be maintained to make it possible to continuously adapt the na-
tional-level methodology to changing conditions throughout the sub-
sequent phases of the EPA process. Results chain analysis should be 
complemented by monitoring approaches that are able to capture un-
intended effects of EPAs.  
iii. Information collection at all levels should start at a very early point of 
time to provide baseline information for the further monitoring  
process and allow the comparison with targets. 
iv. A complaint or voluntary reporting mechanism informing the moni-
toring committee and/or an ombudsman could constitute a valuable 
complement. 
v. Finally there should be a legal commitment on data sharing among/by 
regional ACP neighbours, otherwise it could be difficult to coordinate 
and harmonise national monitoring results at regional level. 
The selection and implementation of the methodology will require thorough 
expertise to ensure availability and feasibility of results. Thus, it may be neces-
sary to provide training, including for moderators and statistical experts.  
Examples 
1. Examples of indicators on the development cooperation part of EPA 
include: 
− basic quantitative indicators on commitment and disbursement lev-
els: e.g. volume of EPA-related assistance committed by donors and 
by the country itself in various assistance areas previously agreed; 
share of aid channelled through budget support or other instruments, 
discrepancies between annual commitment and effective disburse-
ment by donors. 
− qualitative indicators to judge aid effectiveness, for example percep-
tion of ownership (integration of trade issues into national develop-
ment programmes, including PRSP, knowledge and degree of par-
ticipation of different actors in aid programming) and policy align-
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ment (programmes implemented are in line with national develop-
ment strategies). 
2. Interesting examples of indicators in the area of non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs) that could replicated directly for the EPA-monitoring exercise 
can be found in the context of the NTB Monitoring Mechanism estab-
lished by the East African Business Council and the East African Com-
munity Secretariats with the objective of facilitating the identification, 
reporting and monitoring of the elimination of current and future NTBs 
within the EAC Partner States. 
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Annex 1  ECDPM-DIE Workshop in Brussels on  
21 February 2007 
Summary Report 
on the ECDPM-DIE consultative workshop on 
A Monitoring Process for the Implementation of EPAs 
21 February 2007, Sofitel Hotel, Brussels 
In the context of negotiating ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs) there have been repeated calls for a monitoring mechanism. In 2005 
EU Member States committed themselves to closely monitor EPAs so that they 
help achieve development objectives and to “establish and implement an 
improved monitoring mechanism against development objectives within the 
EPA process” (Council of the European Union, 2005).  
Responding to these calls, the European Centre for Development Policy 
Management (ECDPM) and the German Development Institute (DIE) have 
launched a joint activity that aims to elaborate options for monitoring the 
implementation and impacts of EPAs together with key stakeholders from 
Europe and ACP countries. This activity is co-financed by the German 
Ministry for Development Cooperation. More information regarding the 
project is also available on the website: www.ecdpm.org/trade/epamonitoring. 
As part of their consultation process, ECDPM-DIE organised a one-day 
consultative workshop with ambassadors, officials, trade and monitoring 
experts from the ACP and Europe in Brussels on the 21st of February 2007. 
The purpose of this workshop was to discuss objectives, key features, 
methodological and institutional options for an EPA-monitoring mechanism. 
Summary 
The discussion focused on the importance of identifying a clear process for 
monitoring EPAs. Different potential purposes of the monitoring process were 
explored, including:  
− compliance with EPA commitments, 
− the capacity of the ACP to implement the agreements, to effectively take 
advantage of the new opportunities they offer and thus to undertake 
appropriate reforms and adopt side adjustment policies and measures, and 
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− their impact on development, poverty alleviation and regional integration. 
The challenge is to design a monitoring mechanism that provides information 
on these issues in a timely manner and guides further adjustments in such a 
way as to ensure that EPAs and supporting measures effectively deliver on 
their stated development objectives. In order to ensure the maximum use and 
usefulness of an EPA-monitoring exercise, it appears essential that the ACP 
and the EU jointly agree on: 
− the scope, process, focus, and format of the monitoring process, 
− the constraints and capacity requirements of the ACP, addressing those 
related to EPA monitoring, 
− finding a way to ensure that the results of monitoring can effectively 
influence subsequent policies to ensure the necessary pre-conditions are 
met prior to tariff liberalization (i.e. how to change actions if EPAs are not 
delivering the desired impacts). 
If a consensus can emerge on these key dimensions during the EPA 
negotiations, it will facilitate the monitoring process and enhance its 
usefulness; in particular, it will make the identification of trade and 
development EPA-related benchmarks and indicators and the gathering of 
appropriate data and information easier and more transparent. As a result, the 
EPA-monitoring exercise will become less politically charged or biased and 
more results-oriented. 
Indeed, monitoring becomes more effective and functional if it is anticipated 
and specified to the greatest extent possible in the agreement itself. This would 
also provide for: 
− a better institutionalisation of the monitoring process and 
− its results to inform decision making on the implementation of EPAs, 
accompanying measures and policies, development assistance and 
possible remedies; 
− the outcome of the monitoring to feed into periodic reviews that would be 
provided for in the agreement. 
Given the importance of this integration of the monitoring process in EPAs, 
the monitoring issue should be addressed during the EPA negotiations rather 
than later on. In order to ensure an effective impact of monitoring on 
implementation, the contracting parties, i.e. EU and ACP countries and 
regions, need to be actively involved at the governmental, parliamentary and 
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stakeholder level. However, in order to ensure greater ownership, proposals for 
monitoring principles should come from the ACP and it should be ensured that 
the monitoring process does not become dependent on EU experts and 
expertise Furthermore, it should be noted that monitoring can be envisaged 
both at the national and regional levels, keeping in mind that to be meaningful, 
regional monitoring should build on specific national considerations. Careful 
attention should be given to who should be involved in the monitoring process, 
what should be the approach and priority focus of monitoring (i.e. identifying 
the most pertinent dimensions for the country and region concerned), and how 
to carry out the monitoring (including in terms of methodology, but also 
capacity and financing of monitoring). 
By clarifying and spelling out trade & development objectives, and the ways to 
reach them, an agreement on monitoring could also facilitate the EPA 
negotiations. The issue is currently being discussed in the EPA negotiations 
with the Caribbean, notably with the proposal to put in place a Joint EPA 
Council. 
ECDPM and DIE are currently consulting stakeholders and working on a study 
to further explore and specify the issues of monitoring mechanisms for EPAs. 
Presentations and report available at: 
www.ecdpm.org/trade/epamonitoring  
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Annex 2  ECDPM-DIE Workshop in Brussels on 
14 June 2007 
 
Summary Report 
on the consultative workshop on 
A Monitoring Process for the Implementation of EPAs 
What Recommendations for a Way Forward? 
14 June 2007, Sofitel Hotel, Brussels 
Following up on the consultation in February 2007, ECDPM and DIE 
organised a half day follow-up workshop on Monitoring EPAs in Brussels. 
The purpose of the workshop was to elaborate concrete recommendations for a 
way forward, covering both (i) key functions and institutional questions that 
should be covered by the legal text, and (ii) and concrete steps that should be 
taken after signing an EPA to ensure that monitoring becomes operational and 
effective. 
The workshop was split into two sessions according to the above mentioned 
questions.  
What to include in the legal EPA text? 
In order to make the monitoring mechanism useful and operational, it is 
important to establish it as part of the EPA provisions. The purpose of the first 
session was thus to start identifying those features that should be covered by 
the legal text. 
After a short presentation summarizing key elements of the background paper 
circulated for this workshop65, participants discussed whether and how 
different aspects of monitoring should be contractualised. 
There was general disagreement among different participants with regard to 
the scope of monitoring-related provisions that should be part of an EPA legal 
text. It was noted that trade-offs exist between the need for policy space and 
flexibility on the one hand and on the other the need for concrete provisions in 
the EPA text to ensure that monitoring becomes operational and serves the 
                                                          
65 The background note is available at www.ecdpm.org/trade/epamonitoring. 
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need of all stakeholders concerned. Thus, while some felt that it would be best 
to keep monitoring related provisions rather general to allow for flexibility in 
view of country specific needs and changing conditions,66 others wanted to 
have concrete provisions in the agreement that set up the exact framework for 
monitoring EPAs. 
Stakeholder views further differed on the question of what would be the most 
important issue to be contractualised in an EPA legal text. While some 
participants highlighted the need to define monitoring institutions, others 
argued that the key is to agree on the content of a monitoring mechanism (i.e. 
priority areas to be monitored). 
Participants agreed that monitoring should not focus exclusively on monitoring 
the implementation of EPAs but should encompass the outcomes and impacts 
of implementation, which should be mentioned in the legal text. There was, 
however, a key disagreement on whether to include concrete indicators in the 
EPA legal text. 
Most representatives from EU member states and the EC rejected the idea of 
including indicators in the legal text and maintained that indicators could not 
be agreed before the end of negotiations, and in any case should be country-
specific. They further argued that contractualisation of indicators would not 
allow for the required flexibility. 
Some NGOs and ACP stakeholders, however, claimed that the development 
dimension of EPA has to be conceptualised and targets defined accordingly. It 
was argued that without clear targets that form the basis and framework for 
monitoring the agreements’ results it would be difficult to monitor the 
development dimension of EPAs, which would remain too vague and broad a 
term. Thus, some participants proposed to make the implicit causal chain from 
trade rules to development objectives explicit in the EPA text and accordingly 
include main indicators in an annex to the agreements (as proposed in the EPA 
text drafted by the ESA region67). These can be either agreed on beforehand, or 
                                                          
66  As result of EPA implementation, specific conditions and needs may change in terms of the 
evolution of economic and social situations as well as in terms of institutional settings, for 
instance in the relationship and respective roles of the Regional Economic Communities and 
the AU institutions. 
67  According to article 19 of the EPA text proposed by the ESA region, the ESA-EU EPA 
Council will undertake every 5 years a formal and comprehensive review in order to assess 
the contribution of EPAs towards the achievement of development benchmarks as set out in 
the annex of the agreement. Ethiopia was mandated to come up with a proposal for such 
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be included as provisions in the agreement that concretely name different 
institutions that are to develop these indicators. In any case, the identification 
of indicators should be done by independent institutions that have combined 
trade and development expertise. 
The discussion on whether and how to include provisions on the institutional 
design of a monitoring mechanism in EPA texts was controversial.  
The EC proposal to establish for each regional EPA a Joint EPA Council at 
ministerial level, with different sub-committees, namely a Trade Committee, a 
Development Committee, a Parliamentary Committee and Non-state-actors 
Committee, was only partly accepted. Many stakeholders, including officials 
from EU member states, deemed this a rigid structure and criticised the 
establishment of new complex institutions. They argued that monitoring 
should be linked as much as possible to existing institutions (avoiding building 
parallel structures) and that the details of the institutional design should be left 
for further discussion between the parties of each regional EPA (taking 
especially into account the arrangements and procedures of the various ACP-
EPA configurations). 
The question of how to link these institutions with the CPA joint institutions 
(such as the JPA or the JMTC) as well as with the all-ACP and ACP 
regional/national organisations was raised. In this context the mandate of the 
African Union (AU) to monitor and harmonise negotiations and 
implementation of EPAs for Africa was highlighted. Similarly on the EU side, 
it was argued that both the EC and EU member states should be represented in 
the EPA institutions (including on monitoring), in line with respective 
competences. Furthermore the distinction between trade and development in 
the sub-committees structure was criticised and it was proposed to establish a 
single committee responsible for both trade and development. 
Participants agreed that parliamentarians and non-state actors must be involved 
in the monitoring. There was disagreement, however, on exactly how to 
capture this in an EPA legal text. It was emphasized that simply referring to 
                                                                                                                               
concrete development benchmarks for the ESA region. According to this proposal, the: (i) 
increase of export volume and revenue; (ii) diversification of export base and (iii) value 
addition on exports are the three main components to measure whether EPAs contribute to 
broader goals derived from the CPA (such as poverty reduction, sustainable development and 
integration of ACP countries into the global economy = ‘core benchmarks’). In order to 
achieve these goals, a set of actions that - within a definite timeframe - oblige the contracting 
parties to act to address the problems has to be defined in the annex of the agreement. 
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the need for consultation would be not enough. In the case of EPA 
negotiations, despite the fact that all parties committed to involve NSA on a 
regular basis and repeatedly emphasized the importance of such involvement, 
in many countries the lack of participation of NSA in EPA negotiations has 
been a serious problem and led to a perceived lack of transparency in the EPA 
process. Thus it would not be sufficient to merely include NSA involvement as 
one of the principles of the agreements, and mechanisms for actual 
participation should be inserted in the legal texts. Other participants argued on 
the contrary that it is the responsibility of governments of European and ACP 
countries to ensure participation in and ownership of the process (of EPA 
implementation and monitoring), and thus any such dimension would go 
beyond the scope of an EPA legal text. 
Some participants further stressed that the exact structure and procedures of 
monitoring would largely depend on its purpose, in particular on whether 
monitoring will trigger safeguards, accompanying measures or a review of the 
agreement. The operationalization of monitoring would thus depend on its 
functions and on the possibilities for revision (that should be agreed upon as 
part of the overall outcome of EPA negotiations). Such a ‘response’ dimension 
of monitoring – e.g. the way monitoring results are used and trigger 
adjustments, safeguards or accompanying measures - would thus be of special 
interest and should be defined in the legal text.68 
Most participants agreed that a minimum agreement on the overall setting for 
an EPA-monitoring mechanism, which should in principle be the same for all 
regions, would be necessary to make results for the different EPA regions 
comparable. 
Process to make EPA monitoring operational 
The purpose of the second session was to start identifying first steps that will 
induce a process aimed at the timely establishment of an effective monitoring 
mechanism that becomes fully operational. 
The session was introduced by a presentation highlighting a number of points. 
To make the monitoring mechanism fully operational, the first step should be 
to identify key stakeholders to be involved, including trade and development 
                                                          
68  It was also emphasized that different kinds of response may require different mechanisms 
and the participation of different stakeholders. E.g. monitoring for compliance purposes may 
be most efficiently done by signatory parties, while monitoring impacts on the rural poor may 
require a more consultative approach and include farmer organisations. 
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experts. Monitoring results might be biased as some actors are better 
organised, while others, like farmers organisations, often lack the capacity to 
fully engage in a monitoring mechanism. Thus the capacity of stakeholders to 
monitor should be assessed and gaps identified. It may be useful to define a set 
of actors that are responsible for monitoring, with sufficient flexibility for 
others step in for certain sectors (e.g. farmers in monitoring market access in 
agriculture). 
In a second step, it will be necessary to identify at national and regional level 
priority sectors and those inputs (in terms of EPA provisions and EPA-related 
accompanying measures) that are likely to have a major impact. The choice of 
methodology will depend on sectors and areas selected. However, the “results 
chain analysis” may be a useful methodology based on the input – output – 
outcome – impact chain.69 In identifying this results chain for key sectors it has 
to be kept in mind that the further one goes down the results chain, the more 
difficult it is to see causalities. 
Two of the possible options to define indicators are through ex ante impact 
assessments (SIA) or/and consultations with stakeholders at the beginning of 
the monitoring process. Assistance might be needed for timely collection and 
processing of data. 
In the ensuing discussion, the proposed steps were generally accepted. It was 
stressed that monitoring must be country specific, linked with existing 
monitoring systems and will have different costs per region as monitoring will 
get more expensive if data is not yet available. 
It was further emphasized that it may be necessary to establish a complaint 
mechanism to cover unexpected effects as results chain analysis can only cover 
expected results. More generally, it was stressed that incentives are needed to 
get stakeholders seriously involved and that major incentives would be to 
ensure the transparency of results and to equip the monitoring mechanism with 
teeth (enforcement power).  
Looking into the feasibility of results chain analysis in ACP countries, it was 
noted that monitoring will most probably depend on resources made available 
                                                          
69  A result chain describes the EPA-induced policy changes and the most important 
accompanying measures and goes on to identify key (positive and negative) consequences at 
the subsequent levels of outputs, direct and indirect outcomes and impacts for different 
stakeholders. Indicators then have to be identified for important steps in this results chain to 
measure progress towards goals. 
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for the conduct of the monitoring exercise and related capacity building. In this 
context it was mentioned that in most ACP countries there is scarce capacity 
even to implement basic safeguard mechanisms as part of trade agreements. To 
cut costs and use synergies, most participants agreed that EPA monitoring 
should be linked to in-country processes such as the PRSP. It was, however, 
also noted that often data collected for policy tools like the PRSP are very 
general. Thus, sectoral and trade data have to be gathered. This may be 
achieved by strengthening existing monitoring systems. 70 In any case, basic 
systems to gather trade data have to be in place in every country. In this 
context EU stakeholders confirmed that building resources and capacity for 
monitoring in ACP countries and regions will be a key part of the EPA 
implementation process and funding for this should be made available through 
the Joint EU-AfT Strategy. This would also encompass improvement and 
generation of trade data. 
Some participants highlighted that causality of observed effects might be 
difficult to prove. In order to isolate EPA effects from effects of other policy 
reforms (e.g. reforms induced in the context of WTO obligations), policy 
reforms have to be monitored as well. This will give hints as to causal relations 
of observed results that are not induced by EPA and related measures. 
Finally, it was emphasized that Regional Environmental Center (RECs) should 
be included in monitoring EPAs and that it may be useful to assign them the 
task of monitoring regional integration (RI) within the overall EPA-monitoring 
framework. This will be particular relevant for some regions that have already 
induced endogenous initiatives for monitoring regional integration, like the 
SADC and COMESA regions. 
Conclusion 
The chances of reaching agreement on concrete recommendations and possible 
provisions for monitoring to be included in an EPA legal text were limited by 
the range of differing views held by various stakeholders, as the latter differed 
not only in terms of whether the agreements should contain monitoring related 
provisions and in how much detail but also regarding the content, scope and 
format of a monitoring exercise. 
                                                          
70  Ethiopia, for instance, started establishing a data system three years ago to analyse impli-
cations of policy reforms (for details, see Ethiopian Development Research Institute, 
http://www.edri-et.org/index.htm). 
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However, participants came up with some important suggestions and agreed on 
some key aspects. Consensus could be reached on the need to achieve a 
minimum understanding between the parties on scope, key areas, institutions 
and stakeholders to be involved in monitoring before the end of the 
negotiations. Such agreed minimum elements, starting with an obligation for 
all parties to conduct effective monitoring, should be included in the EPA legal 
text. Moreover, all participants also agreed on the need to build capacity for 
monitoring and to establish synergies with existing similar in-country 
processes as well as on the importance of the response dimension of 
monitoring. 
Presentations and report available at: 
www.ecdpm.org/trade/epamonitoring 
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Annex 3  DIE-FES Workshop in Dar Es Salaam, 
Tanzania, 28 Feb. – 1 March 2007 
Background 
As part of the DIE/ECDPM project on the development of a monitoring 
mechanism for EPAs, a workshop was organised in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania 
on February 28 and March 1, 2007. In the same week a series of bilateral 
meetings was held with representatives of different stakeholders. The main 
aims were 1) to identify the positions and ideas of a wide range of actors on 
the possible contents, purpose and objectives of a monitoring mechanism and 
2) to “test” the application of results chain analysis in practice. The workshop 
participants represented a wide range of stakeholders, including representatives 
from government, NGOs, private sector and academia. In addition, a number 
of bilateral meetings were held with stakeholder representatives who could not 
attend the workshop. These efforts were greatly facilitated by the fact that the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation acted as a co-organiser of the workshop, and not 
only contributed financially and logistically but also made use of contacts from 
its already well-established dialogue programme with these actors on EPAs.  
1.   Workshop 
The workshop started with a word of welcome from the co-organisers, Wilman 
Kapanjema of Friedrich Ebert Foundation and Michael Brüntrup of DIE. Dr. 
Brüntrup also introduced the background to the project and the programme and 
purpose of the workshop. He emphasized that the discussion on a monitoring 
of EPAs was not intended to create additional pressure to finalise the 
negotiations by the end of 2007. The aim was solely to have at least some 
elements of a monitoring mechanism at hand if and when the negotiations are 
completed. 
1.1   State of play in SADC-EPA negotiations 
In the following presentation, Dr. Livingston Kaboyoko, from the Department 
for Trade and Industry Tanzania, presented the state of play in the on-going 
EPA negotiations in the SADC region with a focus on Tanzania’s priorities 
and its membership in overlapping regional configurations. The priorities 
identified by the SADC region are Technical Barriers to Trade, Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary measures, Regional Integration and the Development 
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Dimension, especially regarding supply side constraints. The problem here is 
that DG Trade has no mandate to negotiate on development assistance, and 
therefore the crucial issue of supply side constraints needs to be addressed 
either bilaterally with individual EU member states or through the European 
Development Fund (EDF). 
One important challenge for regional integration derives from the fact that 
South Africa, which is a member of SADC, already has a Trade and 
Development Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) with the EU. It took the EU a 
long period of consideration before it asked for cohesion and ultimately a 
merger of the TDCA into the negotiations and the prospective agreement 
with the SADC-EPA region. The members of the SADC-EPA region are not 
agreed with this and note that other SADC members perceive that their 
interests differ considerably from those of South Africa. 
The parallel membership of Tanzania in the SADC-EPA region and the East 
African Community (EAC) poses another challenge. EAC has already 
established a Customs Union amongst its members. However, Kenya and 
Uganda, its other members, are negotiating EPAs as part of the ESA region, 
as are Rwanda and Burundi, which are about to join EAC. Tanzania hopes to 
resolve the potential problems arising from this through harmonisation of the 
SADC and EAC (and thereby the ESA region) tariffs with the negotiations 
on a common external tariff for the COMESA region and the long term 
objective of the African Union to harmonise tariffs amongst all African 
countries. Since these processes are unlikely to be completed by the end of 
2007, Tanzania will probably need more adjustment time to resolve this 
problem. 
In the discussion it was stressed  that one important issue to monitor is the 
preparedness of ACP countries and regions to enter into EPAs. The different 
and usually longer timetables for independent integration processes are a 
point in case. It was asked whether Tanzania has a clear idea of what it really 
wants from the EPA, and whether it has the capacity to negotiate it. It was 
questioned whether there is sufficient data available for Tanzania to make 
good decisions and feed into a monitoring system. For both decision making 
and monitoring, civil society in Tanzania needs to be better prepared to make 
inputs. It was stated that EPAs have to address supply side constraints, 
otherwise they could be considered useless. 
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1.2   Methodological issues and identification of impact chains 
The next session dealt with methodological issues of monitoring. Tobias 
Reichert gave a background on monitoring methodologies with an emphasis on 
results chain analysis, with a view to preparing for a practical exercise in its 
application during the workshop. Since EPAs were still under negotiation 
during the time of the workshop, it was obviously not possible to monitor their 
actual implementation, let alone impacts. 
So participants were asked to identify the sectors and broad monitoring areas 
which in their perception are most likely going to be affected by the policy 
changes induced by the EPAs. After a brief discussion in the group, four 
sectors were identified: 
− Agriculture 
− Manufacturing 
− Tourism 
− Fisheries 
In a next step an attempt was made to identify impact chains and possible 
indicators. To do this, the workshop was divided into three working groups, 
each of them given the task to identify an impact chain for one of the sectors, 
with one group dealing with the two “natural resource based” sectors, tourism 
and fisheries. In the workshops, the “metaplan” method was used, with 
participants noting policy instruments and results on cards, which were then 
clustered on the basis of result level (output, outcome, impact) and which 
direct and indirect results are derived from which instruments/inputs. The 
position of each card and the causal links to results at higher levels were 
discussed more or less extensively in each group. 
All three working groups were able to come up with a meaningful results 
chain. The group on “natural resources” produced two. Pictures of the results 
chains developed are presented at the end of the paper, a brief summary of the 
impact paths in the different groups is given below: 
a) Agriculture 
In the agriculture sector the policy changes which were expected to have the 
most important impacts were reduction of tariffs on EU exports as well as from 
other SADC countries into Tanzania and reduction of Non-tariff Barriers, 
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especially SPS measures for Tanzania’s exports to the EU and other SADC 
countries. 
The outcomes expected from these changes were: 
− Increased intra-regional trade in agricultural products, and probably higher 
agricultural gross domestic product (GDP) in the region 
− Changes in agricultural production patterns in Tanzania, with net effects 
on production and agricultural GDP unclear 
− Lower tariff revenues for Tanzania 
The impacts on regional integration are therefore expected to be positive, the 
impacts on rural employment and poverty reduction in Tanzania unclear. 
Indicators to monitor were identified as: 
− Value added per farmer/agricultural worker 
− Cereal yield  
− Growth in agricultural value-added  
− Agricultural policy costs index  
− Crop production index  
− Livestock production index  
− Volume of exports 
− Volume of imports 
(not exhaustive due to lack of time)  
b) Fish Industry 
In the fisheries sector, the policy change or input that was expected to have the 
biggest impacts was considered to be Aid for Trade, especially support for 
hygiene and other SPS-standards. A second important policy “input” would be 
reduction of regional trade barriers.  
The immediate outputs would be a greater ability of the Tanzanian fish 
industry to meet standards for the EU market and lower tariff barriers within 
the region. 
The direct outcomes of these developments are expected to be expanded 
markets for Tanzanian fish in the region and easier access to EU markets. The 
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indirect outcome would be increased catches of fish, especially from Lake 
Victoria. 
A broad range of indirect outcomes from this was identified by the working 
group, including the risk of overfishing certain species in Lake Victoria, with 
the consequent loss of livelihoods for small scale fishermen, an increase in 
industrialised fishing and fish processing, which may contribute to job 
creation, a change of eating habits, with decreased fish consumption due to 
higher prices in response to increased exports and accordingly reduced 
domestic supplies, and even increased availability of protein animal feed from 
fish residues. 
On the impact level, the poverty impacts obviously depend on the balance 
between employment generated in commercial fishing compared to incomes 
lost in small scale fishing and whether small scale fishermen will in fact be 
able to find new sources of income outside fishing. Environmental impacts 
may be mixed; e.g. since many small scale fishermen use dynamite, its decline 
may result in lower chemical pollution. On the other hand, industrial fisheries 
and factories may result in higher pollution with processing waste if this is not 
properly managed. Overfishing of certain species might have negative health 
impacts, since these fish eat mosquito larvae and a decline in their numbers 
can result in a higher number of mosquitos and hence malaria. 
Indicators for effects on the output level include: 
− Expenses in investment, capacity building for meeting SPS standards  
− Share of fish exports rejected for hygiene reasons 
− Applied tariffs for intra-regional trade in the SADC-EPA region 
The central indicator on the direct outcome is 
− Trade volumes overall (locally, regionally and EU) 
Indicators for indirect outcomes include: 
− Annual catches of fish in commercial fishing in metric tonnes, 
disaggregated by fish species 
− Data on fishing capacities (number of fishing ships and processing 
factories) 
− Number of fishermen employed in the industrial fishing sector 
− Number of subsistence fishermen and traditional fishing boats 
− Change of eating habits - level of protein in diets (surveys) 
 Michael Brüntrup et al.
  
 German Development Institute 160
In addition, the working group identified a number of measures to address 
potentially negative impacts. 
Maximum catch quotas should be set for different fish species; this could be 
supported by the EU, the main export market, which should provide data on 
the amount imported from Tanzania and other West African Countries.  
An alternative/additional source of livelihood for traditional fishermen could 
result from an increase in artisanal fish farming. 
c) Tourism 
The same working group developed a (less detailed) impact chain of the 
tourism sector as well. Here the two policy inputs that were expected to have 
the biggest impacts were investment and competition policies, the inclusion of 
which is still under debate in the negotiations, and aid for trade, especially in 
the area of infrastructure and accompanying domestic policy reforms. Some 
investment related issues may become part of the EPAs as part of 
commitments in the services sector. 
The outputs of these changes could include more secure land rights, clearer 
conditions for foreign investment and more landing rights for foreign planes 
and ships, allowing organisers to arrange for trips more easily. The direct 
outcomes can be expected to be increased FDI in the tourism sector and a 
higher number of tourists entering the country. 
The indirect outcomes of increased FDI can include a better directly tourism-
related infrastructure such as hotels and resorts but also to a certain extent 
“supporting” infrastructure like roads and telecommunications that could also 
be useful for the broader public. Other outcomes include increased 
employment in the tourism industry, higher demand for Tanzanian products, 
and where investments take place in eco-tourism, conservation may be 
promoted. On the negative side, tourism may result in the over-use and 
consequent degradation of natural resources. 
A higher number of tourists may have also have indirect socio-cultural 
outcomes. There is a risk of cultural deterioration and promotion of a 
consumerist lifestyle. Positive effects can derive from inter-action with tourists 
from countries with a higher level of human development, including more 
gender equality. 
No indicators were identified for this impact chain. 
Monitoring Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
German Development Institute 161 
d) Manufacturing  
The working group on the manufacturing sector saw changes in rules on FDI, 
rules of origin in the EU and reduction of tariffs in Tanzania as the most 
important policy inputs. The group focused directly on the levels of outcomes 
and identified technology transfer and increased export opportunities 
(especially in the textile sector) as most likely ones. Indirect outcomes would 
be higher employment with a positive impact on poverty reduction.  
On the other hand, the outcome of lower tariffs on industrial goods in Tanzania 
were seen as dominant, with a significant loss in government revenue and de-
industrialisation and loss of employment, resulting in more poverty and brain 
drain of qualified workers. That would have negative impacts on poverty and 
other important development objectives such as health and domestic security. 
No indicators were identified for this impact chain. 
1.3   Conclusions 
The “quality” of the impact chains varied, especially at the level of detail at 
which different possible outputs and outcomes were identified. One important 
factor at work here seems to have been how familiar the facilitators of the 
respective working groups already were with the results chain methodology 
and whether they attended preparatory meetings with the organisers. Another 
important factor was how broadly the sectors were defined - the narrower the 
sectors, the more detailed and informative the impact chains, hence the impact 
chain for fisheries was more detailed than that for the manufacturing sector 
chain. 
Despite being invited, relatively few representatives of private sector 
organisations and government attended the workshop. Hence the majority of 
participants were from NGOs, social groups and academia. The workshop also 
suffered from an very small timeframe: Key sectors and impact chains had to 
be identified done within one day. However, all participants regarded the work 
on impact chains as a very valuable experience which also greatly enhanced 
their own understanding of the possible impacts of EPAs on the Tanzanian 
economy and Tanzanian society. In conclusion, the participants agreed that a 
monitoring process for EPAs should focus on the results and impact level and 
involve representatives of all affected stakeholders. Loss of revenue from 
tariffs resulting from liberalisation was highlighted as a key issue for 
monitoring. 
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2.   Main points from individual interviews 
Prof. Mlawa: National Chairman of Board of External Trade 
The EPAs have a wrong starting point: they assume that ACP countries are 
capable of producing what is demanded in foreign markets. However, this is 
normally not the case. An example are agricultural products: while Tanzania 
can produce rice and livestock at competitive prices, it cannot provide the 
quantities that are required by global companies on a reliable basis. Tanzanian 
companies often lack the expertise to make use of market niches, e.g. in honey 
and cotton clothes. Hence also existing preferences, also under AGOA, are 
hardly used. Therefore EPAs must focus on supply constraints, which requires 
a link to the EDF. The key problem is that the negotiations do not allow for 
such a formal link. 
A monitoring process needs to ensure that the information available in private 
companies is utilised. They know their needs and problems, but no one is 
listening to them. The Board of External Trade acts as facilitator for these 
information flows, but lacks funds and political influence. Many politicians 
support the revenue authority rather than entrepreneurs. There is no policy 
strategy on the use of trade for development in Tanzania, and probably most of 
Africa. Many decisions are highly politicised. 
Confederation of Tanzanian Industries 
The Confederation of Tanzanian Industries (CTI) has been fully involved in 
the national EPA process, and it has the vice chair of the co-ordination 
committee with the trade ministry.  
From CTI’s perspective, EPAs are a must, since Cotonou preferences would be 
terminated without them. They can also provide an added value compared to 
the Euro Banking Association (EBA) initiative, since they address rules of 
origin, SPS measures and trade facilitation. Public procurement is already 
liberalised. EPAs might increase transparency, but this is not sure since most 
decisions are now decentralised. Investments should be liberalised selectively 
on a sectoral basis.  
The only major problem with them is reciprocity, especially for LDCs. 50% of 
Tanzanian industries are already liberalised, and most of the rest will be soon, 
without major problems. For around 100 products, a longer time period of 20 
years is required before liberalisation. A list of these sensitive products was 
defined based on criteria indicating which industries need protection and 
which are important for government revenue. 
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Tanzania should use EPAs as “training” on how to liberalise with the rest of 
the world and test its strength. The EU will remain Tanzania’s most important 
trading partner for many years to come. 
Monitoring, especially impacts of EPAs, will be important to inform 
recommendations for mitigation measures. Existing regional agreements, for 
example the EAC, do not have a monitoring system. As a result, there are no 
effective channels to process information and complaints from business, and it 
is not clear what impacts they have. 
CTI recognises that a monitoring mechanism that represents different 
stakeholders cannot make real decisions, although it can at least highlight 
issues. It should allow for information that is available faster than data from 
the Bureau of Statistics. For example, CTI has its own surveys, but only 
amongst its members. 
On a regional basis, COMESA and UNCTAD recommend harmonised 
databases, but the EAC countries still use different statistical systems.  
In terms of the regional configuration, most Tanzanian businesses prefer the 
ESA region, with which it has a trade surplus. In SADC there is concern about 
competition with South Africa. The government is, though, to remain in SADC 
mainly for political reasons. 
Mr Nyantake, Consultant 
Tanzania already has a number of monitoring processes for economic policy. 
The Independent Monitoring Group on Economic Development reports to the 
President’s office, and compiles data on poverty and economic development.  
The Tanzania National Business Council consists of 20 government ministers 
and 20 representatives of the private sector, and is chaired by the President. It 
discusses mainly macro-economic issues and investment policies. In principle, 
farmers organisations such as the Tanzania Farmer’s Association and the 
Chamber of Agriculture and Livestock are also part of the Council, as are 
academics and NGOs, but in practice they are often not represented. The 
Council has technical working groups on a number of issues including on 
trade, but Mr Nyantake was not sure whether there is a specific group for 
EPAs.  
There is also monitoring group on the Growth Poverty Reduction strategy in 
the Ministry of Planning. EDSF runs a “development gateway” for Tanzania 
and hosts Internet based discussions on a number of issues. 
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On the regional level, only the East African Business Council is active in the 
EAC region. Other stakeholder groups do not have functioning regional co-
operation. 
Gideon Nasani, Vice President, CTI 
As one of the few business representatives, Mr Nasani saw larger benefits for 
Tanzania as a member of SADC rather than the ESA region. He explained this 
ass a result of greater complementarity in economic structures, since South 
Africa is already industrialised, and in addition may provide some special and 
differential treatment for LDCs like Tanzania. 
Some elements of the trade protocol of EAC are not well respected, especially 
in the area of rules of origin. Uganda already imports processed fruit juice 
from South Africa at the (lower) tariff rate for inputs, and then re-packages and 
sells it on the regional market. Rules of origin are poorly enforced in the 
cement industry as well. An effective monitoring system could help remedy 
this situation. 
East African Business Council, Acting Executive Director 
Mr Mosses believes that monitoring could be very helpful in the EPA process. 
It would have to establish “critical control points” where stakeholders, 
particularly business associations, can provide information.  
East African Business Council (EABC) carries out polls on trade policy and 
publishes an annual business climate index. In the customs union of EAC, 
public awareness increased only shortly before the Common External Tariff 
was agreed. EABC is now starting an impact analysis of the custom union, 
which includes a monitoring mechanism of Non-Tariff Barriers, including an 
annual survey amongst companies. 
Farmers are less organised than in other sectors, but an East African Farmers 
Federation (EAFF) does exist. EABC wants it to become a member. Fisherfolk 
are even less organised. 
At a greater regional level, Mr Mosses expects some convergence in 
COMESA, but it is not clear whether a customs union can be agreed. 
The idea of an electronic process to collect data and inputs for monitoring is 
good, but needs back-up through other means. 
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Annex 4  ECDPM-CUTS-FES Workshop in Nairobi, 
Kenya 23−24 April 2007 
 
EPA Development Benchmarks & Monitoring: 
Workshop organised by CUTS, ECDPM and FES in cooperation with 
APRODEV 
23−24 April 2007, Nairobi, Nairobi Safari Club – Workshop Report 
1.   Introduction 
Following a brief introduction by ECDPM on the main findings from previous 
consultations and workshops conducted in Tanzania and Brussels, Mr. Andrea 
Morara presented the paper ‘Towards a Monitoring System for the Economic 
Partnership Agreements: A Kenyan Perspective’, which was prepared as a 
background paper for the conference. 
He described the Kenyan Monitoring and Evaluation System and discussed 
how existing mechanisms and structures could be used for EPA monitoring. 
a) The Kenyan M&E system 
The Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 
(ERS), the overarching national development strategy in Kenya, provides the 
overall framework for the development of the National Integrated M&E 
system (NIMES). Coordination of the NIMES is located with the Monitoring 
& Evaluation Directorate (MED) of the Ministry of Planning and National 
Development (MPND). The Monitoring and Evaluation Department is 
responsible for collating, coordinating, and disseminating information. MED 
has established a coordination framework, consisting of horizontal linkages 
across line ministries and civil society at the central and devolved levels, and 
vertical linkages from the cabinet to the district level. Further, a national 
Monitoring and Evaluation Steering Committee has been established, 
comprising government stakeholders from the Ministries of Planning and 
National Development, the Ministry of Finance, development partners, and 
NGOs. 
The Central Planning & Project Monitoring Units (CPPMUs) are the main 
units in all government ministries responsible for monitoring and evaluation of 
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the implementation of their respective ministry's strategic plans. The intention 
is to have the CPPMU monitor and evaluate the implementation processes 
(inputs and activities), outputs and outcomes to ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness in delivering the strategic objectives. In collaboration with all 
departments in the ministry, the CPPMUs are expected to institutionalise the 
M&E framework within the various departments. Each of these departments is 
expected to collect data using special data collection tools and forward the data 
to the CPPMUs for collation and analysis. On their part, the CPPMUs will 
analyse the data and generate reports that will subsequently be used by 
management for decision-making.  
Any M&E subsystem, including the one to be designed for the EPAs, is 
designed to plug into Kenya’s National Integrated M&E System (NIMES). 
The government is making progress in strengthening its capacity for M&E, but 
much more still remains to be done.71 
b) Main Results of Monitoring WS in Tanzania 
This presentation was followed by an outline given by Ms. Agnes Mwakagi 
from the University Dar Es Salaam, who attended the Monitoring Workshop in 
Tanzania and presented the main findings (see Annex 3). 
c) General Discussion 
After the presentation the floor was given to the participants for a short round 
of comments before the participants were finally split up into two working 
groups. 
Some researchers pointed out that the opening of telecommunication markets 
showed that employment and efficiency had improved, though the move had, 
on the other hand, led to a decrease in government revenues. Thus, monitoring 
should not be limited to an assessment of negative outcomes but should assess 
both positive and negative results. 
                                                          
71 Development partners have worked together in supporting the development of the Statistical 
Master Plan. During the coming year donors will commit themselves to work towards a 
sector wide approach for delivering support to further reduce transaction costs to the 
government. Such support will include support for building the capacity of line ministries and 
local governments to collect and analyse data and disseminate information. 
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It was suggested to link EPA monitoring to the mid-term reviews of the EDF 
programmes. Others felt that a simple adaptation of existing mechanisms to 
EPA monitoring needs would be insufficient. Most of the participants believe 
that Kenya lacks a monitoring culture and capacity, though their views differed 
with regard to how serious this problem is. Some stressed that it was a lack not 
of monitoring capacity but of willingness that is hindering an efficient 
monitoring of EPA negotiations and implementation. 
With regard to the objectives of monitoring, participants stressed how 
important is was that not only capacity, compliance and impacts should be 
monitored but also remedies, since the first categories would prove useless if 
they did not induce adjustments and changes. 
Participants were largely in favour of a participatory approach that involves 
civil society and private sector organisations. Some criticised the lack of 
linkages and information flows between private sector, civil society, 
parliamentarians and the government. 
2.   Working Groups 
The participants were split up into two working groups. Whereas working 
group A aimed to develop a concrete institutional design for Kenya and the 
ESA region based on the most important functions of monitoring and the 
stakeholders to be involved, working group B concentrated on ‘what’ needs to 
be monitored as well as on methodological aspects of monitoring (with the aim 
of developing an impact chain for one key sector and developing respective 
indicators for the different steps of the chain). 
Working Group A 
a) Function of monitoring mechanism 
The working group started with a brainstorming session on the most important 
functions of monitoring EPAs. Finally, five main functions were identified, 
encompassing the following: 
i. Monitoring capacity 
Monitoring capacity (to implement and take advantage of EPAs) would 
cover the assessment of private sector institutions and the public sector 
with the aim to identify capacity building needs. ‘monitoring capacity’ 
over time would then encompass capacity building and accompanying 
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measures implemented by respective countries and through respective 
EU assistance, according to capacity needs. 
ii. Conformance/complementarity72 
To see whether EPA objectives and outcomes conform to national 
development objectives 
iii. Compliance 
Participants stressed that monitoring compliance should not only 
encompass an assessment of whether parties comply with EPA 
provisions but also whether accompanying measures and reforms were 
reducing risks and boosting positive impacts of EPAs. 
iv. Impact/Objectives 
Monitoring should encompass an assessment of impact and outcomes of 
EPAs on broader development objectives. 
v. Remedy/adjustment 
Monitoring for remedy and adjustment needs of the EPA text or single 
provisions of it would serve as a kind of underlying objective of the 
whole monitoring exercise. All stakeholders stressed how important it 
was that monitoring lead to changes and not simply be for information 
purposes and future learning. 
The participants emphasized that the two categories capacity and compliance 
are closely interlinked, as parties might implement the provisions of the 
agreements only fragmentarily or not in time due to capacity constraints. 
Interestingly, the participants’ discussion focused on ‘monitoring capacity’ 
instead of monitoring impact and output, which was the focus of another 
consultative session in Brussels. 
b) Legal foundation and design 
Having identified the above listed five broad functions of monitoring EPAs, 
the participants called for the monitoring mechanism to be specified to the 
greatest extent possible in the EPA legal text, acknowledging the danger that 
this might entail the risk that monitoring could become a political exercise 
only. It was agreed that monitoring should be specified in the EPA agreement 
itself to the greatest extent possible, and not end up in the Annex, which would 
normally not attract much attention. 
                                                          
72  The term ‘coherence’ as discussed in previous consultations was explicitly rejected. 
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It was interesting to see how the ‘reality check’ changed opinions. First the 
participants argued that monitoring should be conducted by independent 
institutions and involve the private sector and civil society. Once we started 
discussing concrete design options and linkages with existing institutions, 
participants changed their views.  
 
They finally agreed on the following proposal for a Kenyan-Regional 
Monitoring Mechanism: 
The structure of the monitoring mechanism should be two-fold and consist of 
− a joint EU-ACP monitoring mechanism at regional level, and 
− an intra-institutional mechanism at national level. 
At national level, participants argued that the government needs overall 
authority as it will provide resources for monitoring. According to the working 
group, the Ministry of Planning and National Development (MPND) should 
take the coordination function, while the concrete monitoring exercise should 
be done by clusters73 in the respective line ministries. The institutional linkage 
with the Ministry of Planning would ensure that enough resources are provided 
for monitoring. Furthermore, coordination of the NIMES is already located 
with the Monitoring & Evaluation Directorate (MED) of the Ministry of 
Planning (see summary of presentation, above). The concrete monitoring 
would be done by Central Planning Units (CPU) in the respective line 
ministries, which are already in charge of conducting the annual reports of 
each ministry required to report its results to the Ministry of Planning. 
Using existing structures would make it possible to minimise the costs for 
monitoring. Thus it was agreed that the CPUs would need to strengthen their 
monitoring capacity. 
A forum should be established for each cluster to bring together private sector 
and CSOs to feed into the reporting. Surprisingly, participants discussed what 
the role of non-state actors should be only when explicitly requested to do so 
by the facilitators, and the idea of such a forum was not further elaborated in 
the working group. 
Monitoring at regional level would be necessary for monitoring of regional 
integration (RI). In the ideal case this would be done by a regional institution 
                                                          
73  Agriculture, MA, trade, trade-related, fishery and services. 
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that has country offices in each member state. A further task of a monitoring 
institution at regional level would be to coordinate activities at national level 
and to standardize reports in order to make country reports comparable. It was 
agreed that monitoring at regional level could be linked to the COMESA 
Secretariat’s work, since it is currently working on a programme for 
monitoring RI (‘RI Surveillance Mechanism’). 
One important point that was stressed was the need to have a legally binding 
agreement among the regional partners that countries should provide data to 
the regional authorities, as participants presumed there might be a large 
measure of reluctance to do so. 
While it was agreed in the beginning of the session that monitoring should be a 
joint exercise, the question of how to involve the EC in this exercise remained 
open. The possibility of having a third structure at the ‘international level’ was 
considered but not discussed further due to lack of time. 
Working Group B 
Before this workshop, interested stakeholders in Kenya had, for various 
reasons, devoted very little time and resources to the issues of: a) what needs 
to be monitored as part of EPA implementation; and b) methodological aspects 
of monitoring (how to monitor the implementation of EPA). These two areas 
are very complex and were new to most participants, some of which found it 
difficult to contribute significantly in the short time available during the 
workshop. 
The first session of this working group addressed point a) ‘what to monitor’, 
and participants agreed on the following points. 
− In spite of the fact that the long term objectives of EPAs are shared by the 
ACP and EU, there is serious disagreement between them on how to 
achieve those objectives (desired impact) starting from the EPA 
provisions (inputs). Such attribution gaps thus relate to the exact steps by 
which specific EPA inputs will lead to certain outputs and the desired 
outcomes (leading eventually to fulfilment of goals). It is such (impact) 
chains of steps that should be monitored. 
− This implies that there are different elements to be monitored: both the 
content and the process of EPA implementation; compliance with, 
capacity for and the impact of EPA; implementation of both the legal text 
(i.e. a binding agreement between ACP and EU parties) and the actions 
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accompanying an EPA (involving third parties in certain cases, while in 
others remaining the exclusive responsibility of only one of the parties). 
An EPA monitoring system will have to monitor a combination of all 
these elements, and choosing only one or a limited number of them would 
lead to a narrow and unsatisfactory approach to monitoring. 
− However, given the range of issues involved and the limited capacity to 
address them all, some prioritization, or at least sequencing, of what needs 
to be monitored is necessary. This could be done by prioritizing on the 
basis of the chapters of the EPA text, of economic sectors, of the social 
groups involved, or of the most serious impediments to achieving the EPA 
goals. 
Taking the above into account, the working group undertook such a 
prioritization exercise, identifying key economic sectors and the EPA-related 
provisions (input) likely to be most important to achieving the related 
objectives (desired impact). 
Participants decided to categorize the priority EPA-related inputs in three 
groups: market access (MA) to the EU; measures to address supply-side 
constraints; development resources accompanying EPA. For each category, the 
key policy areas were specified in more detail and the respective goals 
attached to these identified. For instance, MA to the EU was subdivided into 
EU tariff and non-tariff barriers, and under the latter category, EU rules of 
origin and sanitary & phytosanitary measures (SPS) were recognised to be the 
most serious impediments to Kenyan export growth. Therefore, in the case of 
SPS, EPA should aim at putting in place policy reforms and capacity building 
measures (responsibility of both Kenyan government and the EU) to achieve 
the goal of ‘improved and effective access to European markets by Kenyan 
exporters’. The same line of reasoning was applied to the other policy areas. 
For example, under ‘measures to address supply-side constraints’, ‘firm-level 
policies and support measures’ were deemed crucial and in this context both 
behind-the-border interventions (such as fiscal incentives) and border 
interventions (such as tariff reduction to make imports of intermediary goods 
cheaper) should aim at value addition for Kenyan industries. This exercise was 
done initially taking the example of the Kenyan agriculture sector, but 
everyone realized this framework could be applied to all other industries as 
well. 
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A monitoring system will have to verify that the different steps in each of these 
policy areas (inputs) will lead (or at least contribute positively) to the final 
specific EPA goals. Precisely ‘how to monitor’ this was the subject of the 
second session of working group B, that considered the example of one 
sensitive agriculture sub-sector particularly under discussion at present by 
Kenyan society (sugar) and only one specific long term outcome (value 
addition) important to reaching the final objective (desired impact) of poverty 
reduction. 
The methodology chosen was to attempt to develop a ‘sectoral impact chain’ 
describing the policy measures (inputs) that are most important for the sector, 
the direct/indirect outputs and different impact for different stakeholders, and 
the respective indicators for the different steps of the chain that could be used 
for monitoring. 
Participants therefore moved: 
− from the inputs - in the three broad categories above (for instance, using 
performance requirements to attract new investment in the sugar 
processing industry);  
− to outputs (both positive and negative, such as increased investment in 
machinery, but also more environmental waste from sugar cane crushing); 
− to some indicators showing that these outputs can lead to the desired 
outcome - value addition (such as reduced cost of production and share of 
profits reinvested in technological upgrading, or, in the case of negative 
impact, that environmental waste reduction does not overburden the 
budgets of Kenyan firms). 
Importantly, participants realized that all the three broad policy areas identified 
are interrelated. In the example of value addition for the sugar processing 
industry, MA measures (for instance, regional rules of origin stimulating 
sourcing of cheaper inputs from neighbours) and development cooperation 
resources (to facilitate, for example, research and development in new seeds by 
local small and medium-sized enterprises − SMEs) will also be crucial to 
complement supply-side policies (such as performance requirements). 
Once impact paths had been identified, the time available was no longer 
sufficient to complete exercise, which was restricted to selection of impact 
indicators, related intermediate proxies for quantitative / qualitative indicators, 
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as well as examples of determination of research approaches and methods and 
data/information requirements. 
3.   Interviews 
The following individual interviews were conducted. 
Consumer Information Network  
− The focus of monitoring should lie on impacts as this is the key concern of 
consumers (for instance, do EPAs enhance access of consumers to basic 
goods? How are consumers’ rights changing with change in trade rules?). 
− Interviewees criticised that NSA were not included in impact assessment 
and argued that lack of capacity prevents them from engaging in 
negotiations. 
− Interviewees further criticised the lack of transparency of EPA 
negotiations. 
− Monitoring should be done by an independent forum (“something like a 
public assembly”) that feeds into government report. 
− Asked about their views on the monitoring mechanism model likely to be 
proposed by the EU (regional Joint EPA Council with technical level 
committees), the participants said the format was generally adequate but 
claimed that crucial sectors would not be represented and stated that 
monitoring should be done by independent institutions.  
− A general problem seen in EPA negotiations and monitoring is that certain 
sectors lack an effective representation (especially in certain countries in 
Africa) and do not receive support for establishing adequate organisations. 
− Consumer organisations need funds to create an effective organisation to 
voice their concerns and need capacity building support for monitoring. 
− Asked about the monitoring mechanism proposed in working group A, the 
interviewees criticised the strong role of the government. Limiting the role 
of CSOs to just delivering input would be insufficient and steps should be 
taken to avoid a situation in which there is one official government report 
and parallel reports from civil society. Monitoring should be a 
participatory process; otherwise it will be an ‘empty box’. 
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− Involving NSA would not only strengthen the credibility of the report but 
also empower CSOs. In addition, interestingly, some of the Kenyan CSOs 
(including the Consumer Information Network) have experience in 
undertaking applied research on the impact of different policies (for 
instance, the impact of liberalisation on access to food by the poor and a 
study on government budget monitoring) and have direct experience in 
data collection for such analyses (for example, data on prices in rural and 
streets markets). In certain cases the government (Kenya Bureau of 
Statistics) shared its methodological manuals to support CSOs in their 
research. 
− National-level monitoring of EPA will be crucial, though of course a 
synthesis at regional level should be the final reporting stage of a 
monitoring mechanism. Monitoring should be either done by regional 
organisations that work together with liaison offices at national level or be 
done by national organisations. In any case there should be an independent 
monitoring system of NSAs that also makes it possible to hold the Kenyan 
government (and not only the EU) accountable for the beneficial reforms 
it has committed to undertake as part of the EPA process. 
− Monitoring should be done by cluster: consumers, farmers, fisheries… 
and involve key regional organisations of each sector (in a sort of ‘peer 
review mechanism’). It should further distinguish between producers and 
consumers, as these groups have different objectives: while producers may 
be disadvantaged in some sectors due to EPAs, competition may benefit 
consumers (e.g. the sugar industry in Kenya, which is protected at the 
expense of consumers). 
− Regarding monitoring of PRSPs, interviewees argued that these were very 
elaborate, but still the organisations involved were close to the 
government (“you can’t monitor yourself”) 
− KIPRA was also deemed too close to the government to deliver realistic 
and fully independent reports. 
Kenyan Fish Processors and Exporters Association (AFIPEK) 
− An independent private sector driven monitoring mechanism should be 
designed. This should report to the government, which has to be involved 
as final decision maker for economic policies and trade relations (‘only 
the government can provide such a monitoring mechanism with teeth, to 
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be effective’). However, for purposes of compliance and complaint, it 
would be important for the monitoring system to include a sort of 
‘ombudsman’ mechanism to allow the private sector to make its case 
directly to the highest level of ACP-EU EPA decision-making (a regional 
joint EPA council or others) (instead of going first through slow national-
level bureaucracy/procedures) when harm to the business environment is 
caused by actions (or non-actions) by the EU or the national government 
in connection with EPA. It was mentioned that more transparency and 
government accountability are badly needed, as issues related to 
corruption, red-tape, and lack of implementation of business 
environment/trade facilitation reforms are the most serious impediments to 
growth for the Kenyan private sector. 
− The private sector should play a key role in EPA monitoring, and the 
information should flow in both directions: results from the private sector 
to feed into official reports, and formal government results should be 
spread ‘downstream’ to the private sector. 
− Monitoring should be done by industries (agriculture, fisheries, service..) 
so that the private sector has better chances of playing a leading role in the 
mechanism. The results should be reported to the competent authorities of 
the specific cluster (e.g. Ministry of Agriculture) so that these are best 
placed to effectively implement the required changes. 
− Regarding the issue of capacity, the interviewee argued that the main 
problem was not a lack of human resources to undertake the monitoring 
but a lack of sufficient funds, especially for data collection (for instance, 
in marine fisheries important data like the max. sustainable catch levels 
are still lacking). 
− Another problem was the lack of interest of the fish industry, which will 
be only willing to get involved if it benefits directly from monitoring. 
Incentives should therefore be provided to the private sector to join such a 
system, in which case certain businesses may even be willing to contribute 
their own (financial) resources to make the monitoring mechanism work. 
− Monitoring should generally be conducted at national level and 
coordinated at regional level. For fisheries, however, a regional approach 
would be necessary, as stocks are normally shared by a region (e.g. Lake 
Victoria, representing the main fisheries sector for Kenya as the marine 
fisheries industry is still in its infant stage). 
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− The fisheries industry has previous experience of collaboration with the 
government to monitor implementation of certain policies (for instance, on 
eco-labelling of products), whereby the Kenyan producers appointed an 
independent monitoring body (such as a consultancy firm) and used its 
reports to ask the government to make certain legislative/regulatory 
changes. These and other options could be explored for EPA, for instance, 
the Kenya Marine and Fisheries Research Institute (KEMFRI) could 
conduct impact monitoring for the fisheries sector. Compliance should be 
monitored by government, together with implementation of possible 
legislative changes as result of monitoring. And the private sector would 
be in between the two stages of this process, to receive impact assessment 
results, analyse them and turn them into requests to government 
(competent authorities) for changes to EPA/national legislation. 
− Examples of what exactly the private fisheries sector would like to be 
monitored on a very regular basis (monthly rather than yearly) include: 
effective market access improvements (especially for Kenyan goods to 
comply with EU SPS measures); employment generated in the various 
sub-sectors; investment flows in the Kenyan industry; number of joint 
ventures established with local producers. 
Kenya Small Scale Farmers Forum 
− The interviewee claimed that farmers should be involved in the 
monitoring as they are the key stakeholders concerned by EPAs. At 
present farmers in Kenya and the ESA region lack a sufficient amount of 
organisation to effectively represent their concerns. 
− To effectively engage in monitoring, farmers would need to get support to 
build national and regional farmers’ unions to increase knowledge, 
awareness and information sharing. 
Economics Department, University of Nairobi  
− A general problem that would arise with EPA monitoring is related to the 
very serious lack of relevant data. The availability of production and 
trade-related data in Kenya is extremely poor (with the sole exception of 
import/export flows) and there is no plan by the government to improve 
the situation (mainly due to lack of resources for data collection). The 
only area where proper databases exist or are under construction is the 
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MDGs (especially data on poverty), but there is no connection with other 
economic data. An additional problem is lack of coordination within 
government/public sector, and even in cases where new data are indeed 
collected by an agency or a department, they are not shared with others or 
interested stakeholders at large. 
− Development cooperation resources should address this situation by 
helping to build the capacity to both collect and analyse data, both within 
and outside government agencies. KIPRA has the overall mandate from 
government to deal with trade-related data and analysis in cooperation 
with the Kenyan Bureau of Statistics, but their capacity is not adequate, 
and so far they have also used very old datasets for their research on trade. 
It is crucial therefore that any monitoring system for EPA include such a 
capacity strengthening component. 
− There is in Kenya a pool of researchers, including within universities 
(with increasing numbers of PhD students) and CSOs (such as the 
Economic Affairs Institute, Econews, or Oxfam), that have improved their 
ability to undertake relevant trade-related research of the kind needed for 
EPA monitoring. With appropriate resources and under the supervision 
and mandate of the Ministry of Trade&Industry they could undertake such 
important exercises for data collection. 
− The cooperation between government and the research community is 
improving in Kenya, and most likely the government would not oppose 
the idea of giving a formal role in EPA monitoring to CSOs and the 
private sector. The option of sharing responsibility for different areas of 
monitoring should be explored; for instance, the government could 
monitor compliance with the agreement, while private sector and CSOs 
would monitor the respective impacts of EPA on local industries and the 
poor. 
− In order to identify suitable and feasible ways to collect and analyse EPA-
related data, and taking into account the present status of available 
quantitative information, methodological discussions on ‘how to monitor’ 
an EPA should also cover qualitative methods. 
− Given the very different social and economic realities within the ESA 
region and the number of issues at stake in EPA implementation, any 
monitoring mechanism focusing only on the regional synthesis of 
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available information and not covering the national level of analysis is 
likely to be inappropriate. 
Presentations and additional reports available at: 
www.ecdpm.org/trade/epamonitoring  
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Annex 5  Various definitions of monitoring used by 
development organisations 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines monitoring as “A 
continuing function that uses systematic collection of data on specified 
indicators to provide management and the main stakeholders of an ongoing 
development intervention with indications of the extent of progress and 
achievement of objectives and progress in the use of allocated funds” (OECD / 
DAC 2002, 27-28). OECD / DAC (2003, 56) further specifies that “this also 
includes information on the context (economic, social, political) that affects 
development results”. 
According to the World Bank (2006, 43), “Monitoring is a joint responsibility 
of the country and the Bank at the project and country levels. It requires: (a) 
defining the expected outcomes; (b) identifying monitoring indicators for final 
and intermediate outcomes, as well as outputs that contribute to achieving the 
outcomes; (c) ensuring that baseline data are available and targets are set to 
assess progress; (d) making sure a system is in place to collect, analyze, and 
report the data; and (e) monitoring progress. Monitoring information should be 
used to assess progress toward achieving objectives and to inform adjustments 
or other actions needed to ensure that the objectives are met”. 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD 2002, A-7) 
defines monitoring as “[t]he regular collection and analysis of information to 
assist timely decision making, ensure accountability and provide the basis for 
evaluation and learning. It is a continuing function that uses methodical 
collection of data to provide management and the main stakeholders of an 
ongoing project or programme with early indications of progress and 
achievement of objectives”. 
The EC’s evaluation unit (EC 2004, 142) proposes the following definition for 
monitoring: “(…) The systematic and continuous collecting, analysis and using 
of information for the purpose of management and decision-making”. 
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Annex 6  Existing assessment processes for trade 
agreements 
The only systematic attempts at ex ante assessments of trade agreements are 
the Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIA), which, initiated by the EU 
Commission, have since the year 2000 accompanied trade negotiations in 
which the EU is involved. However, the SIAs are not meant to inform the 
EU’s negotiating mandate (which is usually defined before the SIA is started), 
and are used only to a limited extent for the outcome of negotiations. The 
focus of SIAs is on identifying accompanying measures to mitigate potential 
negative measures and enhance expected positive measures of the trade 
liberalisation measures to be negotiated. 
The most comprehensive ex post assessments have been undertaken in the 
context of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) as well as by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) on the impacts of various 
trade related policies in several developing countries. 
1.   Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIA) 
Based on the general methodology for SIAs, the EPA-SIA proposed a 
combination of quantitative approaches, especially Computable General 
Equilibrium Models (CGEs), and qualitative approaches especially Causal 
Chain Analysis (CCA) (PwC 2004, 182). The Causal Chain Analysis applied 
in SIAs is similar to, but does not use the same terminology as, the results 
chain method described in Chapter 5.   
CGEs, where these are available for ACP countries, should mainly be used to 
determine the trade and economic impacts of trade liberalisation policies, 
while CCA would be used to establish the links between these changes and 
social and environmental impacts. The EPA-SIA proposed to look at: 
− scale effects: the overall level of economic activity, 
− product effects: the availability and use of environmentally sound  
products, 
− structural effects: change of production patterns towards or away from 
environment- intensive sectors and processes, depending on their 
competitiveness, 
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− technology effects: environmentally sound production technology may 
become more easily available through imports or FDI, 
− infrastructure, and  
− government revenue and regulation. 
This list closely resembles the impacts discussed by OECD with regards to the 
environmental impacts of trade liberalisation (OECD 1994, 13). 
To identify priority trade measures, the following criteria have been used: The 
measure is: (i) a core component of the Common Agricultural Policy, (ii) 
likely to be subject of EPA negotiations with respect to liberalisation, (iii) one 
that could significantly affect trade in strategic sectors between EU and ACP, 
(iv) one where one might expect a priori that there may be important 
sustainability impacts. 
The following trade measures have been identified by chapter: Trade in Goods 
(market access), General Trade Related Areas (Trade facilitation, Rules of 
Origin, Trade, defence measures, IP, Standards, Trade and Labour), Trade in 
Services, Specific Trade-Related Areas (Investment, Public procurement). 
The second level of analysis was to adopt a sector approach to assess the 
impacts of trade measures for most relevant sectors, which had to be identified 
using the following criteria: The sector: (i) is significant from an economic, 
environmental and social perspective, (ii) is significant in terms of trade flows 
in both volume and financial terms, (iii), may be impacted by changes in the 
trade measures induced by EPAs, (iv) is one where one expect that there will 
be potential impacts of EPAs on sustainability. 
A list of sectors and respective commodities has been identified, including 
Agriculture (sugar, bananas, cotton…), Non-Agricultural (fish and fish 
products, textile and clothing), Services. 
Indicators used 
Based on an in-depth assessment, a list of indicators has been developed to 
assess the sustainability impact of EPAs. 
A schematic presentation of the approach used in the SIA is given in Figure 
A6.1. It represents a highly simplified causal chain in which CGE modelling is 
used to determine the broader economic impacts of the trade related impacts. 
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The use of more elaborate CGEs which would allow for the explicit modelling 
of social and poverty effects is severely limited in most ACP countries, 
especially in Africa, due to resource constraints and limited data availability. 
The SIA compares the impacts of a “baseline”, status quo / no EPA scenario, 
with the impacts of a “likely” outcome of EPA negotiations. Rather than for 
the economies as a whole, the SIAs would focus on selected sectors that are 
likely to be most affected by EPAs and/or that are expected to have a major 
impact on sustainability objectives. 
Table A6.1:  Indicators used to assess the sustainability impact of EPAs  
Economic 
Social / 
Development 
Environment 
Institutional 
indicators 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
HDI Concentration of 
population in coastal 
zones 
Political 
participation 
Income Population Freshwater quantity / 
quality 
International 
cooperation 
Inflation Poverty Soil quantity /  
Soil quality 
  
Access to  
information and 
technology 
Gender equality Intensive/modern 
agricultural practices 
  
Investment Employment …   
Government  
expenditure and 
revenues 
Health 
… 
  
Transportation Education …   
Debt  
Sustainability 
      
Source:   PwC (2006) 
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During the actual SIAs of different sectors in the EPA regions, a CGE could 
only be applied in two Caribbean countries (PwC 2005, 191). Other ACP 
countries lacked the necessary input-output data and, consequently, Social 
Accounting Matrices. Since the study in the Caribbean focused on the 
tourism sector, the liberalisation measures did not consider easily 
quantifiable data such as tariffs and quotas. Hence the direct trade impacts of 
the expected liberalisation had to be estimated independent of the model – 
and were set somewhat arbitrarily as an increase in number of visitors and 
foreign direct investment (PwC 2005, 49). The CGE then was used to assess 
the effects of these estimated impacts on the wider economy. The SIA on 
rules of origin in SADC countries applied a partial equilibrium model for the 
garment and the fisheries sector (PwC 2006). The SIA on the horticultural 
sector in the ESA region estimated the competitiveness and the comparative 
advantage of the sector based on costs and prices obtained through 
questionnaires from companies in the sector (GRET / PwC 2006). 
Competitiveness was measured by costs in current prices, comparative 
advantage was measured by costs in “undistorted” shadow prices and 
exchange rates. In the SIA of food processing in West Africa, econometric 
models were applied to estimate the elasticity of domestic demand to price 
changes, and consequently to lower import prices for EU products resulting 
from decreased ACP tariffs (PwC 2005, 191). The SIA on financial services 
in the Central Africa Region used a qualitative SWOT Analysis (Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) as a starting point for the assessment of 
EPA impacts on the sector (Forum pour l’Afrique / PwC 2006). No 
quantitative assessments were made in the SIA of the fisheries sector in the 
pacific region (PwC 2006, 182). 
Hence, in the ACP context the use of CGE models seems to be severely 
limited by data and capacity restrictions. Even in the Caribbean, probably the 
most advanced ACP region, the selection of countries for a case study was 
mainly driven by the availability of suitable data, which could only be 
obtained in two countries, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, although the 
latter is not representative for the tourism sector of a small island. Still, far 
reaching assumptions had to be made for lack of data. In other regions, 
attempts for a quantitative assessment were either dropped altogether 
(Central Africa and Pacific) or limited to partial, sector specific exercises. 
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2.   Evaluation of the impacts of the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA) on the Environment and Labour Markets 
The North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), established in 1994 and 
comprising Canada, Mexico and the United States, was one of the first trade 
agreements that had explicit provisions on environmental and labour issues. 
These were not part of the NAFTA treaties themselves but enshrined in 
separate side agreements by all three NAFTA partners. Trilateral Committees 
on Environmental and on Labour Co-operation were established in parallel to 
the NAFTA Free Trade Committee, and given the task to “consider on an 
ongoing basis the environmental (and labour rights) effects of NAFTA”. 
Figure A6.1:    Illustration of the analytical approach for trade related 
measures 
Trade Measure / Sector
Trade-related impacts
Impacts on trade floor / impacts on trade rules
Impacts on flows of goods an services / investment
In what sectors? For what products?
• Determines through CGE modeling or expert 
analysis depending on data availability
CGE Modelling
• Sectoral and macroeconomic impacts
• Impacts on poverty (income an income distribution)
Modelling can be applied to selected ACP countries, 
depending on data availability and subject to human 
resource and financial constraints
Analysis of scenario B
To be determined for specific measures
Causal pathways for impacts on sustainability
Scale; Product/Services; Structure; Production 
(including management); Technology and knowledge; 
Infrastructure; Transportation and Government 
revenue, policies and regulation.
Economic impacts
Impacts on selected 
indicators
Determination of 
priority
Environmental 
impacts
Impacts on selected 
indicators
Determination of 
priority
Social impacts
Impacts on selected 
indicators
Determination of 
priority
Governance and 
institutional 
impacts
Impacts on selected 
indicators
Determination of 
priority
Analysis of scenario A
To be determined for specific measures
 
Source:   PwC (2004, xxiv) 
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A paper on methodological issues in assessing the impacts of NAFTA on 
labour markets finds that: “... CGE models are forecasting methods, while 
partial equilibrium and qualitative/quantitative studies are better suited to 
identify effects that have already occurred” (Abbott 2004, 5). 
Partial equilibrium models methods attempt to estimate the effects of a policy 
on one or more variables, by holding other potentially affected variables 
constant. These models often emphasize regression analysis, to determine the 
statistical relevance of the relation of the observed variables. 
Qualitative/quantitative research is not as structured and econometrics based 
as partial equilibrium models. It usually highlights general trends based on 
existing research and a primary analysis of various economic indicators. 
Causal relationships are not definitely proven, but supported by strong 
quantitative reasoning. The strength of these groups of approaches is their 
ability to observe and report upon phenomena in a combined statistical and 
qualitative way. This makes it possible to take broader aspects of a policy into 
account, which are often missed by exclusively quantitative methods. 
Most quantitative analyses were undertaken after 2000, since before this date 
sufficient data were not available to undertake a rigorous statistical estimate on 
impacts. This changed only five years after NAFTA entered into force, 
indicating that data availability is a significant problem even in advanced 
economies such as NAFTA. 
The NAFTA Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) developed an 
analytic framework for assessing the environmental impacts of NAFTA (CEC 
1999). It aims to analyse the impacts of NAFTA comprehensively and to 
supplement the results of formal models, which require data that do not yet 
exist to an adequate degree in the NAFTA region. It also tries to capture the 
qualitative and sometimes anecdotal evidence that is the only data available on 
some important processes and is not captured by formal mathematical models 
(CEC 1999, 8). The framework includes the impacts of rule changes (e.g. tariff 
reduction harmonisation of domestic standards and norms, investor 
protection), NAFTA institutions such as different NAFTA committees and 
changes in trade and investment flows. In order to identify the impacts of 
NAFTA on trade and investment flows, the framework endeavours not to look 
only at trade statistics but to qualify this data through specialised interviews 
with corporate officials and other stakeholders and utilisation of public data on 
trade in goods with a “NAFTA” certificate of origin. This should allow for a 
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more detailed “process tracing” to connect the NAFTA regime with the trade 
that results from it (CEC 1999, 8). 
The changes in production that result from these trade flows are then analysed 
from different perspectives (CEC 1999, 28):  
− the raw materials and other inputs used, 
− efficiency, scale and location of the production processes, 
− physical technology employed in the production process, including 
pollution prevention, 
− strategic management, 
− relative prices of products and related emissions. 
In addition to production effects, the NAFTA methodology proposes to look at 
impacts of changes in infrastructure, social organisations (environmental and 
industry lobby groups) and government policy.  
The main activity of the CEC in monitoring and evaluating the environmental 
impacts of NAFTA was the organisation of biannual public symposia on trade 
and environment since 2000. For these, the CEC does not commission research 
directly but issues calls for papers to be presented at symposia. The papers 
presented at the symposia used CGE modelling only in a minority of cases. 
Regression analysis and qualitative methods were far more common (CEC 
2002). 
The independent ten-year review of the CEC was presented to the Ministerial 
Council on Environmental Co-operation in 2004 (CEC 2005). Among other 
things, it criticised the lack of collaboration between the CEC and the 
appropriate trade bodies under the NAFTA Free Trade Commission. To what 
extent plans to improve this collaboration have been effective is currently 
difficult to assess. 
3.   UNEP Integrated Assessments of Trade-related policies 
The only multilateral agency that has systematically undertaken assessments of 
the impacts of international trade is UNEP. It published a “Reference Manual” 
for the Integrated Assessment of Trade-related policies (UNEP 2001) and has 
since commissioned a number of country and sector specific studies in several 
developing countries. 
 Michael Brüntrup et al.
  
 German Development Institute 188
The reference manual describes different methodologies for undertaking 
assessments, both ex ante and ex post. It focuses on economic models both on 
the macro-level (input-output tables, CGE models) and the sectoral/micro-level 
(partial equilibrium, benefit cost analysis). It also presents methods like 
Environmental Impact Assessment, Multi-Criteria Analysis (weighing 
economic efficiency against distributional impact, social acceptability and 
environmental impacts.  
The studies commissioned by UNEP have usually been undertaken by local 
researchers and institutes, and they were mainly ex post assessments of the 
impacts of trade and related policy changes, including Structural Adjustment 
Programmes. All studies addressed developing countries and were designed in 
co-operation with the respective governments. The methodologies applied 
included: 
− qualitative assessments based on multi-stakeholder dialogues, including 
Rapid Rural Appraisal, 
− regression analysis,  
− gross margin analysis to determine the profitability of an activity under 
different scenarios, 
− cost benefit analysis, 
− partial equilibrium models of the sectors analysed in the studies. 
Macroeconomic methodologies were not applied in any of the studies, which is 
probably due to the sectoral focus of most studies and a lack of appropriate 
data in many developing countries. 
4.   Conclusion 
The methodological approaches applied thus far for the assessment of trade 
and related issues identify macro-economic models, especially general 
equilibrium models as an important tool. Since these models represent 
comprehensive pictures of the economies assessed, they make it possible to 
conceptually identify indirect effects and linkages of trade policy which go 
beyond the sectors or products immediately affected by a policy change. 
However, in practice few impact studies have applied CGEs, mainly due to 
data constraints and the difficulty to model policy changes that go beyond 
simple tariff and quota changes, e.g. changes in investment rules or rules of 
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origin. Data limitations even proved to be a challenge in the advanced NAFTA 
region, and this challenge is obviously bigger in the ACP context – especially 
in Africa. 
Hence qualitative approaches play an important role in virtually all studies, 
while quantitative methods usually focus on regression analysis and partial 
equilibrium models. In almost all cases, the use of quantitative approaches is 
restricted to assessing the trade and economic impacts of policies. Social and 
environmental impacts are usually forecasted or evaluated by qualitative 
instruments. These can essentially be described as more or less formalised 
results chain analysis exercises. The impacts of trade and economic changes on 
social and environmental conditions are usually derived from logical 
reasoning, expert interviews and participatory methods like rapid rural 
appraisal. 
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Annex 7 Structural Adjustment Programme Review 
Initiative (SAPRI) 
Initiated as a response to civil society criticism of structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPs), this methodology was developed by an international civil 
society network (SAPRIN), in co-operation with World Bank and national 
governments of countries in which SAPRI was conducted (SAPRIN 2002). 
Since most SAPs were started already in the 1980s, SAPRI could only be 
performed as a retrospective evaluation. The process was not designed to 
monitor the SAPs during their implementation. However, the experiences 
made here are relevant for EPA monitoring as well, since the methodology has 
similarities to open qualitative methodologies such as MAPP and MSC. 
SAPRI aimed at a “political economy approach” conceived to look beyond 
purely economic factors in assessing the impacts of changes in economic 
policies, and it includes analysis of institutions, power structures and interests 
that affect economic behaviour. The analysis was therefore to cover the role of 
social relations, especially gender, ethnic, cultural and age, as differences, as 
determinants of policy impacts. SAPRI also aimed to look at the impacts of 
inter-related policy packages rather than to focus on simple cause-effect chains 
of one specific measure on one particular outcome (SAPRIN 1999). Gender 
perspectives were to play a central role in the methodology. The political 
economy approach should also include the discussion and construction of 
alternatives to the SAPs. 
In the national SAPRI processes, national fora of CSOs were organised to 
identify the issues to be investigated. The opening national fora were designed 
for the presentation and discussion of the experience of local populations with  
and perspectives on , specific economic adjustment measures and their 
respective impacts. World Bank and national government representatives 
participated in these meetings in most countries. However, their influence was 
to be minimised to allow for a truly participatory approach. Further 
participatory workshops were held at regional levels. These events were, in 
essence, hearings on citizens’ perceptions of government policy in general and 
structural adjustment policies in particular. Thus, the workshops were the 
starting point for identifying the policies and themes to be analysed as well as 
for the study of causal relationships as indicated by the participants. 
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At the regional and national workshops, national steering committees were 
formed in the participating countries which oversaw the research into the 
issues identified. Trade policies were chosen amongst the four most important 
issues to be researched in nine out of the ten countries in which SAPRIs were 
conducted. 
The country studies were carried out using three basic tools of investigation: 
− Desk Reviews. Each research team compiled and reviewed existing 
literature, including previous research, official documents and statistics, as 
well as reports by international institutions.  
− Primary Surveys. Local stakeholder surveys were undertaken by some of 
the research teams, either using quantitative techniques or employing a 
mix of both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
− Participatory Reviews and Fieldwork. Methods used included a range of 
participatory appraisal techniques, semi-structured interviews, workshops 
and focus-group discussions with social actors whereby the experiences 
and views of various stakeholders were collected and analysed. 
Several different research approaches were adopted by the national research 
teams. In Ecuador, causality diagrams were drawn during the workshops to 
identify perceptions of the causes and effects of these policies as well as their 
impact on the participants’ communities. Information gleaned from these 
processes was then systematised by the research teams and used to identify the 
variables and indicators, along with their respective interrelations. In Mexico, 
participants of workshops described the socio-economic transformations 
experienced in their communities, as well as the reasons for such changes and 
their reactions to them, and identified possible relationships between these 
changes and the application of structural adjustment policies.  
The major analytical approach of impact studies on the trade liberalisation 
component of SAPs was “pre- and post-“ comparison, with a focus on how 
different social groups, especially disadvantaged groups perceived these 
changes. Essentially, the assessments report on increasing imports and often 
deteriorating terms of trade, and consequently slow increases in exports, 
resulting in deteriorating trade balances. The overview report does not make 
reference to more detailed impact chains and does not discuss other possible 
reasons for the negative economic and trade developments. This may be one of 
the reasons why there was considerable disagreement between the World Bank 
and the SAPRI groups that resulted in the World Bank withdrawing from the 
presentation of the overall result of the SAPRI exercise. 
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Annex 8 Key stakeholders and institutions in EPA 
monitoring 
This annex provides some additional information on the potential roles and 
responsibilities of a number of European, ACP and joint institutions, shown in 
Figure 6.1, in (a) future EPA-monitoring mechanism(s). 
1.   Institutions at the level of the European Community 
On the European side, the European Commission plays an important role in 
negotiating trade agreements and their implementation.74 The Commission also 
has a right of initiative with regard to European development policy and 
manages the European Development Fund (EDF) on behalf of the Member 
States. It is from the EDF that resources to establish a monitoring system will 
(most likely) be drawn. Thus, the Commission will play a key role in defining 
the scope and features of a monitoring mechanism and making it operational.75 
The Council of Ministers of the European Union comes together in different 
formations: Issues relating to trade and development cooperation are discussed 
in its General Affairs and External Relation formation. As the main EU 
decision-making body, the Council decides on policy proposals and has to 
approve the international trade agreements negotiated by the European 
Commission as well as other policy proposals. It will thus also have to approve 
future EPA treaties, including a possible monitoring mechanism and related 
funding from the European Development Fund (EDF). Where issues fall 
outside the exclusive competence of the Community, EU member states will 
have to approve the agreement and any decisions on the EDF. 
As far as the decision to allocate EDF resources to EPA monitoring is 
concerned, the EDF Committee, which brings together representatives of the 
Commission, Member States, and the European Investment Bank will have a 
                                                          
74  In the field of trade, a policy area that is fully “Europeanised,” the Commission has the sole 
right of initiative, and it negotiates the text of the EPAs with the regional organisations. 
75  ACP-EU cooperation is not governed by the usual European decision-making procedures for 
development cooperation, but follows specific procedures. The Commission negotiates and 
manages aid on behalf of the Member States, which contribute to the European Development 
Fund (EDF). The EDF, which is not part of the European Community’s budget, and is funded 
by Member States, follows its own rules and is managed by the EDF-committee. The latter is 
composed of representatives of the Member States and the Commission. 
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decisive role to play, as it discusses and approves financing decisions on the 
European side. 
The role of the European Parliament in matters concerning the negotiation and 
implementation of trade agreements and ACP-EU cooperation is rather 
limited. The European Parliament has no direct access to the negotiating fora. 
It is, however, regularly consulted, and it may have to give its assent for EPAs, 
depending on their format. 
The European Parliament may not be directly involved in the implementation 
of EPAs and related assistance. Consequently, its role in any future EPA 
monitoring mechanism may also be circumscribed. However, it can exercise 
its powers of democratic control and provide recommendations to the 
Commission and the Council. In the view of those members of the European 
Parliament interviewed, their role in monitoring EPAs would be to make use of 
the results of a future monitoring mechanism to point to problems, to urge 
corrective measures and to enhance the accountability of EPAs. 
2.   ACP regional organisations and their members 
On the part of ACP countries, it is the regional organisations/groupings that 
negotiate EPAs. It is very likely that they will also play a crucial role in 
monitoring the implementation and impacts of these agreements. However, as 
in most of the potential “EPA regions”, economic integration is not yet very 
advanced and the regional institutions remain weak, government institutions at 
the level of the ACP member states will remain important actors (e.g. trade 
ministries, ministries of planning and finance, statistics institutes etc.). They 
will have to play a central role in data collection and processing, since most of 
the regional groupings lack the necessary statistical and organisational 
capacities. 
3.  The joint institutions 
One central principle of ACP-EC cooperation is joint decision making and 
management of cooperation. For this purpose, three joint institutions were 
established through the Cotonou Agreement: the Joint Council of Ministers, 
the Joint Committee of Ambassadors, the Joint Parliamentary Assembly.76  
                                                          
76  For more details on the tasks and responsibilities of these joint institutions, see ACP-EU 
Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000 (ACP-EU 2000), Part Two – 
Institutional Provisions, Article 14-17. 
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As a consultative body, the Joint Parliamentary Assembly can adopt 
resolutions and make recommendations on the implementation and 
management of ACP-EU cooperation, including issues relating to the 
monitoring of implementation and impacts of assistance (ACP-EU 2000, 
Article 17). The Joint Parliamentary Assembly may thus also make proposals 
for a monitoring mechanism. It could also use results from the monitoring 
mechanism for its own proposals and ensure that EPA implementation 
becomes accountable to the citizens of the EU and ACP states. 
The Joint Council of Ministers, the joint decision-making body, comprises on 
the one hand the members of the Council of the European Union and members 
of the European Commission and on the other hand members of the 
government of each ACP country. This body usually meets once a year to 
conduct political dialogue, to adopt policy guidelines and decisions necessary 
for the implementation of the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, to resolve 
issues liable to impede their implementation and to ensure a smooth 
functioning of the consultation mechanisms (ACP-EU 2000, Article 15). Thus 
it may also become active on issues related to EPA monitoring which may 
affect all ACP countries or a specific region. It’s main role will, however, be to 
draw on information produced by (an) EPA monitoring system(s), e.g. to 
discuss compliance, progress and impact in different regions with a view to 
drawing overall conclusions on the effectiveness of the agreements with regard 
to the objectives of the Cotonou Agreement. The joint ACP-EU Council of 
Ministers can also meet in a specific geographical composition if appropriate 
to the issue to be addressed, i.e. for instance in a configuration made up of the 
ministers of the ACP countries that have signed an EPA (ACP-EU 2000, 
Article 15 (1)). 
The Joint ACP-EU Council of Ministers can delegate powers to the Joint 
Committee of Ambassadors. The latter consists of the permanent 
representatives of each EU Member State and a representative of the 
Commission, from the European side, and the head of mission of each ACP 
state, on the ACP side. The Committee of Ambassadors assists the Council of 
Ministers in the fulfilment of its tasks and carries out any mandate entrusted to 
it by the Council. In this context it is also responsible for monitoring the 
implementation of the Cotonou Agreement and progress towards achieving its 
goals (ACP-EU 2000, Article16 (2)). The Committee of Ambassadors meets 
regularly and prepares the Council sessions. It monitors the implementation of 
the Cotonou Agreement with a view to prepare meetings and decisions of the 
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ACP-EU Council of Ministers (ACP-EU 2000, Article 15 and 16). Thus the 
Committee has quite a broad mandate for monitoring all aspects of ACP-EU 
cooperation. 
It is, however, important to note that so far procedures and institutional 
arrangements for a systematic monitoring function have only been defined for 
the aid component of the Cotonou Agreement. These have been spelt out in 
Chapter 5 of Annex IV to the Agreement on ‘Implementation and Management 
Procedures’. According to Article 32 of this chapter, “the objective of monitoring 
and evaluation [of development cooperation] shall consist in the regular assessment of 
development operations (preparation, implementation and subsequent operation) with 
a view to improving the development effectiveness of on-going and future operations.” 
According to Article 33, the purpose of monitoring and evaluation is to 
“(a) provide regular and independent assessments of the Funds operations and 
activities by comparing results with objectives; and thereby  
(b) enable the ACP States and the Commission and the Joint Institutions, to feed 
the lessons of experience back into the design and execution of future policies and 
operations.” 
Apart from evaluations conducted by either of the partners of the agreement, 
monitoring and evaluation is carried out jointly by the ACP-EC Development 
Finance Cooperation Committee, which is assisted by the European 
Commission and the ACP Secretariat.77 The procedures of the Development 
Finance Cooperation Committee are defined by the Committee of 
Ambassadors of which it is a technical-level sub-committee.78  
As funding for the design of an EPA-monitoring system and related capacity-
building is likely to come from EDF resources, the ACP-EC Development 
Finance Cooperation Committee will play a role in monitoring and evaluating 
any future EPA-monitoring mechanism(s). 
 
                                                          
77  The ACP Secretariat, which is located in Brussels, is responsible for the administrative 
management of the ACP Group. It assists the Group's decision-making and advisory organs 
in carrying out their work.  
78  For more information on the Development Finance Cooperation Committee and its 
procedures, see ACP-EC Committee of Ambassadors (2001). 
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Annex 9  Selected national and international databases 
useful in the context of EPA monitoring 
Table A9.1 provides a general measure of the statistical capacity in each ACP 
country. The statistical capacity indicator can score from 0-100 and is the 
simple average of statistical practice, data collection and indicator availability. 
For orientation, the developing country average is 65. 
Table A9.1:   Statistical capacity indicator (scale of 0 to 100) for  
 ACP countries (World Bank data)  
 
2006 
Statistical 
capacity 
indicator 
Statistical 
practice 
Data 
collection 
Indicator 
availability 
West Africa     
Benin 63 40 70 80 
Burkina Faso 72 50 80 85 
Cape Verde 52 40 60 55 
Cote d’Ivoire 70 60 80 70 
Gambia 53 40 60 60 
Ghana 58 30 70 75 
Guinea 55 30 70 65 
Guinea-Bissau 43 30 40 60 
Liberia 18 10 0 45 
Mali 63 40 80 70 
Mauritania 68 40 80 85 
Niger 70 50 80 80 
Nigeria 52 40 40 75 
Senegal 75 60 80 85 
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Table A9.1:   Statistical capacity indicator (scale of 0 to 100) for  
 ACP countries (World Bank data)  
 
2006 
Statistical 
capacity 
indicator 
Statistical 
practice 
Data 
collection 
Indicator 
availability 
Sierra Leone 47 30 60 50 
Togo 52 40 40 75 
East South Africa     
Burundi 40 40 20 60 
Comoros 57 30 70 70 
Djibouti 45 40 30 65 
Eritrea 38 20 20 75 
Ethiopia 60 50 60 70 
Kenya 62 40 70 75 
Madagascar 63 50 60 80 
Malawi 63 60 50 80 
Mauritius 63 80 40 70 
Rwanda 60 50 60 70 
Seychelles 52 50 60 45 
Sudan 30 30 0 60 
Uganda 73 60 80 80 
Zambia 65 20 80 95 
Zimbabwe 53 60 30 70 
Central Africa     
Cameroon 72 60 70 85 
Central African 
Republic 38 10 50 55 
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Table A9.1:   Statistical capacity indicator (scale of 0 to 100) for  
 ACP countries (World Bank data)  
 
2006 
Statistical 
capacity 
indicator 
Statistical 
practice 
Data 
collection 
Indicator 
availability 
Chad 58 60 30 85 
Congo, DR 43 50 30 50 
Congo, Rep. of 50 50 50 50 
Equatorial Guinea 28 10 20 55 
Gabon 43 20 50 60 
São Tomé & 
Príncipe 48 30 60 55 
Southern Africa     
Angola 35 40 10 55 
Botswana 47 30 40 70 
Lesotho 62 50 60 75 
Mozambique 68 50 70 85 
Namibia 50 40 50 60 
Swaziland 57 30 70 70 
Tanzania 62 50 60 75 
Caribbean Region     
Antigua n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Bahamas  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Barbados  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Belize  43 50 20 60 
Dominica  45 50 40 45 
Dominican Rep.  63 40 60 90 
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Table A9.1:   Statistical capacity indicator (scale of 0 to 100) for  
 ACP countries (World Bank data)  
 
2006 
Statistical 
capacity 
indicator 
Statistical 
practice 
Data 
collection 
Indicator 
availability 
Grenada  47 50 40 50 
Guyana  50 40 30 80 
Haiti  32 20 20 55 
Jamaica  77 60 80 90 
St. Lucia  57 50 60 60 
St. Vincent  60 60 60 60 
St. Kitts & Nevis  47 50 60 30 
Surinam  55 50 50 65 
Trinidad & Tobago 70 80 60 70 
Pacific Region     
Cook Islands n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Federal Sts. of 
Micronesia 27 20 20 40 
Fiji  47 40 40 60 
Kiribati  30 20 20 50 
Marshall Islands 25 10 20 45 
Nauru  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Niue  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Palau  32 20 40 35 
Papua New Guinea 50 60 30 60 
Samoa  45 40 40 55 
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Table A9.1:   Statistical capacity indicator (scale of 0 to 100) for  
 ACP countries (World Bank data)  
 
2006 
Statistical 
capacity 
indicator 
Statistical 
practice 
Data 
collection 
Indicator 
availability 
Solomon Islands 30 20 20 50 
Tonga  43 40 40 50 
Tuvalu  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Vanuatu  50 70 20 60 
Source: World Bank 
 
 
Table A9.2:   Year of publication of first and second PRSP in  
   ACP countries (World Bank homepage) 
Country PRSP I PRSP II 
West Africa   
Benin 2002  
Burkina Faso 2000 2004 
Cape Verde 2004  
Gambia 2002  
Ghana 2003 2005 
Guinea 2002 2006 
Mali 2003  
Mauritania 2000 2006 
Niger 2002  
Nigeria 2005  
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Table A9.2:   Year of publication of first and second PRSP in  
   ACP countries (World Bank homepage) 
Senegal 2002 2005 
Sierra Leone 2005  
East South Africa   
Burundi 2006  
Djibouti 2004  
Ethiopia 2002  
Kenya 2004  
Madagascar 2003 2007 
Malawi 2002 2006 
Rwanda 2002  
Uganda 2000 2005 
Zambia 2002  
Central Africa   
Cameroon 2003  
Central African Republic 2006  
Chad 2003  
São Tomé & Príncipe 2005  
Southern Africa   
Lesotho 2005 2006 
Mozambique 2001 2006 
Tanzania 2000 2005 
Caribbean Region   
Dominica 2006  
Guyana 2002  
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Table A9.3:   Availability of governance indicators for  
  developing countries by selected sources 
Governance Earth trends 
World 
Bank BTI 
Free-
dom 
House 
HDR 
Democracy Status   x   
○ Political and Social 
Integration   x   
○ Stability of Democratic 
Institutions   x   
○ Rule of Law   x   
○ Political Participation   x   
○ Stateness   x   
Management Index   x   
○ Steering Capacity   x   
○ Resource Efficiency   x   
○ Consensus building   x   
○ International Cooperation   x   
Trend Democracy   x   
Political Rights x   x  
Civil Liberties x   x  
Public Sector Management and
Institutions  x    
○ Property Rights and Rule-
based Governance  x    
○ Quality of Budgetary and 
Financial Management  x    
○ Efficiency of Revenue 
Mobilization  x    
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Table A9.3:   Availability of governance indicators for  
  developing countries by selected sources 
Governance Earth trends 
World 
Bank BTI 
Free-
dom 
House 
HDR 
○ Quality of Public 
Administration  x    
○ Transparency, 
Accountability and 
Corruption in the Public 
Sector 
 x    
Status of Major International 
Labour Rights Conventions  
(ratified, denounced) 
    x 
Public Expenditure  
(% of GDP) x    x 
○ Health x    x 
○ Education x    x 
○ Military x    x 
○ Total Debt Service     x 
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Table A9.4:   Availability of economic development indicators for  
   developing countries by selected sources 
Economic 
Development 
B
TI
 
A
fr
ob
ar
om
et
er
 
(A
B
) 
Ea
rth
 tr
en
ds
 
H
D
R
 
TI
 
M
D
G
 
U
N
C
TA
D
 
FA
O
 
U
N
ID
O
 
W
B
 
In
te
rn
at
. 
M
on
et
ar
y 
Fu
nd
 
(I
M
F)
 
Trend Market  
Economy x           
Market Economy 
Status x           
○ Socioeconomic 
Level x           
○ Market 
Organisation x           
○ Currency and 
Price Stability x           
○ Private Property x           
○ Welfare Regime x           
○ Economic 
Performance x           
○ Sustainability x           
Trends in the 
Economy  x          
○ Macroeconomic 
Conditions  x          
○ Personal Living 
Conditions  x          
○ The Experience 
of Poverty  x          
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Table A9.4:   Availability of economic development indicators for  
   developing countries by selected sources 
Economic 
Development 
B
TI
 
A
fr
ob
ar
om
et
er
 
(A
B
) 
Ea
rth
 tr
en
ds
 
H
D
R
 
TI
 
M
D
G
 
U
N
C
TA
D
 
FA
O
 
U
N
ID
O
 
W
B
 
In
te
rn
at
. 
M
on
et
ar
y 
Fu
nd
 
(I
M
F)
 
○ Attitudes to 
Economic  
Reform 
 x          
Economic  
Management          x  
○ Macroeconomic 
Management          x  
○ Fiscal Policy          x  
○ Debt Policy          x  
Structural Policies          x  
○ Trade          x  
○ Financial Sector          x  
○ Business 
Regulatory 
Environment 
         x  
○ GDP per capita 
(PPP US$)    x      x  
○ Annual Growth 
Rate    x      x  
○ Highest Value 
during 1975-2004    x      x  
○ Year of highest 
value    x      x  
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Table A9.4:   Availability of economic development indicators for  
   developing countries by selected sources 
Economic 
Development 
B
TI
 
A
fr
ob
ar
om
et
er
 
(A
B
) 
Ea
rth
 tr
en
ds
 
H
D
R
 
TI
 
M
D
G
 
U
N
C
TA
D
 
FA
O
 
U
N
ID
O
 
W
B
 
In
te
rn
at
. 
M
on
et
ar
y 
Fu
nd
 
(I
M
F)
 
Gross domestic 
product, constant 
prices 
  x        x 
Gross domestic pro-
duct, current prices   x        x 
Gross domestic pro-
duct, deflator   x        x 
Gross domestic pro-
duct per capita,  
constant prices 
  x        x 
Gross domestic pro-
duct per capita, 
current prices 
  x        x 
Gross domestic pro-
duct based on 
purchasing power 
parity (PPP) valuation 
of country GDP 
          x 
Gross domestic pro-
duct based on 
purchasing power 
parity (PPP) per 
capita GDP 
          x 
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Table A9.4:   Availability of economic development indicators for  
   developing countries by selected sources 
Economic 
Development 
B
TI
 
A
fr
ob
ar
om
et
er
 
(A
B
) 
Ea
rth
 tr
en
ds
 
H
D
R
 
TI
 
M
D
G
 
U
N
C
TA
D
 
FA
O
 
U
N
ID
O
 
W
B
 
In
te
rn
at
. 
M
on
et
ar
y 
Fu
nd
 
(I
M
F)
 
Gross domestic pro-
duct based on 
purchasing power 
parity (PPP) share of 
world total 
          x 
Implied PPP  
conversion rate           x 
Inflation,  
consumer prices           x 
Population           x 
Current account  
balance           x 
Agricultural value 
added per worker          x  
Value added as % of 
GDP          x  
○ Agriculture          x  
○ Industry          x  
○ Services          x  
Foreign Direct  
Investment          x  
Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI)     x       
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Table A9.4:   Availability of economic development indicators for  
   developing countries by selected sources 
Economic 
Development 
B
TI
 
A
fr
ob
ar
om
et
er
 
(A
B
) 
Ea
rth
 tr
en
ds
 
H
D
R
 
TI
 
M
D
G
 
U
N
C
TA
D
 
FA
O
 
U
N
ID
O
 
W
B
 
In
te
rn
at
. 
M
on
et
ar
y 
Fu
nd
 
(I
M
F)
 
Net foreign direct 
investment inflows 
(% of GDP) 
   x      x  
Financial Flows:  
Net Inflows (sales - 
purchases) of Cross-
Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions 
  x    x     
Cost to register  
property, 
(%) of property value 
  x       x  
Cost to start a new 
business,  
(%) GNI per capita 
  x       x  
Time required to re-
gister property (days)   x       x  
Time required to start 
a new business (days)   x       x  
Telephone mainlines 
(per 1000 people)   x x  x    x  
Cellular subscribers 
(per 1000 people)   x x  x    x  
Internet users 
(per 1000 people)   x x  x    x  
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Table A9.4:   Availability of economic development indicators for  
   developing countries by selected sources 
Economic 
Development 
B
TI
 
A
fr
ob
ar
om
et
er
 
(A
B
) 
Ea
rth
 tr
en
ds
 
H
D
R
 
TI
 
M
D
G
 
U
N
C
TA
D
 
FA
O
 
U
N
ID
O
 
W
B
 
In
te
rn
at
. 
M
on
et
ar
y 
Fu
nd
 
(I
M
F)
 
Digital Access Index   x         
Agricultural 
Production   x     x    
○ Quantity produced   x     x    
○ Producer price    x     x    
○ Value at farmgate 
(forthcoming)    x     x    
○ Area harvested    x     x    
○ Yield per hectare    x     x    
Industrial 
Performance            
MVA, average annual 
real growth rate 
(in %) 
        x   
Non-manufacturing 
GDP, average annual 
real growth rate  
(in %) 
       x   
MVA per capita, in 
constant 1995 US$          x   
MVA as percentage 
of GDP at constant 
1995 prices 
       x   
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Table A9.4:   Availability of economic development indicators for  
   developing countries by selected sources 
Economic 
Development 
B
TI
 
A
fr
ob
ar
om
et
er
 
(A
B
) 
Ea
rth
 tr
en
ds
 
H
D
R
 
TI
 
M
D
G
 
U
N
C
TA
D
 
FA
O
 
U
N
ID
O
 
W
B
 
In
te
rn
at
. 
M
on
et
ar
y 
Fu
nd
 
(I
M
F)
 
Average annual real 
growth rates (ISIC 2-
digit level) 
        x   
Structure of MVA 
(ISIC 2-digit level)         x   
Value added and 
related indicators by 
industry, at current 
prices, selected years 
        x   
Employment, wages 
and related indicators 
by industry 
        x   
Apparent  
consumption         x   
Ratio of output to 
apparent consumption         x   
Imports as % of 
apparent consumption         x   
Exports as % of  
output         x   
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Table A9.5:   Availability of sustainable development indicators for  
   developing countries by selected sources 
Sustainable Development Earth trends HDR FAO ESI 
Traditional Fuel Consumption  
(% of total energy requirements)  x   
Electricity consumption per capita 
(kilowatt-hours) x x   
Carbon Dioxide Emissions  x   
○ Per capita (metric tons)  x   
○ Share of world total (%)  x   
Forests: Annual change in growing 
stock 1990–2005 x  x  
Change in extent of primary forest 
1990–2005 x  x  
Change in extent of forest and 
other wooded land 1990–2005 x  x  
Extent of forest and other wooded 
land 2005 x  x  
Land degradation: severity of  
human-induced degradation x  x  
Air Quality    x 
Biodiversity    x 
Land    x 
Water Quality    x 
Water Quantity    x 
Reducing Air Pollution    x 
Reducing Ecosystem Stress    x 
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Table A9.5:   Availability of sustainable development indicators for  
   developing countries by selected sources 
Sustainable Development Earth trends HDR FAO ESI 
Reducing Population Stress    x 
Reducing Waste & Consumption 
Pressures    x 
Reducing Water Stress    x 
Natural Resource Management    x 
Environmental Health    x 
Basic Human Sustenance    x 
Reducing Env.-Related Natural 
Disaster Vulnerability    x 
Environmental Governance    x 
Eco-Efficiency    x 
Private Sector Responsiveness    x 
Science and Technology    x 
International Collaborative Efforts    x 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions    x 
Reducing Transboundary  
Environmental Pressures    x 
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Table A9.6:   Availability of trade indicators for developing countries 
   by selected sources 
Trade 
Ea
rth
 tr
en
ds
 
H
D
R
 
M
D
G
 
Eu
ro
 st
at
 
U
N
C
TA
D
 
C
O
M
 
TR
A
D
E 
FA
O
 
U
N
ID
O
 
W
B
 
IM
F 
Proportion of total developed 
country imports (by value 
and excluding arms) from 
developing countries and 
from the least developed 
countries, admitted free of 
duty 
  x  x    x  
Average tariffs imposed by 
developed countries on 
agricultural products and 
clothing from developing 
countries 
  x  x    x  
Debt service as a percentage 
of exports of goods and 
services 
x x x      x x 
Imports    x  x x    
○ trade value    x  x x    
○ quantity    x  x x    
Exports    x  x x    
○ trade value    x  x x    
○ quantity    x  x x    
MFN Mean     x      
MFN Minimum     x      
MFN Maximum     x      
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Table A9.6:   Availability of trade indicators for developing countries 
   by selected sources 
Trade 
Ea
rth
 tr
en
ds
 
H
D
R
 
M
D
G
 
Eu
ro
 st
at
 
U
N
C
TA
D
 
C
O
M
 
TR
A
D
E 
FA
O
 
U
N
ID
O
 
W
B
 
IM
F 
NTM Incidence     x      
# of Tariff Lines     x      
Terms of Trade  x         
Imports of goods and 
services (% of GDP)  x       x  
Exports of goods and 
services (% of GDP)  x       x  
Merchandise Imports         x  
Merchandise Exports  x       x  
○ Primary Exports  x       x  
○ Manufactured Exports  x       x  
○ High-technology 
Exports  x       x  
Composition & Value of 
Trade in Industrial Goods 
(SITC-Rev.1) 
       x   
○ Percentage in total 
exports         x   
○ Percentage in total 
imports        x   
Trade balance (exports less  
imports)         x   
Ratio of trade balance to total 
trade        x   
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Table A9.7:   Availability of poverty and food security indicators for 
  developing countries by selected sources 
Poverty and Food Security Earth 
trends HDR MDG FAO WB 
Proportion of population below 
$1 purchasing power parity per 
day 
  x  x 
The poverty headcount ratio   x   
Poverty gap ratio (incidence 
multiplied by depth of poverty)   x  x 
Share of the poorest quintile in 
national consumption   x  x 
HDI x x    
○ Life expectancy at birth  x    
○ Adult literacy rate  x    
○ Combined gross enrolment 
ratio for primary, secondary 
and tertiary schools 
 x    
○ GDP per capita (PPP US$)  x   x 
Population below income poverty 
line (%)  x   x 
○ 1 US$ a day x x   x 
○ 2 US$ a day x x   x 
○ National Poverty Line x x   x 
○ urban/rural differentiation x    x 
Poverty Gap at 1$/2$ a day     x 
Births attended by skilled health 
personnel x x x   
Children under height for age x x    
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Table A9.7:   Availability of poverty and food security indicators for 
  developing countries by selected sources 
Poverty and Food Security Earth 
trends HDR MDG FAO WB 
Probability at birth of not 
surviving to age 40 (% of cohort)  x    
Inequalities  x    
○ Health (richest and poorest 
20% of total population)  x    
− Infant mortality rate  x   x 
− Under-five mortality rate  x   x 
○ Income and Expenditure  x   x 
○ Share of Income or 
Expenditure (Richest 10%, 
Richest 20%, Poorest 20 %, 
Poorest 10 %) 
x x   x 
○ Inequality measures  x    
− Richest 10 % to Poorest 
10 %  x    
− Richest 20 % to Poorest 
20 % x x    
− Gini Index x x   x 
○ Gender   x    
− GDI (Gender 
Development Index)  x    
− GEM (Gender 
Empowerment Measure) x x    
Percent of urban population living 
in slums x     
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Table A9.7:   Availability of poverty and food security indicators for 
  developing countries by selected sources 
Poverty and Food Security Earth 
trends HDR MDG FAO WB 
Estimated earned annual income, 
female (non-agricultural) x x   x 
Estimated earned annual income, 
male (non-agricultural) x x   x 
Lack of Durability of Housing x     
Prevalence of (moderately or 
severely) underweight children   x   
Proportion of the population 
below the minimum level of 
dietary energy consumption 
  x   
Consumption    x  
○ Quantity    x  
○ Dietary Energy    x  
○ Proteins (forthcoming)    x  
○ Fats (forthcoming)    x  
○ Total and per Capita    x  
Food Quality    x  
○ Contributions of 
Carbohydrates in total 
Dietary Energy Consumption
(%) 
   x  
○ Contributions of Fats in 
total Dietary Energy 
Consumption (%) 
   x  
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Table A9.7:   Availability of poverty and food security indicators for 
  developing countries by selected sources 
Poverty and Food Security Earth 
trends HDR MDG FAO WB 
○ Contributions of Proteins in 
total Dietary Energy 
Consumption (%) 
   x  
○ Minimum Dietary Energy 
Requirement 
(kcal/person/day) 
   x  
Undernourishment    x  
○ Number of undernourished 
Persons (millions)    x  
○ Population undernourished 
(% of total)  x  x  
Children under weight for age 
(% under age 5) x x    
HIV prevalence (% ages 15-49) x x    
Population without sustainable 
access to an improved water 
source (%) 
x x x   
Physicians (per 100,000 people) x x    
Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 
100,000 live births) x x    
Population without sustainable 
access to improved sanitation (%) x x    
Youth literacy rate  x    
Net primary enrolment ratio x x    
Net secondary enrolment ratio x x    
Children reaching grade five  x    
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Table A9.8:   Availability of official development assistance (ODA)  
  indicators for developing countries by selected sources 
ODA Earth 
trends HDR MDG OECD UNIDO 
Proportion of ODA 
provided to help build trade 
capacity 
  x x  
ODA Disbursements by    x x 
○ Recipient    x x 
○ Donor     x x 
○ Aid Type    x x 
○ Part    x x 
○ Amount Type    x x 
○ Year    x x 
ODA received  
(net disbursements) x x  x  
○ Total x x  x  
○ Per capita x x  x  
○ As % of GDP x x  x  
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Table A9.9:   Selected governance indicators for Tanzania  
  by selected sources 
Governance Earth trends 
World 
Bank BTI 
Freedom 
House HDR 
Democracy Status   6.5 (of 10)   
○ Political and Social 
Integration   
5.8 
(of 10)   
○ Stability of 
Democratic 
Institutions 
  6.0 (of 10)   
○ Rule of Law   
5.8 
(of 10)   
○ Political 
Participation   
7.0 
(of 10)   
○ Stateness   
7.8 
(of 10)   
Management Index   
5.9 
(of 10)   
○ Steering Capacity   5.7 (of 10)   
○ Resource Efficiency   4.7 (of 10)   
○ Consensus building   6.5 (of 10)   
○ International 
Cooperation   
8.7 (of 
10)   
Trend Democracy   +/-   
Political Rights 3 (Partly Free)   
3 (Partly 
Free)  
Civil Liberties 4 (Partly Free)   
4 (Partly 
Free)  
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Table A9.9:   Selected governance indicators for Tanzania  
  by selected sources 
Governance Earth trends 
World 
Bank BTI 
Freedom 
House HDR 
Public Sector 
Management and 
Institutions 
 
average 
3.8 
(of 6.0) 
   
○ Property Rights and 
Rule-based 
Governance 
 3.5 (of 6.0)    
○ Quality of 
Budgetary and 
Financial 
Management 
 4.5 (of 6.0)    
○ Efficiency of 
Revenue 
Mobilization 
 4.0 (of 6.0)    
○ Quality of Public 
Administration  
3.5 
(of 6.0)    
○ Transparency, 
Accountability and 
Corruption in the 
Public Sector 
 3.5 (of 6.0)    
Status of Major 
International Labour 
Rights Conventions 
(ratified, denounced) 
    
complet
ely 
ratified 
Public Expenditure  
(% of GDP)      
○ Health 2.4% (2003)    
2.4% 
(2003) 
○ Education 2.8% (1991)    
2.8% 
(1991) 
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Table A9.9:   Selected governance indicators for Tanzania  
  by selected sources 
Governance Earth trends 
World 
Bank BTI 
Freedom 
House HDR 
○ Military 1.1% (2004)    
1.1% 
(2004) 
○ Total Debt Service     1.1% (2004) 
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Table A9.11:   Selected sustainable development indicators for Tanzania
    by selected sources 
Sustainable Development Earth trends HDR FAO ESI 
Traditional Fuel 
Consumption (% of total 
energy requirements) 
 94.4%(2003)   
Electricity consumption 
per capita (kilowatt-hours) 
78 
(2003) 
78 
(2003)   
Carbon Dioxide Emissions     
○ Per capita (metric tons)  0.1 (2003)   
Forests: Annual change in 
growing stock 1990–2005 
-16400 
(2000-2005)  
-16400 
(2000-2005)  
Change in extent of forest 
and other wooded land 
1990–2005 
-1.1% 
(2000-2005)  
-1.1% 
(2000-2005)  
Extent of forest and other 
wooded land 2005 
39% 
(2005)  
39% 
(2005)  
Air Quality    -0,73 
Biodiversity    0.23 
Land    0.17 
Water Quality    -0.79 
Water Quantity    -0.29 
Reducing Air Pollution    0.80 
Reducing Ecosystem Stress    0.22 
Reducing Population Stress    -0.91 
Reducing Waste & 
Consumption Pressures    0.86 
Monitoring Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
German Development Institute 233 
Table A9.11:   Selected sustainable development indicators for Tanzania
    by selected sources 
Sustainable Development Earth trends HDR FAO ESI 
Reducing Water Stress    0.91 
Natural Resource 
Management    -0.25 
Environmental Health    -0.75 
Basic Human Sustenance    -1.08 
Reducing Env.-Related 
Natural Disaster 
Vulnerability 
   0.49 
Environmental Governance    -0.01 
Eco-Efficiency    0.93 
Private Sector 
Responsiveness    -0.12 
Science and Technology    -0.63 
International Collaborative 
Efforts    0.74 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions    0.91 
Reducing Transboundary 
Environmental Pressures    -0.61 
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Table A9.12:   Selected trade indicators for Tanzania by selected 
                         sources 
Trade Earth trends HDR MDG WB IMF 
Debt service as a 
percentage of exports of 
goods and services 
6.4%
(2004) 
6.4% 
(2004) 
6.4%
(2004)
6.4%
(2004)
6.4% 
(2004) 
Imports of goods and 
services (% of GDP)  
29% 
2004)  
29%
2004)  
Exports of goods and 
services (% of GDP)  
19% 
(2004)  
19%
(2004)  
Merchandise Exports      
○ Primary Exports  80% (2004)  
80%
(2004)  
○ Manufactured Exports  20% (2004)  
20%
(2004)  
○ High-technology 
Exports  
2% 
(2004)  
2% 
(2004)  
 
 
 
Table A9.13:   Selected poverty and food security indicators for 
   Tanzania by selected sources 
Poverty and Food Security Earth trends HDR MDG FAO WB 
Proportion of population 
below $1 purchasing power 
parity per day 
  57.8%(2000)  
57.8% 
(2000) 
Poverty gap ratio 
(incidence multiplied by 
depth of poverty) 
  20.7 (2001)  
20.7 
(2001) 
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Table A9.13:   Selected poverty and food security indicators for 
   Tanzania by selected sources 
Poverty and Food Security Earth trends HDR MDG FAO WB 
Share of the poorest quintile 
in national consumption   
7.3%
(2000)  
7.3% 
(2000) 
HDI 
0.430 
(of 1) 
0.430
(of 1)    
○ Life expectancy at birth  
46 years
(2000-
2005) 
   
○ Adult literacy rate  69.4%(2004)    
○ Combined gross 
enrolment ratio for 
primary, secondary and 
tertiary schools 
 48% (2004)    
○ GDP per capita (PPP 
US$)  674   674 
Population below income 
poverty line (%)      
○ 1 US$ a day 
57.8%
(1990-
2004) 
57.8%
(1990-
2004) 
  
57.8% 
(1990-
2004) 
○ 2 US$ a day 
89.9%
(1990-
2004) 
89.9%
(1990-
2004) 
  
89.9% 
(1990-
2004) 
○ National Poverty Line 
35.7%
(1990-
2003) 
35.7%
(1990-
2003) 
  
35.7% 
(1990-
2003) 
Births attended by skilled 
health personnel 
46% 
(1996-
2004) 
46% 
(1996-
2004) 
46%
(1996-
2004) 
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Table A9.13:   Selected poverty and food security indicators for 
   Tanzania by selected sources 
Poverty and Food Security Earth trends HDR MDG FAO WB 
Children under height  
for age 
44% 
(1996-
2004) 
44 
(1996-
2004) 
   
Probability at birth of not 
surviving to age 40  
(% of cohort) 
 
44.4%
(2000-
2004) 
   
Inequality measures      
○ Richest 10 % to  
Poorest 10 %  9.2    
○ Richest 20 % to  
Poorest 20 % 5.8 5.8    
○ Gini Index 34.6 (0- 100) 
34.6 
(0- 100)   
34.6 
(0- 100) 
Gender       
○ GDI (Gender 
Development Index)  
0.426
(of 1)    
○ GEM (Gender 
Empowerment Measure) 
0.597 
(of 1) 
0.597
(of 1)    
Percent of urban population 
living in slums 
92.1 %
(2001)     
Estimated earned annual 
income, female  
(non-agricultural) 
569 US$
PPP 
(2004) 
569 US$
PPP 
(2004) 
  
569 US$ 
PPP 
(2004) 
Estimated earned annual 
income, male  
(non-agricultural) 
781 US$
PPP 
(2004) 
781 US$
PPP 
(2004) 
  
781 US$ 
PPP 
(2004) 
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Table A9.13:   Selected poverty and food security indicators for 
   Tanzania by selected sources 
Poverty and Food Security Earth trends HDR MDG FAO WB 
Lack of Durability of  
Housing      
Prevalence of (moderately 
or severely) underweight 
children 
  
22%
(1996-
2004) 
  
Proportion of the population 
below the minimum level of 
dietary energy consumption 
  44%(2004)   
Consumption      
○ Quantity    
1960
(2002-
2004) 
 
○ Dietary Energy    
50 
(2002-
2004) 
 
Food Quality      
○ Contributions of 
Carbohydrates in total 
Dietary Energy 
Consumption (%) 
   
75%
(2002-
2004) 
 
○ Contributions of Fats in 
total Dietary Energy 
Consumption (%) 
   
15%
(2002-
2004) 
 
○ Contributions of Proteins 
in total Dietary Energy 
Consumption (%) 
   
10%
(2002-
2004) 
 
○ Minimum Dietary Energy 
Requirement 
(kcal/person/day) 
   
1810
(2002-
2004) 
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Table A9.13:   Selected poverty and food security indicators for 
   Tanzania by selected sources 
Poverty and Food Security Earth trends HDR MDG FAO WB 
Undernourishment      
○ Number of 
undernourished Persons 
(millions) 
   
16.4 
(2002-
2004) 
 
○ Population 
undernourished (% of 
total) 
 
44% 
(2001/
03) 
 
44%
(2001/
03) 
 
Children under weight for 
age (% under age 5) 
22% 
(1996-
2004) 
22% 
(1996-
2004) 
   
HIV prevalence (% ages 
15-49) 
6.5% 
(2005) 
6.5%
(2005)    
Population without 
sustainable access to an 
improved water source (%) 
38% 
(2004) 
38% 
(2004) 
38%
(2004)   
Physicians (per 100,000 
people) 
2 
(1990-
2004) 
2 
(1990-
2004) 
   
Maternal Mortality Ratio 
(per 100,000 live births) 
1500 
(2000) 
1500
(2000)    
Population without 
sustainable access to 
improved sanitation (%) 
47% 
(2004) 
47% 
(2004)    
Youth literacy rate  78.4%(2004)    
Net primary enrolment ratio 86% (2004) 
86% 
(2004)    
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Table A9.13:   Selected poverty and food security indicators for 
   Tanzania by selected sources 
Poverty and Food Security Earth trends HDR MDG FAO WB 
Net secondary enrolment 
ratio n.a. n.a.    
Children reaching grade 
five  
88% 
(2003)    
 
 
 
 
Table A9.14:   Selected official development assistance (ODA) indicators
    for Tanzania by selected sources 
ODA Earth trends HDR OECD 
ODA received  
(net disbursements) 
   
○ Total 1746 (2004) 1746 (2004) 1746 (2004) 
○ Per capita 46.4 (2004) 46.4 (2004) 46.4 (2004) 
○ As % of GDP 16.1 (2004) 16.1 (2004) 16.1 (2004) 
 
Key: 
Primary Data Source / obtained from National  
Statistical Authorities 
 
Secondary Data Source 
 
x 
x 
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Annex 10 Composition of the UNCTAD Trade and  
Development Index 
 
Dimensions Component Indicator 
Structural and 
institutional 
dimension 
Human capital Health expenditure p.c. (% GDP),  
Education expenditure p.c. (% GDP) 
 Physical infrastructure Paved roads ratio (of total roads), 
Air transport freight (million tonnes 
per km), Telephone mainlines per 
1000 population 
 Financial environment Domestic credit to private sector 
(% GDP) 
 Institutional quality Bureaucratic quality index (0-4 
scale), Corruption index (0-6 scale) 
 Economic structure Agriculture value added (% GDP) 
 Environmental  
sustainability 
Access to improved sanitation (%), 
Access to improved water (%), 
Energy use 
Trade policies and 
processes 
Openness to trade Applied trade-weighted average 
tariff (%) Share of lines with 
national peaks (%), Share of lines 
with international peaks (%), Share 
of lines with specific tariffs (%) 
 Effective foreign  
market access 
Applied trade-weighted average 
imposed by trade partners (%), Share 
of lines with domestic peaks in trade 
partners (%), Share of lines with 
international peaks in trade partners 
(%), Share of lines with specific 
tariffs by trade partners (%), 
Merchandise exports concentration 
index 
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Level of  
development 
Economic  
development 
GDP per capita, PPP constant 1995 
dollar 
 Social development Adult literacy rate (%),  Gross 
combined enrolment rate (%), life 
expectancy (years) 
 Gender development Share of GDP per capita, female to 
male; share of adult literacy rate, 
female to male; share of gross 
enrolment ratio, female to male; 
share of life expectancy rate, female 
to male 
Source: UNCTAD (2007) 
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Annex 11 Development benchmarks for EPA 
monitoring79 
The development benchmarks approach could provide an important analytical 
tool for addressing the difficulties inherent in designing an EPA-monitoring 
instrument. The idea of establishing benchmarks for sustainable development 
through a wide consultative process was first suggested by the ACP-EU Joint 
Parliamentary Assembly in 2002. It has recently been reiterated in various 
ACP Council declarations. 
The approach is based on the idea of setting development objectives (to be 
agreed by ACP and EU stakeholders) and comparing expectations with actual 
provisions in the agreement. Benchmarks are thus used as points of reference 
for assessing the progress of EPA negotiations towards the development goal 
they should serve. Two separate phases of the development benchmarks 
process should be distinguished. First, an appropriate set of sustainable 
development benchmarks is designed in a consultative or participatory manner. 
Definition of the set of benchmarks should be the responsibility of all involved 
local stakeholders to maximise credibility, transparency and ownership. 
Second, progress of EPAs is assessed relative to the earlier defined 
“development benchmarks”. 
The development benchmarks approach has a number of advantages. First, the 
benchmarks provide a tool for bridging different interpretations of the 
development dimension of EPAs and moving discussions forward on the 
content of the EPAs. Second, establishment of benchmarks on sustainable 
development clarify assumptions and values underlying the EPA-monitoring 
exercise. Third, the use of development benchmarks facilitates consensus on 
the exact definition of the specific objectives to be monitored. In broad lines, it 
could constitute an overall methodology for EPA monitoring, to be used 
throughout the ACP, with regional and country-specific identification and 
prioritisation of the specific goals to be evaluated.80 
                                                          
79  This Annex is based on the study by Bilal and Rampa (2006) and results from work and 
discussions of (other) initiatives around pro-development monitoring of EPAs. 
80  Researchers and CSOs interested in such a benchmark process have suggested that three sets 
of development benchmarks be developed to cover the main aspects of the new partnership 
agreements: market access, policy space and development resources. See ICTSD and 
APRODEV (2005). 
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According to some observers, a benchmarking exercise for pro-development 
monitoring would offer an opportunity to institutionalise for the first time a 
systematic assessment of how the economic, trade and development aspects of 
ACP-EU cooperation link together and complement each other in pursuit of 
the CPA objectives. This would therefore go beyond the simple monitoring 
function to be performed by one of the various institutions envisaged by an 
EPA agreement, to become a broader formal assessment of how the different 
dimensions of the ACP-EU partnership, the EPA-related interventions, and the 
various parts of an EPA agreement are linking with each other and 
contributing to poverty reduction and development. Such an approach would 
assign to monitoring a very central role, to be reflected both in an EPA legal 
text (principles, functions, scope, methods of monitoring and use of its results) 
and the steps to be taken after the signing of an agreement to make a 
monitoring system effective and fully operational. 
One proposal in this direction on the kind of EPA legal provisions needed to 
establish the principles and process for development benchmarks monitoring is 
reported here in the following Annex 12. This non-paper, emerging from work 
and discussions of initiatives around pro-development monitoring of EPAs 
(such as those initiated by ICTSD and APRODEV), proposes, for instance, to 
include provisions on monitoring not in a specific chapter or as part of the 
‘institutional provisions’ for EPA but as core part of a Chapter on 
Development. 
Another example of how to capture the concept of development benchmarks 
for the implementation phase of EPA was put forward in 2006 in the draft EPA 
text proposed by the Eastern & Southern Africa (ESA) region (ESA 2007). 
Article 19 (of the Free Movement of Goods Title) would be named 
‘Development Benchmarks and Review Clause’ and read: 
“1. The parties agree to regularly review progress in the implementation of this 
Title within the relevant institution and will propose as appropriate any 
remedial measures. 
2. Every five years the ESA-EU EPA Council shall undertake a formal and 
comprehensive review in order to: 
 i) assess the contribution of Parts XXXX and XXXX towards the achievement 
of development benchmarks as set out in annex XXXX which shall be derived 
from ESA national development programs; 
 ii) ascertain if the development benchmarks have been attained by the 
individual ESA countries as well as determine whether the Community’s trade 
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and development polices and assistance have contributed to individual ESA 
countries achieving the development benchmarks; 
 iii)  monitor policies and the release of resources towards financing activities 
aimed at building the ESA regional market based on the regional integration 
agendas. 
3. Not withstanding Article 14 (Tariff Elimination) of this agreement, in the 
event a specific country has not attained the development benchmarks, it may 
apply for the derogation of tariff reductions set out in this Title and make 
provisions for corrective measures. 
4. In the event that, after each review, the Community is not meeting its 
obligations under this agreement, it shall provide corrective measures”. 
In terms of the process to take place after the signing of an agreement to make 
monitoring operational, a useful approach (outlined in Chapter 7.2) could be to 
utilise ‘results chain analysis’ to monitor how EPA commitments (inputs) are 
being delivered, the associated impacts (outputs) and to identify gaps in the 
achievement of overall objectives for mitigating measures or policy changes. 
‘Development benchmarks’ would be the specific objectives to be monitored 
(for instance, diversification of exports) and ‘development milestones’ would 
be the EPA-induced policy actions and removal of impediments (including 
non-action) by both the EU and ACP countries that are necessary to make 
progress towards those goals (for example, tariff reduction by the EU and 
trade-facilitation reforms by the ACP). ‘Results chain analysis’ would then 
describe the sequence of such milestones and their direct and indirect outputs 
for different stakeholders in the process of achieving the development 
benchmarks. Using this approach, stakeholders participating in the exercise 
could identify thresholds indicating sufficient progress towards the 
‘benchmark’ and indicators for every ‘milestone’ in the results chain. The 
main focus of the monitoring exercise would be whether the results chain from 
EPA provisions (input) to EPA goals (desired impact) is implemented 
accordingly (through measurable thresholds and milestones). This would also 
strengthen mutual accountability, so that ACP and EU stakeholders could 
check whether actions are implemented, and this is not only a matter of agreed 
commitments whereby ACP and EU monitor each other only at government 
level. Such a methodology could be developed for different economic sectors, 
development dimensions or policy domains, and the type and level of details of 
the indicators vary accordingly. 
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Annex 12  Ideas for a simplified text on EPA provisions 
related to development strategies and         
processes for monitoring/benchmarking81  
Rationale 
A text establishing principles on indicators and development benchmarks 
which would be used to monitor progress of the EPAs, to be possibly 
introduced in a Chapter on Development. The text does not attempt to define 
indicators or benchmarks, a task which is too demanding and may not be 
feasible in a negotiating environment. 
Two sets of principles and suggestions for implementation are incorporated in 
the text: 
1st group of principles (Chapeaux and paragraph 1 in Box 1): 
− Conceptualises links between trade and development, and points to 
sustainable development strategies that trade rules should support (not 
hindering their implementation by means of reducing policy spaces) 
2nd group of principles (Paragraph 2 in Box 1): 
−  Establishes the agreed need for “monitoring” in the three dimensions 
(market access, supply side active policies / policy spaces, development 
resources: A4T*)82 
3rd suggestions for implementation (Paragraph 3 in Box 1): 
−  Independent agencies prepare proposals to be brought to a “joint body”, 
thus avoiding entanglements in technical issues on indicators and 
benchmarks. 
                                                          
81 This non-paper is the result of a consultative process on the need for a development 
monitoring of EPA and was compiled in April 2007 with the support of APRODEV and 
ICTSD. Its substance was also captured in a Note by the ACP Secretariat (2007). 
82  Related to Additional Resources for Development Support, two ideas are mainstreamed: a) 
No trade-offs between policy spaces and additional resources should be requested from 
developing countries; and b) additional funds to be contributed by the EU relate to 
overcoming supply side constraints and finance adjustment costs. They must be distinguished 
from EDF. 
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Principles in EPA text 
A text introducing principles on making trade rules supportive of development 
strategies, and monitoring progress of the EPAs based on development 
benchmarks. 
The parties recognise the positive role that the implementation of trade 
disciplines and measures in this agreement may play in supporting the ESA 
countries to achieve their sustainable development goals. Among the goals 
considered are those related to overcoming supply-side constraints and 
improving competitiveness; fostering equity and poverty reduction; ensuring 
environmental sustainability; and enhancing the participation of society at 
large in trade and development policy decisions. 
Therefore, the parties commit themselves to: 
1.  Apply all trade-related rules and disciplines in the agreement in a 
manner that enables (83) and supports the implementation of strategies 
and policies by ESA countries aiming at sustainable development 
objectives, such as: a) fostering innovation systems and developing 
domestic capabilities at regional, national and sub-national levels, to 
adapt, create and incorporate technological improvements84; b) creating 
and consolidating linkages between ESA exporting sectors and SME in 
the rest of the countries’ economies; c) making competitiveness policies 
responsive to the need of environmental sustainability and fostering the 
sustainable use of biodiversity in ESA countries’ exports; d) promoting 
and strengthening networks of micro-enterprises, informal economic 
actors and social actors in general (social capital) to help create 
opportunities and facilitate benefits generated by market reforms and 
trade liberalisation, ensuring that they reach the poor; e) enhancing 
human capital (education and health); f) ensuring the reduction of gender 
disparities and promoting equal opportunities for women and men to 
benefit from employment and trading opportunities; and g) ensuring 
                                                          
83  The concept of policy spaces, i.e. flexibilities in trade rules allowing for the implementation 
of these policies, is implicit in the text “in a manner that enables and supports the 
implementation…” 
84  Innovation systems and technological improvements should be subject to tight regulations of 
good standards of bio-safety regulations.   
Monitoring Economic Partnership Agreements 
 
German Development Institute 249 
effective participation of multiple stakeholders in policy formulation and 
in monitoring the attainment of development objectives; 
2. Jointly monitor progress in the implementation of the agreement and in 
the attainment of development objectives that may derive from it. On the 
basis of the monitoring process, the parties also agree to periodically 
review the results and produce recommendations for adjustments that 
would eventually help optimise the development outcomes. The 
monitoring and reviews will also cover the implementation of the trade-
supported strategies that the agreement would sustain (see paragraph 1), 
and will be based on qualitative as well as quantitative indicators and 
benchmarks that will be related to three categories: a) Effective 
enhancement by the EU of market access and fair treatment for ESA 
countries’ exports; b) overcoming capability constraints and improving 
competitiveness of ESA’s production sectors, including through the 
implementation of supply-side development policies which would 
eventually need flexibilities in trade rules; and c) EU contribution of 
additional resources for development, distinct from existing EDF, to 
facilitate institutional adjustments required for compliance with the EPA, 
as well as the implementation of supply-side policies that would be 
supported by the agreement (see paragraph 1); and 
3.  Agree on the benchmarks, indicators and detailed methodologies to be 
used in the monitoring and review processes within a period of NN days 
after having signed the agreement, and initiate the corresponding 
processes immediately after. To this end, an advisory group integrated by 
trade and development experts from independent organisations (e.g. UN-
ECA; UNCTAD; WB; OECD; UNDP) will be commissioned with the 
preparation of a detailed proposal on benchmarks, indicators and 
procedures for the monitoring and review processes, which will be 
brought to the consideration of (a joint body of) the parties within a 
period of XX days after having signed the Agreement. 
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Annex 13  Benchmarking for pro-development  
monitoring of the negotiation and  
implementation of an ESA-EU EPA − 
Tanzania’s experience 
Presented at the ECDPM-CUTS-FES workshop in Nairobi on 23-24 April 
2007, by  Agnes G. Mwakaje, Institute of Resource Assessment, 
University of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania 
Introduction 
Tanzania belongs to the SADC region of EU-ACP negotiations. Issues already 
agreed in principal during the meeting of SADC-EPA states ministers of trade 
held in Gaborone on 29 March 2004. The ministers agreed on institutional 
mechanisms for negotiations and appointed coordinators for the negotiations 
on different subjects under EU-SADC EPA negotiations. Members states 
agreed in the light of the EPA process, which needs expertise, consistency and 
well coordinated mechanisms to establish a three tier structure incorporating 
− the National EPA Technical Team (NETT), 
− the senior officials at permanent secretariat and ambassador level and, 
− the ministerial level. 
Seven major subjects were agreed for SADC-EPA negotiations and were divided 
among member states to lead negotiations. Tanzania was given three subjects, 
namely trade in services, investment and competition policy (see Annex 3); 
Angola (agriculture and fisheries); Botswana (standards); Lesotho (database, 
rules of origin, legal provisions, institutional arrangements; Mozambique (non 
agricultural market access and fisheries-industrial aspects); Namibia (trade 
facilitation and development cooperation); and Swaziland (trade issues). 
Experiences of Tanzanian in the process of coming up with development 
benchmarks for monitoring EPAs 
The process of developing benchmarks was started by the two-day workshop 
organised by DIE (German Development Institute) and FES (Tanzania). Day 
one of the workshop was a presentation by DIE staff. Two issues were 
presented under monitoring of economic partnership agreements, as follows:  
− Methodological challenges and approaches 
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− Issues and questions 
a. Methodological challenges and approaches 
Here the issue was what approaches should be used in developing benchmarks 
for monitoring EPAs. 
− Quantitative/qualitative, 
− Participatory (subjective)/hard data (objective), 
− Mixed approaches/triangulation, 
− Uniform across countries/individual and /or in-depth. 
b. Methodological approaches employed for monitoring 
It was stated that, with few exceptions, all monitoring approaches use a form 
of causal chain analysis CCA (also: impact chain analysis) CCA, sometimes 
considered part of a logical framework. 
Other methods such as most significant change are mainly employed for ex 
post evaluation of projects on local/regional level 
Benchmarks development for Tanzania’s EPA negotiations 
Benchmarks for Tanzania’s economy were based on three major economic 
sectors: 
− Agriculture, 
− Industry and  
− Natural resources (tourism and fish industry). 
a. Agriculture 
Tanzania is one of the least developed countries (LDCs). The country has a per 
capita GDP of $ 210. The Tanzanian economy depends on agriculture, which 
accounts for over 50% of its GDP. The sector provides 75% of exports and 
employs about 85% of the total work force. Tanzania's GDP growth rate, 
currently at 4.9%, has averaged 3.5% for the past four decades, with 
population growing at an average of 3% per year, consequently registering a 
per capita increase of 0.7%. 
Agriculture is the main source of food supply and raw materials for the 
industrial sector, as well as the major market for industrial goods and services. 
The sector produces and exports value added products such as textiles, 
processed coffee and tea, sisal ropes, paper and chemical products. Cash crops, 
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including coffee, tea, cotton, cashew, sisal, cloves, and pyrethrum, account for 
the vast majority of export earnings. The volume of all major crops - both cash 
and goods, which have been marketed through official channels - have 
increased over the past few years, but large amounts of produce never reach 
the market. Poor pricing and unreliable cash flow to farmers continue to 
frustrate the agricultural sector. 
b. Manufacturing industry 
The manufacturing industry is a very important sector in the economy. In 
Tanzania, domestic manufactures substitute imported goods and in turn save 
foreign exchange that would otherwise have been used to import the same. 
More important, industrial sector employment accounts for about 18% of total 
wage employment and remains the largest single source of urban employment 
in the country. The sector also facilitates the development of other sectors of 
the economy through supply and demand relationships. 
During the period between 1991 and 1995, industrial production growth rates 
averaged 1.0% per annum. However, industrial production started to pick-up in 
the period between 1996 and 1999, where growth rates averaged 5.3% per 
annum. The GDP contribution of the manufacturing sector, however, declined 
from 8.7% in 1991 to only 8.3% in 1999, mainly because of unstable power 
supply and economic liberalisation measures, notably the restructuring of the 
parastatal sector, implemented by the Parastatals Sector Reform Commission 
(PSRC). This move greatly enhanced private sector investment and 
participation. Notable improvements were recorded in the production of beer, 
wheat flour, pyrethrum extract, cement, aluminium products and dry cells. 
Total manufacturing production in 1999 increased by 16.5%. However, low 
production was recorded in biscuits, konyagi, cigarettes, sisal twine and ropes, 
fishnets, petroleum products and dry cells, due to shortage of working capital. 
Foreign exchange shortages and mismanagement continue to deprive factories 
of much-needed spare parts and have reduced factory capacity to less than 
30%. 
c. Fishing 
Tanzania's potential fish resources are promising in both marine and 
freshwater fishing as well as in aquaculture. Tanzania is endowed with natural 
water bodies located on every side of the country's borders. In the north is 
Lake Victoria, the largest in Africa (51%). Nile perch (sangara) has been very 
popular for fish fillets currently exported to the EU member countries and 
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other markets. The export of fish fillets has significantly boosted Tanzania's 
exports to overseas markets. In 1999 fish fillets accounted for 9.6% of total 
export earnings. The Indian Ocean surrounds the country along the East Coast 
strip from north to south. Export of fishery products from the Indian Ocean has 
been increasing due to the increasing level of overseas investment. 
The annual yield in fresh water fishing is about 307,105 metric tonnes, while 
that of coastal fisheries is around 51,669 metric tones. This figure excludes the 
Exclusive Economic Zone, which has substantial fish resources that are 
unexploited. The total potential yield is around 780,000 metric tones, and this 
clearly indicates that very little of the production potential is being exploited. 
The contribution of the fisheries sector to the economy must be seen in  the 
provision of food, employment opportunities and foreign exchange earnings. 
The industry consists of artisanal fishermen deploying traditional methods, 
only 0.4% of whom are modern industrial/commercial fishermen or 
entrepreneurs. Fish products from both the inland water bodies and from the 
Indian Ocean accounted for 11.3% of total Tanzanian exports in 1999. On 
average, fishing contributed about 2.9% of GDP, and its performance in 1999 
indicated growth of 3.1% per annum. 
The meaning of development benchmarks of EPAs in the Tanzania context 
The workshop started out with a brainstorming session on what benchmarks 
would be appropriate for monitoring EPAs. The poverty reduction strategy, 
widely known as Mkukuta, was used as the basis for these benchmarks for 
monitoring. MKUKUTA is a Kiswahili acronym for the National Strategy for 
Growth and Reduction of Poverty. This strategy is the development framework 
for the current five year phase (2005-2010). It forms part of Tanzania’s efforts 
to deliver on its national Vision 2025 and the MDGs. The overall agenda of 
Mkukuta is to reduce income and non-income poverty. The focus is outcome 
oriented and organised around three clusters: 
Cluster 1: Growth and reduction of income poverty 
Cluster 2: Improved quality of life and social well-being and 
Cluster 3: Governance and accountability 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper provides a coherent framework for 
Tanzania’s poverty reduction efforts. It provides an opportunity to adopt a 
more systematic approach to monitoring and evaluating the impact of 
Tanzania's fight against poverty. This approach will help to ensure that the 
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targets set in the strategy are met and that progress is made towards the 
ambitious goals of the National Poverty Eradication Strategy. 
Indicators for measuring the development objectives effect of EPAs 
Agriculture 
− Agriculture value added per worker  
− Cereal yield  
− Growth in agricultural value added  
− Agricultural policy costs index  
− Crop production index  
− Livestock production index  
− Volume of exports 
− Volume of imports 
− Intervention considered: goods trade (Tariffs Rules of Origin TBT) 
Reduction and elimination of tariffs and NTBs in Tanzania will lead to larger 
intra-export (regionally) increases than exports to the rest of the world. 
Agriculture intra-imports and non-agricultural intra-imports will increase. In 
Tanzania this will mean change in production patterns which may lead to 
negative production but may have positive consumption impacts. 
Reduction and elimination of tariffs and NTBs in other member countries, e.g. 
EAC or SADC, will have positive impacts on agricultural and non-agricultural 
intra-exports. Within the region this will mean increased agricultural GDP, 
production and change in trade patterns. 
This outcome will enhance integration of trade in the SADC/EAC economy. 
This will also mean enhanced international integration and enhanced economic 
growth. Overall, this may lead to improved living standards. 
On the other hand, reduction and elimination tariffs and NTBs may lead to less 
tariff revenue, reduced government budget income and affect the country’s 
GDP. Again, there may be reductions in production that may further affect the 
economy of Tanzania. 
Fish Industry 
One intervention considered for the fish industry was Aid for Trade and this 
may result in: 
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− Increased support for hygiene standards, 
− Regional trade integration 
− Expand fish markets in the region 
− Easy access to EU markets 
Possible quantitative impact indicators for the fish industry 
A. Positive impacts 
 i. Job creation indicators 
− Number of fishermen employed in the fishing sector 
ii. Commercial fishing indicators 
− Number of fishing ships and processing factories 
− Data on fishing capacities 
− Trade volumes overall (locally, regionally and EU) 
iii. Increased support for hygiene standards - indicators 
− Expenses in investment, capacity building 
− Share of fish export rejected 
− Number of fish in metric tones per year in commercial fishing 
B. Negative impacts 
i Loss of subsistence livelihoods - indicators 
− Number of subsistence fishermen over time - MNRT 
− Statistics on traditional fishing boats  - MNRT, LG 
− Change of eating habits - level of protein in diets (surveys) 
ii. Overfishing indicators 
− Annual fishing statistics by MNRT, LG 
− Number of subsistence fishermen over time - MNRT 
− Statistics on traditional fishing boats - MNRT, LG 
C. Some proposed measures for negative impacts 
i. Over exportation 
− Adopt quota system per country/region 
− Import checks from EU points, 
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ii. Loss of subsistence livelihoods 
− Increase fish farming 
Other Factors with similar impacts 
− Demand from outside the EU 
− Population increase (overexploitation) 
− Increased demand locally (overexploitation - reduced export), 
− Disease outbreaks (human, animals) 
− Social, political instability 
Manufacturing Industry: Benchmarks for Monitoring indicators 
Growth in company sales overtime, Proportion of growth of large firms over 
time, Change of technology in manufacturing over time, Growth of export 
manufacturing, Ratio of export to production, Export of primary goods, 
Consumption of local goods, FDI, Labour productivity, Industry productivity. 
Progress in the process of developing benchmarks and a process for 
monitoring EPAs 
Comparative benchmarking is the main tool used to evaluate each indicator. 
The analysis draws on several criteria rather than using a single mechanical 
rule. The starting point is a comparison of performance in Tanzania itself, 
Tanzania relative to the region, i.e. SADC/EAC. For added perspective, two 
other comparisons are examined: (1) Sub-Saharan Africa and the global 
average. 
Challenges in the process that countries and stakeholders need to be 
aware of in the process. 
For the case of Tanzania 
− Tanzania falls under SADC and East Africa. It is not clear how the 
agreements of Kenya and Uganda in COMESA will affect Tanzania’s 
negotiations in the SADC region. 
− It is unclear to what extent the EPA negotiations will address the 
PSRP/Mkukuta goals. 
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Generally 
− The potential trade creation and trade diversion effects from the EPA 
negotiations.  
− Capacity to develop and monitor benchmark indicators 
− Revenue implications of the EPA 
EPA is likely to lead to significant revenue losses for most of the ACP 
countries, and particularly for the SADC countries, for which trade revenues 
constitute a significant proportion of total revenue. In the ECOWAS region, it 
is only Nigeria that recorded increased import tariff revenue, while many other 
lost (ibid.) 
Conclusion 
It is very likely that there will be more loss of import revenue for many ACP 
countries, and these should therefore be clearly explained in the monitoring 
process. 
Survival of the sub-regional economy under the EPA requires purposeful 
adjustment in the main productive sectors of the economies.  
Capacity to implement EPA benchmarks for monitoring indicators will be a 
challenge for many ACP countries. 
How these impacts could be minimised and how the issue of capacity building 
should be addressed should clearly be an important goal of the EPA 
negotiations on benchmark development and monitoring. 
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Towards a Monitoring System for the ACP-EU Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPAs): 
A joint project by the German Development Institute (DIE) 
and the European Centre for Development Policy  
Management (ECDPM) 
The German Development Institute (DIE) and the European Centre for 
Development Policy Management (ECDPM) will jointly elaborate options to 
monitor the implementation and impacts of EPAs, in a project partly funded by 
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(BMZ). More specifically, the project aims at: 
− developing a flexible set of methods to monitor the implementation of 
EPAs and the impacts of key policies and measures related to EPAs with 
regards to development goals 
− identifying other key factors that will affect the achievement of the EPA 
objectives and 
− exploring options for the procedural integration of an EPA-monitoring 
system in the EPA implementation process (design, implementation, 
analysis and use). 
The project will adopt a highly participatory approach, encouraging various 
ACP and EU stakeholders (negotiators, officials, policy makers, experts, and 
civil society and private sector actors) to provide input into this project. In a 
pilot phase, national participatory workshops will also be organised with 
potential users of the monitoring system in Southern and Eastern Africa. The 
objectives are to identify the key policies and sectors to be monitored and to 
help develop appropriate mechanisms to assess the implementation and impact 
of EPA provisions. This will include the identification of an appropriate 
monitoring process, causal links, indicators as well as sources of data and 
information. 
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If you would like to share your views on possible monitoring systems for 
EPAs, or if you wish more information on this joint DIE-ECDPM project, 
please contact: 
 
DIE 
Michael Brüntrup michael.bruentrup@die-gdi.de tel: +49 228 94927-164 
 
ECDPM 
Sanoussi Bilal sb@ecdpm.org tel: +31 43 350 29 00 
www.ecdpm.org/trade/epamonitoring 
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